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ABSTRACT
The Indian pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical sectors have been characterised by three features
considered analogous to technological stagnation: low R&D investments, "copying" on-patent drugs
(legal in India if a novel process is found) and manufacturing off-patent, generic drugs. Yet, some firms
are innovating in drug discovery and development and the total number of firms is among the most
numerous and export-oriented in the developing world.
This dissertation looks at patterns of technological capabilities using sector-wide indicators and firm-level
cases in synthetic and biological pharmaceuticals. Common explanations for the sectoral capabilities are
the country's process patent regime. However, a more detailed analysis shows this cannot be the sole
cause. Although the patent regime was critical in helping firms develop skills early on, their process
capabilities were honed by a variety of selection environments, of which the patent regime was one type.
There were at least three distinct selection environments and at least three broad types of associated
learning. The findings of external environmental influence and selection do not weaken the importance of
national policy, far from it. However, studies that assign explanatory power for the sectors' advance
entirely to national patent policies or rational firms miss the significance of the Indian story to date. The
research also shows that there is scope for broadening debates on public health medicines to address
technological learning opportunities in developing countries.
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Introduction
1.1 The puzzle-Indian innovations
Rapid advances in the biological and computational sciences have created immense new scientific and
commercial possibilities across the globe. While a few advanced countries generated many of these
innovations at the outset, a sturdy group of developing countries such as India, Brazil, South Africa
and Egypt, has been exploiting these opportunities. However, India alone in the developing world has
a pharmaceutical industry marked by intense competition, local ownership and export reach. This
industry growth has occurred while other developing countries have struggled to build their
capabilities and while their advantages, if any, have shrivelled against an onslaught of foreign firms
entering their domestic markets.
This dissertation is concerned with economic development as viewed through a lens of industrial
capabilities, technological learning and models of innovation. Learning and technological learning are
used here inter-changeably to mean the dynamics of coping with both mature and new technologies.
The technologies may be new to the firm in question, if not to the world (Schmookler, 1966, Nelson,
1992, Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993). Technological learning may involve both technical and non-
technical components.! The dissertation uses a definition of innovation as "the processes by which
firms master and get into practice product design and manufacturing processes that are new to them
whether or not they are new to the universe, or even to the nation" (Nelson, 1992, p. 349).
Squeezed from above by technological innovations in advanced industrialised countries and from
below by low-wage competitors, firms in developing economies are forced to reconsider their path of
learning 2. Technology transfer has been shown to be inherently difficult and costly, forcing these firms
and their governments to develop (and some have developed) strategies to learn "differently".
Technological change is speeding up in some sectors. In particular, the pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical industries are generally viewed as advancing technologically (at the "frontier") in
IThe former may entail process chemistry and engineering, toxicology or clinical expertise, for example, while
the latter requires the building of capabilities such as that involved in learning to file patents or drug applications
in a different country or establishing marketing linkages abroad.
2 From here on, "developing" will be used to describe countries that are not advanced industrialised ones.
"Advanced" or "developed" countries will be taken to mean advanced industrialised countries or those roughly
coinciding with member states of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This
reflects broad statistical categories of industrial composition and per capita incomes. They may hide institutional
or micro-level similarities and differences between the two broad sets of countries or within them.
developed countries, and being largely stagnant in developing ones or competing on low-costs alone.
Although developing countries do depend on advanced industrialised ones for access to products and
tools, the evidence is still mixed whether there are opportunities for these countries to break away and
create their own indigenous capabilities. There is little consensus on how these opportunities might
arise and little systematic study into the conditions under which technological learning occurs.
The examination of the conditions under which India built a dynamic pharmaceutical and burgeoning
biopharmaceutical sector, provides us some unique clues about challenges to drug discovery,
development and manufacturing in a developing country. While the pharmaceutical industry arose
from conditions of governmental protections that seemed unsustainable as the economy opened in the
1980s, it has evolved into one of the most dynamic of India's industries.
In the early 1900s India's first pharmaceutical company was incorporated. From there, onward to the
1970s, Indian companies were written off as "pirates" and "merely copycats". In the late 1990s, Indian
companies were filing applications for New Chemical Entities in US markets and receiving patents. In
Indian biopharmaceuticals, companies have made some impressive strides from "biogenerics" to
vaccines. However, the learning is not uniform, and not all companies have become innovative.
A definition of innovation as a product or process new to the world market creates a puzzle. While the
industry is both competitive and growing rapidly, it has been characterised in the past by three features
which were considered analogous to relative technological stagnation: (a) low R&D investments,
(b)"copying" on-patent drugs (legal in India if novel process is demonstrated) and (c) manufacturing
generic, off-patent drugs. None of these features is characteristic of the conventional view of
technological advancement and innovative firms. Why were Indian firms able to compete successfully
in the world pharmaceutical market when they had neither proprietary technologies at the outset, nor
always the lowest of wages worldwide? Why were they able to prosper when they lack the
characteristics and environment that has typified success in the US and other advanced industrial
countries, such as high R&D spending, or supporting institutions, such as venture capital? Why were
some Indian firms, and not others, able to innovate and prosper? While Indian firms have innovated
and patented processes for much longer than products, a small number of Indian firms has innovated
(in the conventional industry sense) through New Chemical Entities (NCEs) and by filing for an
3 Throughout the various chapters, patents will be only one marker for innovation. Others will be expert
evaluations in interviews and those products that immediately attract alliances for R&D and/or marketing.
increasing number of patents in the US and worldwide. Some firms are also developing bio-
pharmaceutical drugs, which provide a new opportunity for developing countries with relatively
advanced manufacturing skills. In particular, it's advancement is set against a rich policy backdrop,
most publicised of which is the lack of a product patent regime (only process patents are allowed and
for a relatively short 5-7 year period), which facilitated Indian-owned firms to achieve an enviable
foothold against multinational companies in the domestic market. The process patent regime
encouraged Indian firms to seek new ways to make drugs since the technique could be patented, but
not the end product.
The debates surrounding pharmaceuticals in developing countries has centered on two related themes:
intellectual property rights-particularly product patents, and the place of foreign (Western) firms as
innovators. Current explanations for Indian advance are structured along the same line: they lay its
success at the door of the country's intellectual property (process patent-only) regime, multinational
companies, or its low costs. Certainly, low costs have been an important explanatory variable, but
cannot explain why Indian firms have succeeded relative to other countries also competing on low
costs, such as China, Egypt or Brazil, which have strong sectors, but do not appear to have the same
density or export reach. Secondly, although other developing countries have had a similar IP regime,
Indian pharmaceuticals have emerged as the undisputed leader in sheer numbers of competing
manufacturing firms. Furthermore, while many advanced industrialized countries also had the same IP
regime until very recently, they have been unable to either build the number or vertical integration of
Indian companies. Thus, why India? The more enlightened explanations are still insufficient: they tend
to depend too heavily on explanations of successful policies. However, these explanations do not
explain why Indian companies did so well; after all, many other developing countries had similar
policies, as did many industrialised countries.
The dissertation shifts the focus to capabilities-based development over time. The central hypothesis
explored in this dissertation is that process development capabilities, not the process patent regime or
low costs alone, were at the heart of Indian advance. The term "Process Capability" will be used
throughout to refer to the capability within a company of developing a viable manufacturing method
4 In chemicals and pharmaceuticals, history suggests that many older firms in today's advanced industrialised
countries indulged in industrial espionage and "copying" of products and processes during other patent regimes.
Most present day success stories arose in large part by this ability. But the rules for developing economies have
changed; pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals have become characterised as a secretive, product-based,
patent-protected industry
for a given proposed (product) outcome. In the pharmaceutical industry, process capabilities usually
refer to process research, laboratory to factory scale-up and manufacture. This dissertation limits the
focus here to include the skills of process chemistry and process engineering (including
biotechnologies) related to the development of a viable manufacturing routine.' Those companies that
discover drugs but cannot develop and manufacture them for commercial scale and speed, face
considerable disadvantages.
The approach of this dissertation is to explicitly analyse the technological basis for advancement and
to address developments from the. 1950s to the present day against a backdrop of Indian and
international changes. It attempts to contribute to an analysis of the innovation environment, which
elements firms internalise and what dynamic motive force propels some firms forward. Furthermore,
most economic analyses of pharmaceutical firms has been in advanced industrialised countries,
particularly the US and UK, where generic drugs are seen as mature segments warranting little
attention and the predominant focus is on 'blockbuster' drugs or more broadly, drug discovery. The
impact of generic drugs has primarily been explained away as easy revenue streams because of the
presumed ease of producing drugs that are off patent and codified.
The Indian case provides some instructive points. While the time from inception of the industry to the
time of novel processes and product innovation has not been dramatically short by the standards set by
the Asian "Tigers", the strength of the its lessons arise from the rich diversity of learning pathways in
a single industry alone. This research focuses on the following specific aspects of technological
advance: Why is the type of innovation (product or process) important? Is there a clear sequence from
"imitation to innovation? How do government policies act to assist such advance? Some thought for
policy is certainly called for: despite the impressive technological base of the industry and the rosy
picture for some of its leading firms, most still lack (a) the ability to finance and conduct drug-
discovery research compared to the US and other advanced industrialised countries (b) experience (in
numbers of years and numbers of products) in applying newer biotechnologies in drug development
and, perhaps more fundamentally, (c) the institutional environment to support innovation at enterprise
and national level.
5 Other capabilities linked to the production process such as inventory management are not included, important
though these may be in other settings. The categorisation of process capabilities used here differentiates
technological skills from complementary skills, such as legal and regulatory strategies or marketing and
distribution networks.
1.2 Scope and Structure of dissertation
The dissertation is an indirect product of several years of interest and research on economic
development, innovation and health. This research tracks specific learning modes across two broad
technological categories within industries associated with drug discovery, development and
manufacture. The localised flavour of innovation arises from the choice of study of two southern
Indian cities set against a common national policy backdrop. The data for this project includes over 50
detailed face-to-face interviews and phone and email communications with some of the nation's
leading pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical firms, some of its best scientists, engineers and
entrepreneurs (many of whom have also been involved in recent policy making) and situated in two of
its most technologically dynamic cities, Bangalore and Hyderabad. Some interviewees were located
abroad, including some experts for informal assessments of firms. The data has been sourced from the
standard primary and archival sources including academic journals, government reports, books, trade
publications, company reports, analyst and investment reports, stock exchange filings and industry
association, newspaper and magazine articles and interviews.
The intersection of studies on technological capabilities and developing countries is a sufficiently rich
one that this dissertation can address only some facets of the subject. For example, it does not attempt
to engage with elements of Indian advance such as infrastructure (better ventilation or refrigeration),
production-related logistics (how different plants are connected, inventory management, or whether
factory teams are made up of 25 or 50 or people) and informational improvements (such as faster
computers, better Internet and telephone links between factory and laboratory). Moreover, although
the paucity of drugs relevant to developing country populations such as drugs for malaria, tuberculosis
or AIDS, is a distressing and urgent matter, this dissertation will not directly address this topic.6
This dissertation is structured as follows:
The current Chapter 1 Introduction, is followed by Chapter 2: A Review of the Literature and
introduces the key concepts of technological learning and its link to economic development. The
subsequent sections are primarily concerned with the theoretical dimensions of technological learning
as described by firm-level studies, national capabilities and the role of public policy in development.
6 Thus, although some of the Indian firms profiled have been criticised for profit making from drugs relevant
primarily for advanced industrialised countries, this research will not question this strategy choice. Perhaps the
understanding of how firms learn will make us understand the conditions under which drugs for common
illnesses will be pursued. I hope that more firms, once established more securely in world markets, will choose to
focus their considerable capabilities on pressing local health needs. Indeed, some already do.
Chapter 3 Research Design and Methodology provides the logic of the specific methods chosen and
focuses on two samples of firms (in pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals), relying on extensive
primary and secondary data to shape the analysis. Chapter 4 Trouble in the Making: Process
Development and Manufacturing, presents detailed firm and industry data in Indian
pharmaceuticals, and discusses the different core elements of how Indian firms advanced. It lays out
the elements of the early environment and analyses manufacturing capabilities and the policies that
induced firms to invest and upgrade in core segments. Chapter 5 Learning by Proving through
Process Development explores the external environment that defines the pharmaceutical industry and
the regulations surrounding drug development and manufacture, marketing and distribution. Indian
firms have especially well grasped the basics of how to "prove" their quality in cGMP standards, but
have also learnt to grapple with filing speed and patent challenges. International procurement policies
have also been critical. Chapter 6, Beyond Manufacturing: The Rise of Indian
biopharmaceuticals, studies cases of biopharmaceutical firms from the two Southern Indian cities of
Bangalore and Hyderabad, where manufacturing capacity has been central to their story of learning
and experimentation, but manufacturing alone is insufficient to advance with new technologies. The
chapter explores the challenges that these firms face and the uncertainties regarding regulation. Thus,
more mature segments such as public health vaccines have provided an avenue for experimentation.
Chapter 7 Analysis and Synthesis, returns to the major themes of product maturity and learning
environment, to show how selection environments acted in varied ways from the 1950s to create
today's industry and allowed for some types of innovative skills to develop. It emphasises the link
between public health and technological learning and provides some implications for policy.
Chapter 2 A Review of the Literature
2.1.Learning to develop: Industrial Evolution and technological learning
There are important analytical and policy reasons to model how innovation, technological learning and
building capabilities takes place in developing economies, where firms are constrained by other low
cost competitors at one end and high-technology competitors at another.' The debates of economic
development that concern technology are diverse, but they rest on some common assumptions: that
there is a limited amount of invention in the classical sense taking place in developing countries i.e.
first introduction worldwide of a concept of product, and most efforts are concentrated among mature
products, that appropriability conditions, specifically intellectual property rights, define innovation
origins and that preferred vehicles of development in technologically complex industries are foreign
firms. Moreover, much policy has been supply-oriented with a limited understanding of the demand-
side of the equation that generates learning at firm level and industry-wide.
The approach taken in this research is akin to that of the National Systems of Innovation (NSI or
National Innovation Systems, NIS) literature, which has gained currency since the late 1980s
(Freeman 1987, Lundvall 1988). This NIS is seen to be the backdrop to diverse factors, some intended,
others outside the scope of policy, against which firms innovate. There is some concept how national
and other influences, both institutional and organisational, blend together to create a 'system' of
innovation. From a policy standpoint, the NIS is an ex-ante, not ex-post concept (Arocena and Sutz,
2000), such that although technical innovation exists, it may require intention and policy action to
create other factors to nurture or further the innovation, scale of innovation, or extent of regional
spread of innovation. In "systems of innovation", the explanation for innovation rest in the abilities of
societies to generate "systems" of learning that are the basis of development. 2 An innovation system is
defined broadly to consist of units, agents and relationships that interact together to produce new and
economically valuable knowledge. The "system" then comprises firms together with non-market
institutions of which the public sector organisations of various kinds are a part (see Lundvall, 1988). A
' Economic development literature has presented multiple explanations for why technological gaps exist between
advanced industrialised and 'developing' countries. Ever since Solow (1957) attributed the residual for
productivity growth in the US economy to technical productivity enhancements, and Denison (1967) there has
been an abiding interest in how to describe and disaggregate the sources of this technical change. Growth theory
has highlighted the importance of endogenous technical change.
2 Lundvall (1985) discusses 'innovation system', but without reference to the nation; Freeman (1987) discusses
the national characteristics for the first time in studying Japan's growth. Although not explicitly mentioned as
such, "national" characteristics were nevertheless implied in the works of Richard Nelson and others contrasting
the US's S&T system with others.
caveat is necessary: some mappings of such systems do not translate easily to developing countries
(see Arocena and Sutz, 2000), but do provide a framework for thinking, particularly in countries where
national, more centralised planning history has been prevalent. While the public sector is by no means
the only thrust behind firms' ability to compete, one useful way to integrate these often-
complementary approaches is to grapple with how and when institutions like government play a role
in endogenous science-based expertise and influence the ways in which geographic and social spaces
of innovation as well as specific organizations evolve. Subsequent iterations of this literature looked at
different scales and units of analyses-for example, regional systems of innovation (Cooke, 1996,
Maskell and Malmberg, 1999) and technological and sectoral systems of innovation (Carlsson and
Stankiewicz, 1991, Malerba 1992, Breschi and Malerba, 1997). Systems that "work," allow countries
(and their firms) to grasp new technologies, adapt them, or generate new versions at home. Thus, for
those smoothly running, closely intertwined and highly adaptable systems of innovation, both
incremental and more dramatic technological changes are possible. Efficiency is not taken to be
analogous to rigidity, and organisations and the institutions that bind such "systems" are used to
explain economic development itself, not innovation alone. The primary thrust of such approaches
rests in learning (and specifically technological learning) at the heart of economic change.
But what type of learning assists entire economies? How can we think of the variation in learning
across institutions and organisations, and over time? Overall, the economic literature refers to three
different types of learning situated in production experience: The first, learning-by-doing through
changing the production environment and increasing efficiency of capital/production systems (Arrow,
1962, also interpretations of Nelson and Winter, 1982) occurs primarily as a matter of course in
production without necessarily any deliberative attempts by firms to increase their knowledge stock.
On the other hand, there can be more deliberative forms of search, involved with the exploration of the
scientific/technical space (universities or other non-profit research labs) or that subset associated with
profitable activities (the firm being the obvious actor, which conducts R&D). In this sense, countries
that can transform their learning institutions and mechanisms into productive technical outcomes are
more likely to be able to economically direct their futures. Early writings such as David (1975) and
Rosenberg (1976) have suggested that learning effects may be seen as more than either simple learning
by doing, and in fact, more useful than cost reductions alone. These are manifested by learning-by-
using through the use of complex systems (Rosenberg, 1982) and learning-by-interacting between
producers and users (Lundvall, 1988 and demonstrated by Von Hippel (1988) and others). Malerba
(1992) elaborates and suggests six categories: 1. Learning by doing 2. Learning by using 3. Learning
from advances in S&T 4. Learning from inter-industry spillovers 5. Learning by interacting 6.
Learning by searching. The last refers to the more formal process of R&D within the firm.
Previous explanations for economic development such as that occurring in East Asia have rested on
primarily resource explanations of capital accumulation on the one hand or varying abilities of firms
and states on the other. Current explanations for technological advance largely consist of so-called
"accumulation" and "assimilation" theories (Nelson and Pack, 1999), the first focusing on high
investment rates as the driver of economic development, where higher output arises primarily from
higher physical and human capital inputs. In such theories, technological advance emerges primarily
as a by -product of the high investment rates. The "assimilation-ists" suggest that rather than static
physical and human capital factor explanations, more dynamic learning strategies characterise the
advances of some developing countries. The "assimilation" theories underline the importance of
dynamic technological and organisational learning instituted in an environment of (often) State-led
incentives.3 4 There is also an implied cumulative aspect to the latter approach. You can only move
ahead by already learning at each stage. There can be no one single "leap".
Growth accounting exercises that recognised the unaccounted for residual also left largely ignored the
issues of what accounts for differences in the knowledge base across countries and indeed, where
knowledge comes from in the first place. Some have suggested that knowledge of markets were still
largely confined by national boundaries and thus differences in innovative potential across countries
could be explained by demand variations (Vernon, 1966). However, countries sometimes do specialise
in industries that have no local demand base, such as Switzerland's marine engines and immense
3 We can divide the growth literature into two main categories as evidenced by interpretations of the East Asian
"miracle". On the one hand, Young (1995) and Krugman (1994) among others have argued that there is little that
is surprising about the learning curves and outcomes of Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and other East Asian
"Tigers"-it is mostly perspiration, through steady capital investments. I.e. there is, in fact, no "miracle". Those
concerned with endogenous growth and building technological capability would argue that systematic
investments in capital are themselves necessary but insufficient, that the "miracle" lies in the deliberate learning
trajectory pursued by firms (and often aided by governments) in these countries of building 'knowledge assets'
(Lall, 1987, Amsden, 1989, Wade, 1990 and others). The distinction between these two sets of approaches is the
relative importance paid to factor endowments and how they develop- either through systematic resource-
investments alone, or through accumulated knowledge stores that enrich multiple sectors.
4 Furthermore, as Pavitt, 1985, Bell and Pavitt, 1993, 1995 suggest, entire economies can increase efficiency
levels over a short period even if there is no indigenous invention or major technological change. This occurs
through the adaptation and diffusion of external technologies, as did the East Asian Tigers in the early years.
Thus, the relatively small number of "world-class" technological innovations (usually taken to mean US patents)
should not be taken as a sole indicator of whether the sector overall is innovative or not.
pharmaceutical base (Pavitt, 2002). A path-dependent and cumulative mastery of certain types of
knowledge (Nelson and Winter, 1982) then applied to other fields, might explain such examples.
But innovative potential is circumscribed to some degree by past industrial histories and relative
positions in international labour pools. Because developing countries are often focused on or advised
to focus on mature products, this dissertation concentrates on two main strands of literature concerned
with technological learning: (a) Product maturity, specifically, source and type of innovation within
the product's lifecycle and (b) the environment for learning and innovation.
2.2.Product maturity: innovation type and sequence
Within the technology advance literature, the main contrasts are (a) government versus markets as the
"system" of choice or (b) technology-oriented views. The first category could more usefully be split
into two sub-categories: firm-level studies (Stewart and James, 1982, Lall, 1986, Katz, 1987 for
example) and sectoral and national writings (Gerschenkron, 1952, Evans, 1979, Evans and Gereffi,
1981, Krueger, 1973, Bhagwati, 1982, Lall, 1987, Johnson, 1987, Amsden, 1989, Wade, 1990, World
Bank 1993, Bell, 1984, Teubal, 1996 etc.).
This dissertation focuses primarily on the technology-oriented views, which themselves draw on
product life-cycle theory (Vernon, 1966, Abernathy and Utterback, 1978, Kim, 1980, Dahlman, 1985,
Lee, Bae, Choi, 1988, Hobday, 1995, Kim, 1997 etc.). Data analysis indicated that there can be no a
priori decision made about the appropriate institution for development without a more complete
understanding of the technologies at hand, even if developing countries may need more active policy
interventions. Nevertheless, whether State vs. Market debates or Technology debates, a shared theme
in the literature has been the concept of product maturity i.e. developing countries look first to older
products in world markets and use their wage advantage as an important leveraging factor to
manufacture them. Some authors differ when they suggests that in addition to the wage advantage,
latecomers succeed to the extent that they are able to develop knowledge within the firm and the extent
to which the State is able to assist (Lall, 1987, Amsden, 1989, Wade, 1990, Lall, 1992, Hobday, 1995).
In developing countries, which more often than not concentrate on mature products, learning is
situated mostly in process technologies. Incremental shifts in organisational form, production
modifications for market conditions and new supply arrangements, can all lead to further
enhancements in production efficiency. The policy implications to encourage such learning have
usually been subsidies for importing capital goods or complete import substitution. In either case
alone, the evidence is mixed for how firms learn and whether they are adaptable enough to rapidly
changing technological and/or market conditions.
Although the early history of pharmaceuticals suggests that process innovations were at the core of
advances such as penicillin and thus antithetical to product life-cycle theories, more recent changes in
the industry have created a perceived dominant position for product innovation. Further, extensions of
such theories contrast a typology of industrialised versus developing countries thus providing a lens
into markers for advancement.
Economics tends to separate process and product innovations sharply, seeing the former as shifting
supply curves through lowered costs, and the latter as shifting the demand curve through new
products. The process of learning in the two are also seen as separate, that firms doing one tend not to
do another, or even that process capabilities might be developed at the cost of product capabilities.
Thus, learning at firm-level and industry-wide diffusion of innovation, must be situated squarely
within the product's life cycle. For developing countries, this has usually been taken to mean that they
should focus purely on mature industries and compete on the low cost (supply curve-shifting)
advantage, while advanced industrialised countries plough resources into product innovation and
shifting of demand curves. The data suggests that this is a false dichotomy.
The existing models of product-lifecycle theories reinforce the dichotomy. In this view, process
innovation comes after product innovation and is used primarily to drive down costs. The original
version (Vernon 1966, Abernathy and Utterback, 1978, and other life-cycle theorists) suggests that
process development becomes more important as industries mature. When early phase in industry and
new basic product concepts are being defined, product innovation outstrips process innovation. Later
when both producers and consumers have gained experience with different versions of the product, a
"dominant design" emerges and radical product innovation opportunities lessen. Another version of
5 More empirical studies from developing countries on learning-by-doing emerged from firm-level studies in
Latin America (Stewart and James, 1982, Lall, 1986 and Katz, 1987) and demonstrated convincingly that these
firms are actively involved (and have to be) in absorbing, adapting and generating technologies. However, there
was less attention paid to environmental stimuli and how policy instruments could shape industry-wide and
nation-wide change. These latter themes were taken up by newer writings (Evans, 1979, Johnson, 1982, 1987,
Haggard and Cheng, 1987, Evans, 1987, Amsden, 1989, Wade, 1990, for example) which suggest that "lateness"
this theory extends the model to a global production cycle (Vernon, 1966) and suggests that product
innovations occur in advanced industrialised countries, and when the dominant design is well
established and the product matures (by definition), the product moves over to being manufactured in
lower-wage developing economies where process innovations further bring costs down. Kim (1997)
suggests that latecomers such as Korea are relegated to the process innovation domain once mature
technologies come their way but may leapfrog at later points in time.
Moreover, while the product life cycle and other learning models, are good at explaining innovation in
many different industries, they have certain limitations. In particular, the product life cycle model has
three assumptions that may not be always relevant: (for a similar discussion of the US case, see
Pisano, 1997) (a) It assumes that the main benefit of process innovation is cost reduction, that
companies take on process development focus only in mid-phase of an industry's life-when volume of
production has risen and when product innovation opportunities are falling. It also assumes process
development focus does not occur until product design is stable (b) Secondly, it assumes that
organisational specialisation and abilities needed for product development and innovation are different
in essence from process innovation and in fact, work against, those of process innovation. (c) Thirdly,
it assumes that specialised process innovation is not necessary to do product innovation. In fact, it's
seen as antithetical, because companies are supposed to be hesitant to introduce new products that
make existing process technologies obsolete. I.e. new process innovations are not seen as a key to
product breakthroughs.
While the discussions above pertain primarily to innovation "type" (i.e. product or process), there is a
second issue that also relates to the capabilities of innovation: the particular sequence in which
learning and innovation occurs. The literature suggests that countries work their way up from various
forms of copying, reverse engineering, then 'creative' imitation to innovation recognised in its own
right. Lee et al (1988) suggest that developing countries pursue technology trajectories in three stages
of acquisition, assimilation and improvement (suggested by Kim 1980, extending Utterback's model)
from mature, to intermediate and finally generate emerging technologies. Hobday (1995) states that
developing countries thus reverse the direction (relative to industrialised countries) of technological
capability and move from mature to emerging technologies. The implications are two-fold: 1. That
there is a certain identifiable sequence of learning from imitation to innovation and 2. That catch-up or
shapes the entire process of industrialisation and the ways in which firns learn, particularly through imitation,
rather than innovation.
leapfrogging occurs when the speed of working through the sequence accelerates or certain steps are
skipped entirely with the advent of new technologies.
The same process of innovation can be interpreted to result when systems that are rusty begin to work
more smoothly. Reverse engineering or other forms of imitation are seen simply as varied ways in
which learning occurs. Institutions that assist such learning (public research institutes, universities, or
regulatory regimes, for example) are seen as part of the metamorphosis accompanying the learning
process.
Thus far past research literature tell us that developing countries take on mature technologies, learn in
different ways (by "doing", by "using", by "interacting" and so forth) to absorb, master and improve
upon these technologies, and eventually (on an indeterminate and undoubtedly frustrating time-scale
for many countries) will generate innovations if they do it 'right'. But how should these developing
countries source core technologies or meet local demand when often they have limited resources and
maladapted institutions for R&D? As the inexorable product life cycle rotates forth in each industry,
manifested in levels of technological difficulty and value-added segments, developing countries must
individually decide which technological segments to invest in, but are not told how the institutional
niceties are to be arranged for this to occur.
2.3.An overly narrow view of the environment
What is the broader environment in which firms learn and choose particular technological paths? Does
the State possess the capabilities to predict outcomes, target industries or specific technologies and
accelerate technological learning in a field where the frontier is evolving less rapidly? Government
policy was an important driver of early biotechnology and pharmaceuticals even in now developed
countries, particularly in the early stages of research and in setting research priorities. (McMillam et
al. 2000) How have other institutional forces such as patent laws, price controls, and regulatory
approval sped or slowed the learning? There have been some very insightful studies on absorption and
learning capacities. Kim (1997), as a representative example, refers to the firm situated in a "learning
environment", while the now-classic contribution of Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggests that skills
are formed at a more rapid rate if the firm is also investing in in-house capabilities. As in-house
capabilities develop, firms are able to source in information from the outside (their absorptive
capacities). An understanding would prove useful of how the learning environment changes, and how
firms absorb more as their environment shifts.
Some authors have described the environment, particularly selection environments as comprising
markets, institutions and knowledge, broadly speaking (Wijnberg, 1994, Thompson, 1994, McKelvey
1996 and Murmann 2001). Wijnberg (2004) systematically explore valuation within selection
environments in assessing a firm's capabilities .The "new institutionalists" suggest that institutions are
the rules by which markets are organised (North, 1990) and the patterns of behaviour (Hodgson, 1988)
that generate them. 6 The third dimension of the selection environment is seen as knowledge. However,
while these authors (particularly McKelvey) acknowledge that these three dimensions tend to
influence each other, there are insufficient examples, least of all from developing countries, that could
shed light on these frameworks. This dissertation is thus an attempt to contribute to this empirical
research agenda. In such thinking, market transactions are rightly typified as becoming only one
dimension of selection. This dissertation argues for a more specific interpretation of knowledge (and
technological acquisition) as being not independent, but shaped by the institutions within which it is
developed. The firm is embedded simultaneously into both national and international selection
environments that are intricately tied to the ways in which firms learn.
Undoubtedly, any static view of "the environment" cannot do justice to the adaptability of individuals
and firms or the technological choices that they make. Products and process choices are made within
this context, as are the capabilities each encourages. More importantly, the two are related.
Technological choices are not independent of the political and economic environment, but neither are
they entirely dependent on them. Technological specificity continues to be an important determinant
of skills, paths and opportunities. After all, advances at firm-level occur in a broader environment that
defines how the firm structures its strategies and how information flows to and from it. Past writings
appear to have contributed significantly to views of the environment as primarily policy-driven, while
others from the innovation system "school" do study the environment, but predominantly as an
instrument of national or regional policies ', as exogenous shocks (best represented by the trade
6 Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) argue that institutions coordinate economic behaviour, and thus can prove to be
explanatory variables or different national performances. Neither knowledge nor market transactions alone are
explanations; rather the ways in which institutions shape interactions between agents and organisations that
matter. Others writing on this theme are Landes, 1969, North, 1993, Mowery and Rosenberg 1998. In all of
these, institutions are used to demarcate rules of engagement. However, Lundvall (Ed.) 1992, Nelson (Ed.),
1993, Malerba (1999) explain differing performances at national level through specific innovation systems
where institutions (predominantly in the rules and patterns sense) explain knowledge accumulation and differing
trajectories of technology development at national and sectoral levels (Breschi and Malertba, 1997).
7 Indeed, the use of innovation systems in analysing developing countries is still uncommon, in part because of
queries raised about whether innovation (as seen as a first-time event) is applicable to most developing countries.
However, even in the NIS literature, innovation has increasingly been defined broadly to include events and
technologies faced by the firm or country for the first time, even if it cannot be seen as a worldwide first. As
literature) or primarily as entry barriers to firms. At the other extreme, a purely resource-based view of
the firm can over-specify the internal capabilities of the firm with its level of agency and pay
insufficient attention to the constraints and opportunities provided by external changes. By
understanding the interplay of both national and international contexts for the specific industry, there
are more likely to generate insights into the conditions under which firms choose specific paths of
learning and gain both visibility and credibility in the marketplace, which itself is changed by their
entry over time.
While firms can strategically adapt to their selection pressures, often pressures are difficult to
recognise ex-ante, or even at firm-level. Selection and adaptation also co-evolve. Both rely on similar
measures of surviving firms to draw conclusions and interpret survival as either optimal organisational
form and practices, appropriate strategy or unique resources (see Volderba and Lewin, 2003, for a
thorough discussion). Despite this, empirical studies continue to be necessary. Rationales for firm-
level, or even industry-level performance without accommodating selection pressures leads to
incorrect attributions of causality for success or failure, or even appropriate evaluations of whether the
firm or industry has been successful or not. Most classical micro-economic and management studies
are unable to interpret case-studies of technological change because of competing pressures over time,
where some idealised production function or limited patent indicators may be a poor model to capture
both selection and adaptation.
Learning attempts can be set against broader evolutionary dynamics. At least three stages of such
dynamics exist (Aldrich, 1979, Baum and Singh, 1994 a,b, McKelvey, 1997): variation and
heterogeneity (e.g. firm types, standards etc.); selection (both external and internal elements to firms
or other organisations); retention or adaptation, which combines the ability of firms to identify traits
which are selected for or against and adjust accordingly. The stages also partially mirror three
separate, but complementary, streams of evolutionary research with different levels of analysis (see
Durand, 2001 for attempted integration). They are evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter,
1982), population ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) and firm-level dynamic resource-based
approaches (represented by Teece and Pisano, 1994 and Teece, Pisano and Schuen, 1997). All share
the view that selection is recognised ex-post, that individuals cannot fully recognise selection
pressures on populations as a whole, and that selection dynamics allow for causal ambiguity (Durand,
Lundvall (1992) and others have suggested, an important goal of the NSI literature is an attempt to explain the
level and direction of national capabilities and to this extent, its relevance is broader than OECD countries alone.
2001). The last creates special complications for policy-makers and firms alike, particularly because
effects of selection occur with a lag after efforts have been put in place.
Thus, a promising analytical area for study emerges in this dissertation on the role of the environment
and its selection pressures, with specificity to the technology and industry under study, with the
caution that any one model on the environment is likely to have limited explanatory power. While it is
certainly true that events external to the firm, particularly those as significant as national or
international policy changes or crisis can lead to methodological challenges to control variables, the
data for this dissertation suggest unequivocally that the environment in developing countries such as
India, in which imitation or innovation occurs is much richer than these views alone. Of particular
interest in this dissertation are the ways in which the environment (a) shapes the understanding,
assimilation and exploitation of information and knowledge (including technology) and (b) moulds the
imitation/innovation strategies and technology choices of firms' and (c) selects certain firms to propel
forward.
This dissertation argues for a broader understanding of learning processes and capabilities when firms
are faced with both older and newer technologies. Firms are thought to engage in more traditional
learning-by-doing, but in reality, the process is much more interactive and any one industry shows
multiple characteristics as the national and international context changes for the industry. Learning
occurs with a selection environment, which in this dissertation shows some particular manifestations:
(i) policy environment at national and international levels, and (ii) regulation and standards in the
industry (iii) technological characteristics of the sectors.
Past contributions have been very useful in highlighting that the interactive process induces firms to
engage with suppliers and users (for example, Von Hippel 1988, Schmitz and Cassiolato, 1992) or
with their counterparts, other firms (Dosi et al 1988 and Lundvall, 1992, 2002). Systems thinkers have
suggested that the broader institutional arrangement within an economy, encompasses social,
economic-including markets- and political considerations that drive the success or failure of certain
types of collective learning (Best, 1990, Nelson 1992, Lazonick 1993). However, many of the studies
8 Indeed, this theme has arisen much earlier in economics writing, but has fallen into some neglect in recent
years. Vernon (1966, p. 191) suggests correctly in the context of trade theory that ".one cannot be exposed to the
main currents of international trade for very long without feeling that any theory which neglected the roles of
innovation, scale, ignorance and uncertainty would be incomplete." Vernon cautions that the discussion of trade
and investment features of the product life-cycle refers in his case, solely to products associated with high wages
and which are capital-intensive.
are strangely silent on how the environment influences firm choices at the international level and
suggest that the determinants of firm trajectories are largely local, or primarily through national or
regional policy instruments.
There have been useful reporting of changes in newspapers and other popular writings of Indian
process capabilities, but relatively limited analytical structure given to the technological advance,
public policy history and market entry for Indian (or other developing country) pharmaceuticals and
biotechnologies. Some recent academic contributions and commentaries have been useful in
highlighting specific facets of the pharmaceutical industry: engendering technological self-reliance
and negotiation with multinational firms (Lall, 1986, Sahu, 1998), industrialisation with special
reference to Indian pharmaceuticals (ranging from Chibilya, 1968, Ahmad, 1988, for example and
later exemplified by Lall, 1974, 1982, 1984, 1987), descriptions of Indian biotechnology and policy
(Lachke et al. 1988, Padh, 1997, Sharma, 2001, Padmanaban, 2003 and Jayaraman, 2003), drug supply
(Phadke, 1998), tacit versus codified knowledge in technology transfer (Mourshed, 2000),
comparative institutionalism (Felker, Chaudhuri and Gyorgy (WB Paper 392) and Gonsen (1998),
collaborative potential (Chorghade, M.S, V.M. Chorghade, 1998), collaboration types and R&D
potential (Visalakshi S; Sandhya G.D., 1997, Ramani, 2002) or primarily technical elements of actual
implementation of manufacturing (Bhattacharya S.K., S. R. Tripathi, S. Kashyap. 1990,
Mukhopadhyay SK, J. Dwivedy, A. Kumar, 1998, for example). A larger portion has focused on the
product patent and World Trade Organisation decisions (Prasad, H.A.C and S. Bhat. 1993, Redwood,
1994, Keayala, 1996, Lanjuow, 1997, Watal, 2000). A recent study states that Indian firms which use
technologies based on in-house capabilities developed under an inward-looking regime may thrive
even under a liberalised one (Katrak, 2000).9 The Forbes (1999) study suggests that the national
innovation system of India only became fully international after 1991 and others situate India in the
global industry (Thomas, 1996)..While this is certainly true for all sectors, it highlights how Indian
firms prepared through process capabilities, low R&D costs and induced low costs of drugs through
price controls, were able to seize opportunities abroad before the full-scale liberalisation of the 1990s.
Indeed the literature on the positioning of Indian firms vis-A-vis multinational ones was very useful in
9 The study emphasises that products made with the firm's own R&D efforts does not equate with reinventing
the wheel, but may have benefited from foreign journals, exposure to overseas companies and trade fairs, as well
as the firm's own history of past use of imported technologies. The point is in-house R&D instead of licensing or
using standardised technologies alone. The study looks at chemical and allied products, electrical and electronic
industries from 1991 (significant liberalisation) to 1998-'99. The author concludes that although production using
in-house R&D began under a protectionist system, these products have lasted through liberalisation and have
flourished.
building the narrative for early capabilities in the industry (Sahu, 1998, is typical). Where this
dissertation aims to contribute is to shift the analysis away from units of impact as national policy or
firm strategy alone, to building capabilities and the environment that shapes technological choices and
hones certain capabilities more than others. It also hopes to contribute to linking pre-liberalisation
analysis to new data on generic drugs and biopharmaceuticals, which have been left largely silent in
other studies.
An additional debate around pharmaceuticals (and normally translated into debates on intellectual
property) lies in the public health domain. Public health is usually analysed in terms of "public good"
characteristics and by its dearth in developing countries (For a discussion of gaps in supply, see
Mrazek and Mossialos, 2003) yet, there is little writing on how public health affects private
technological capabilities in developing countries. The history of pharmaceuticals in advanced
industrialised countries suggests that a closer look is warranted at such a link when public health needs
are still significant. Indeed, the debate over public health needs such as drugs for TB, malaria or AIDS
is whether supply meets demand, and who owns the production -whether multinationals or local firms
provide the drugs. While this is a fruitful debate, it misses the mark with regard to technological
upgrading. If firms in developing countries are to produce essential drugs for public health, what can
they learn from the process technologically, and how can these capabilities in turn be upgraded to
match changing public health needs?
The ability of firms to search for new demand for existing products, as well as new supply of features
to existing products created a specific trajectory that allowed firms to see and reap rewards in new
markets abroad. It remains to be seen in the Indian case whether the more illuminating unit of analysis
will continue to be the lone Indian firm, or a broader, more diffuse set of knowledge networks, local
and global that support innovation. (As suggested by various authors, more recently, McKelvey, 1999
Brusoni et al, 2001). This will give rise to certain methodological difficulties of its own.
2.4.Nurture versus nature for indigenous industry
Any analysis of innovation policies raises the question of whether and how governments should
attempt to influence innovation processes and outcomes. One view is that states have to substitute for
markets and push industrialisation along in developing nations where markets are underdeveloped
(Gerschenkron, 1952, 1962 and supported by a vast array of later research). Public policies shape
markets and other institutions within which selection occurs. Arrow's seminal work of 1962 on the
economic implications of Learning by Doing elaborates on the assumption that learning is a natural
by-product of production experience. He also emphasised that facing similar problems does not do
much for learning in the long-term. A changing production and selection environment that generates
new problems to solve will result in technological progress, but mere repetition will not. While
developing country governments and academics used this policy as a green signal for infant industry
protections, arguing that such policies would bring the required certainty to returns in human and
physical capital investments and generate positive industry-wide externalities, the actual impact of
such policies has been mixed. It is now recognised that protections alone do not work and State-
industry, Industry-society or three-way societal compacts must require performance levels (Evans,
1979, Evans and Gereffi, 1981, Lall, 1984, Johnson, 1982, 1987, Evans, 1987, Haggard and Cheng,
1997, Amsden, 1989, Wade, 1990, Hobday, 1995, among others). Institutional arrangements that
encourage performance and punish lag, such as revocation of export permissions, rewards and public
recognition for high quality products, preferential access to new technologies, can also be important
drivers of the process of learning.
While the fact that firms learn and need supportive environments to do so is emphasised by the
'assimilationists', the environment tends to remain as an external incentive mechanism, not one that
shapes innovation choices. The international context is particularly underemphasized. Even those
writings that have emphasised a "learning" framework have focused on more "traditional" industries
such as steel and automobiles. The story of electronics, while "high-tech" indicates entry points of
developing economies at greater degrees of product maturity. Bio-pharmaceutical drugs are considered
to be "science-based" (Niosi, 2000), presumed to be resting on abilities in product R&D and drug
discovery. The question is, do the dynamics of innovation play out differently with such technologies
in developing countries?10 In particular, what is the policy basis for the technological and market
advance, if any? However, assimilation of this kind while exemplifying firm level and policy efforts
occurs in a larger technological, socio-political environment with access to markets and demand-side
incentives as important. But demand alone will not tell the story of how indigenous institutions
respond to this mix in what makes the "system" innovative.
Moreover, writings on trade theory in the last three decades, have emphasized the differences in
viewpoints on the role of government in markets as protectors and in creating demand. Once the
10 Furthermore, Amsden (1989) and Westphal (1990) highlight three types of technological capabilities that help
technological learning within firms: (a) production capabilities (b) project execution capabilities and (c)
innovation capabilities. But there is no clear-cut relationship of these capabilities with R&D functions of so-
argument was accepted that markets are inherently imperfect, although competitive, the role of
government became more defensible, if not wholly so. Grossman (1988, 1990), Tybout (1992) and
Rodrik (1994, 1995) have all reviewed the literature extensively and demonstrate the mixed evidence
on whether or not, in what timeframe and how exactly state intervention improves the nation's
welfare. Others have suggested (Harrison, 1994) that even with data, analysis and interpretation
become challenging. From an empirical standpoint, it appears that no country other than Hong Kong,
developed its industrial base without a series of infant industry protections of wide range (Chang,
2002, for example) Functional and selective government intervention (Lall, 1987) has been
widespread in the histories of the UK, USA and Germany (among the early industrializing countries)
and although it varied with time, it was expansive in its scope and international outreach. However,
features such as the rate of technological change, the average size of firms and the need for capital
investments, the need for relatively rapid social and institutional change (to create supply), all vary
between those industrializing earlier and later. Furthermore, the later the industrialization, the shorter
the time available for the principal elements of infant industry protections, export ramp-up and
liberalization of trade (Shafaeddin, 1998, for a review).
The SAPPHO study and others identified success and failure in innovation across industries
(Achilladelis, Robertson and Freeman, 1971) and identified factors influencing innovation. Seven
broad areas of S&T advances, raw materials, market demand, competition, societal needs, government
legislation and companies S&T and market specialisation were identified as influencing innovation.
Achilladelis, Schwarzkopf, Cines, 1990, and Achilladelis, 2001 others have studied the chemical and
pharmaceutical industry more particularly. The dichotomy of "S&T-push" and "market-pull" is
insufficient to answer the specific pathways of countries. In particular, this trajectory, techno-
economic paradigm or technological paradigm (Freeman and Perez, 1988, Dosi, 1982, Nelson and
Winter, 1982, Rosenberg, 1976, for example) is historically unique in each case, but has some
elements that can be generalized to other developing countries.
Demand-side policies have been investigated in various ways. However, the impact of demand
deemed to be in the public interest has not been investigated as a tool for technological learning and
not in developing countries, where such demand may be most acute. While this may not be easy to
structure, it is useful to understand the socio-political and economic conditions under which such
called science-based industries such as biopharmaceuticals, where innovation is invariably associated with R&D
policies can be constructed, and exploited. As Lundvall (1992) and others have suggested, an
important goal of the NSI literature is an attempt to explain the level and direction of national
capabilities. This and other economic literature (Hirschman, 1961 was one starting point) have
highlighted demand conditions as an innovation-inducing mechanism, later highlighted again by Von
Hippel (1988) on the importance of user-interactions with the innovator.
To conclude, product maturity and selection pressures of the environment, including policy, affect
learning choices. While it is unclear what the fortunes of these industries will be in the long run, thus
making challenging any assessment of the relative merits and de-merits of various developmental
theories based on long-term models, there is sufficient data to suggest that existing explanations are
missing the richness of the Indian story. Those views looking predominantly to foreign (western) firms
for technological diffusion in developing countries, and to intellectual property-particularly product
patents, as the prime determinant for Indian innovation, warrant refinement. These debates overlook
important characteristics of the selection environment and the entry points for building capabilities
that has shaped Indian advance and the diverse paths of learning. One-size-fits-all policies aimed at
diverse industries with significantly different environments and technologies will not serve countries
in their developmental goals.
in drug discovery and early development, and not with manufacturing and commercialisation.
Chapter 3 Research Design and Methodology
3.1 Introduction
The choice of cases (and nested cases) was structured to track capabilities, specifically, process
development capability, over time. Because the hypothesis was set against other causal explanations for
advance such as patent regimes and low cost, a historical approach was used with nested cases at firm and
sector-levels.
The emphasis is on pharmaceuticals and bio-pharmaceuticals or that set of scientific and technological
tools and practices in research and development, as well as manufacturing, that are engaged with broadly
(a) therapeutics: (drug discovery, development or manufacture) or (b) diagnostics. Both of these areas are
included when the process or product or set of tools employed involves either small molecules
("traditional" pharmaceuticals) or large ones (recombinant protein chains and "modern" of post 1970s
developments in molecular biology). Because recombinant DNA and genetic engineering companies are
an important but not the only form of biotechnology utilised in these countries, a broader definition of
biotechnology is necessary for the purposes of this study. The sector provides interesting disciplinary and
industrial changes with the onset of the molecular biology "revolution" of the 1970s. Modem
biotechnology, a set of process technologies, is usually defined with the onset of molecular biology
breakthroughs such as the creation of recombinant DNA and of monoclonal antibodies in the 1970s.
These advances heralded a change in the ways biomedical science and technologies functioned. Advances
in bioinformatics capabilities, combining computational algorithms with the search for new genetic
taxonomies, has also provided new avenues for growth. The structural changes in the industry have also
led to new divisions of labour between various types of firms, providing new opportunities for firms (and
their governments).
The focus was on the national system that builds innovation capabilities for two main reasons. Although
Bangalore and Hyderabad are good examples of localised capabilities, their histories have, in large part,
been driven by national policies. Secondly, while other units of analysis-regional, sectoral and so forth,
are no doubt interesting and insightful for Indian pharmaceuticals, international pressures and
opportunities in this sector are phrased in terms of national opportunities, even if exploited by firm-level
competencies. Many of the institutions that support innovation in India have been nationally driven across
diverse sectors, although some states have become active recently. Therefore, the nation state for the
purposes of the research design is still a relevant and dominant marker for structuring the environment in
which firms learn, even if (and precisely because) the international context varies.
3.2 Methods:
The research comprises a one-country (India), two sector study. The dissertation used a combination of
(a) a study of innovation categories and products and processes over time and (b) a set of case studies .
The primary data collection tool for the case studies was structured, open-ended interviewing with a list
of sample questions included at the end of this chapter. Case-analysis was chosen because the focus of the
dissertation was the intersection of three subjects areas: technological innovation, firm-level learning
strategies and policy effects, whose combined effects are difficult to study statistically.
The figure provides a schematic of the research design, with a focus on indigenous firms.
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3.2.1 Sample selection
The analysis focused on two firm samples: the first comprising a combination of primary and secondary
data from India's 5 leading pharmaceutical firms in 2001 and the second consisting of primary data from
biopharmaceutical firms in the two southern Indian cities of Bangalore and Hyderabad, considered to be
India's up coming biotechnology centres. The second sample comprises 21 firms with research in
biopharmaceuticals in Bangalore and Hyderabad, two of India's rapidly rising biotech centres, which
were selected by criteria described in the previous chapter. The sample is too small to systematically
investigate why some firms moved ahead faster than others or were more innovative, but the dissertation
provides some insights into the characteristics of the leading firms that may be tested in later studies as
causal factors.
First sample: All-India pharmaceutical leaders
In pharmaceuticals, 5 Indian-owned firms were selected for the sample by whether they were overall
leaders in market share.' For these companies, systematic company histories, product and process
innovations and industry-level changes were collected. Primary and secondary data of indicators are
analysed for the top 5 Indian pharmaceutical companies by market share in 2001. Secondary indicators on
their overall impact on the industry were used to confirm the choices, specifically technological
innovation capability.
Second sample: Localised biopharmaceutical companies
In the case of biopharmaceuticals, localised firms were selected in the Bangalore and Hyderabad region
from three main sources and their cross-listings: Department of Biotechnology publications, companies
listing in biotech-related websites of the two states and mentioned in regional policy documents, those
mentioned in TIFAC and other documents, and/or listed as collaborators with public research institutes
(PRIs). The second sample comprises 21 firms with research in biopharmaceuticals in Bangalore and
Hyderabad, two of India's rapidly rising biotech centres, which were selected by criteria described in the
previous chapter. Their expertise is more varied than in pharmaceuticals, ranging from drug discovery to
manufacture and bioinfornatics.
My cases differ on multiple levels. First, they vary by public sector influence -by policy type and by stage
of influence. Second, they vary by technological focus, most prominently, two samples of firms in
pharmaceuticals, and those in biopharmaceuticals. Third, they vary by product type. Fourth, I have
selected the leading five pharmaceutical firms, but made a deliberate choice to focus the
biopharmaceutical firms situated in Bangalore and Hyderabad, to give a localised flavour to innovation.
The decsriptions at the end of the chapter provide a brief profile of the 5 leading companies of Sample 1
and the main characteristics of companies in sample 2.
Despite the dimensions of difference, there are some very important common characteristics to the firms
described. All have shown some minimal level of process and product innovation in either synthetic or
biological pharmaceuticals. All focus on the US market, some with greater focus on the UK or Western
Europe. All have moved into the generic drug market. All of the leading five firms are large firms (over
500 employees). All the firms in synthetic and biopharmaceuticals samples alike are important in their
respective segments and face the same pressures of low cost, high quality, high speed and high
competition in their target markets.
Comments:
Choosing the firm sample was not a straightforward exercise. Faced with a trade-off of huge geographic
spread for Indian pharmaceutical firms and a limited time frame and budget for data collection, the
research was focused on two southern "biotech" cities of Bangalore and Hyderabad. This allowed an
investigation of compisition, capabilities and growth of the sectors as reflected in the firms in these two
cities, with Hyderabad being the home to almost 40% of Indian bulk drug production. Both cities had
many public research institutes and universities associated with both sectors. No other city sample
combination in close proximity could have afforded me the same firm sample coverage in both spheres of
technology. Pharmaceutical firms lying outside these cities were interviewed by telephone, or analysed by
secondary sources. Some biopharmaceutical firms were not available within the timeframe of the research
or did not respond in time to set up interviews. The second sample is only partially representative of the
population of such firms. This is for two reasons: first, many of these firms are new and are still defining
their focus. Thus, knowing which firms are good comparisons within this set is tricky as are tracking
births and deaths of firms. Furthermore, while these firms all have a biopharmaceutical focus, they come
to the field with different focus, expertise, company histories and organisational sizes. Ideally, this set
should be tracked over a much longer timeline. One significant problem that should diminish with studies
following this one, is that well-established data sets on companies was scarce at the time of data
collection.2 Thus, preliminary conversations with various people in the field helped identify, by a
'snowball' effect, which companies to focus on, and these were then compared to secondary data to pick a
final set. Although the sample size is relatively small, the detailed interviews provide insights into the
learning process that a survey instrument or other statistical study would have been unlikely to obtain. For
future research, more interviews will be used to test the hypotheses formed in this dissertation and will be
combined with surveys of a large sample of firms in both pharmaceuticals and pharmaceuticals.
3.2.2 Hypotheses tests
Although the study is inductive in nature, hypothesis testing was done as findings emerged. The main
dependent variables are speed to market (measured as the time lag between introduction of a product on
the world market and the Indian introduction of the same or similar product to the world or domestic
markets), cost of the drug and process and product improvements of the Indian -introduced drug. In
addition, US and Indian Patent data is used.
1 Some multinational subsidiaries were also interviewed to obtain a different perspective on Indian firms.
2 Since then, publications such as "BioSpectrum" in India have undertaken a ranking of leading companies.
However, here again, all companies are listed, but not compared by expertise, but predominantly by sales, R&D
figures and personnel, among others.
Interviews comprised testing hypotheses of process capability by studying(a) importance of in-house
process versus product development and (b) the sequence of technology development in specific drug
segments, (c) the relevance of the institutional environment in the development of technological in-house
capabilities (d) the importance of national ownership, specifically with regard to alliances and access to
technologies developed in the public research sector (e) lastly, I also tested the relative mix of in-house
and outsourced R&D and services functions in the different types of firms. In all cases, I was assessing
how much technological learning had been amassed in-house relative to acquisition, what sequence of
innovation had taken place, if discernible, and at what stage of the company's development. The levels of
sophistication were also checked with experts in the industry in India and in the US.3
3.2.3 Data sources, Indicators/metrics:
My empirical data for the dissertation comes from three main sources: (a) Qualitative data sources
(Primary): detailed, structured and open-ended firm-level interviews (b) Quantitative sources (Primary
and Secondary): economic indicators for firm-level, industry-level and national technological capability.
Statistical information across countries. (c) Other secondary data sources such as company annual reports,
financial record, stock market reporting, media profiles, various third-party ranking systems and more
rarely (because of such few academic studies) journal articles or books. I also used case-study material
where available developed by universities and from international organisations.
One way of measuring technological and market advance was to study the longitudinal performances of
private Indian-owned firms". A set of the firm's products and processes is taken as indicator of
technological advance. In particular, while New Chemical Entities are taken as the ultimate indicator of
product innovation, multiple paths to the same end product, increased speed of production and rapid
generic filing are some of the non-exhaustive indicators of process innovation. Overall, there are three
main types of indicators that were used for both background research and for building a framework of
learning paths and the selection environment:
3 In the Indian case, I also interviewed bioinformatics firnms, with their parent capability in the computing industry,
to see how they were moving into biopharmaceuticals, especially drug discovery and development.
4 Among most developing countries with pharmaceutical capability, India had the highest percentage of privately
owned Indian firms in the top 10 by domestic market share. Thus, firm ownership was a central factor in sample
choice. Government policies from the 1950s onwards have resulted in gains to Indian companies even today in
newer bio-pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, where necessary to illustrate industry-wide learning, examples from the
public sector effort are also relevant.
5 The top five firms have changed over time, so in addition to these, to mitigate any selection bias, the background
analysis also traced the histories of some that fell out of the top five, and some that were not market leaders, but are
innovators (as measured by number of New Chemical Entities found, patents filed etc).
1. The first, sector economics, looks at the broad trends driving the industry as well as the growth
indicators specific to the technologies used.
2. The second indicator, innovation timelines, deals with the micro-details of product and process
development within each firm, or 'events' that highlight technological advance.
3. The third combined indicator, firm type, alliances, products, helps to explicitly model the relative
advance, if any, by mapping technological and business outcomes.
Box 1 Indicator types and examples
INDICATOR TYPE EXAMPLES
Indicator I: -Total sectoral output and growth
Sector economics -Increased market share in that sector
-Increased exports in that sector
-% of that sector's total output relative to total industrial output of the country
-% of that sector's exports in country's total exports
-% of people employed in R&D, No. of PhDs
-R&D spending growth rates relative to capital investments
-Amount invested in segment X relative to segment Y
-No. of patents, inspections by regulatory authorities (import opportunities)
Indicator H: Innovation Event timelines
Timelines -Acquisitions, date when certain firm types enter sector, date when sector
becomes independent in certain key functions, or first production of some
specific product, or first attempt at process type A or B
World timelines
-Outlines when certain products and processes were introduced elsewhere,
then in country X pharma sector. (e.g. When first introduced in the world, by
whom, then when introduced in India, then when introduced in India or
elsewhere by Indian company). Measure time lag trend, Filing of ANDAs and
180-day exclusive licensing period.
-Manufacturing of generic to first establishment of licensing or contract
manufacturing arrangement of an Indian company with an MNC.
Indicator I: -Domestic alliances versus international alliances (technology advances and
firm type, alliances, sophistication of technology domestically-market opportunistic versus
products technology driven
-Key events and institutional drivers, Development timeline for certain
products, Patenting timeline, Strategic alliances by firm for key firms, Process
or product type vs. Firm size, sources of initial technology, indigenous efforts
to assimilate foreign technology
-Differences with patented brand drug (get this from ANDA or from FDA,
USPTO)
-No. of public health versus other drugs
-No. of new filings in different export markets
-World's largest manufacturers of certain broad product categories: (also
financing)-Position of Indian firms, Type of Indian firms, ownership structure
within Indian industry
-By product line and specific product and process categories
DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEWS
Companies were first communicated with by email or phone asking if they would be willing to be
interviewed. Only those who evinced an interest were communicated with and interviews were scheduled.
Structured but open-ended interviews were carried out with scientists and engineers, academics (many of
whom were scientists), CEOs, heads of R&D, senior executives, venture capitalists/bankers and policy
officials. The smaller number of policy makers explicitly identified is misleading. An important strength
of the sample is that many of the academic interviewees had held multiple positions, often in government
or directly advising or leading government committees on industrial research or technology transfer, and
so were able to provide both the details of the sector's history and provide perspectives from the State's
standpoint.
Interviews lasted 1-2 hours on average. Hand-written notes were made of every interview. No taping, or
typing was done during the interviews since they occasionally required touring of facilities while
speaking, and many interviewees looked comfortable when they saw I only had pen and paper. 50 Indian
interviews were carried out by August 2003 (47 in person with 3 additional telephone interviews) and 4
more by telephone by November 2003.
A challenge to the entire research was that in many cases, detailed descriptions of particular process
innovations have had to be left out because it has been impossible to tell the story, fascinating though it is,
without revealing the identity of the company (or the person) to a reader who is familiar with the two
sectors. Thus references to people interviewed, even public officials, is represented as non-attributable
quotes. Company names are mentioned directly only when the information used is in the public domain.
On way to circumvent this difficulty for future research is to administer a survey in addition to case work,
thus allowing aggregates to build a general typology of capabilities and their dynamics.
COMPANY PROFILES
Pharmaceutical firms
India's top five companies by domestic sales in 2001, Ranbaxy, Cipla, Sun Pharma, Zydus-Cadila and
Wockhardt are described briefly below. Their advances are tracked as evidence of specific features of
structural and technological change in the Indian pharmaceutical industry. Data obtained was a
combination of detailed secondary data derived from industry statistics, and reports, interviews with CEO
and R&D personnel, and supported by some phone interviews with India's leading firms. The second
sample describes companies working in biopharmaceuticals in Bangalore and Hyderabad for whom
primary data was collected through detailed structured, open-ended interviews. The first thus provides a
lens on the pharmaceutical industry, and the second on more localised innovation occurring in the use of
biological tools in the same industry.
1. Ranbaxy was India's largest pharmaceutical company by sales in 2003, and its second largest in 2001.
It began in the 1960s and emerged as India's largest company by sales in 2002 by acquisition, inching
past Cipla. It is an 8000 staff company and has become India's largest R&D investor by % of sales
revenue, at 6% in 2002 It pioneered the break into the US generic drug market, ranking 9*h in the US in
2002, 1 lth in the worldwide generic drugs market and growing faster in its US markets than US-based
pharmaceutical companies (at over 120%).6 It has announced the move to add one thousand more R&D
staff into its Indian laboratories. It has moved into New Chemical Entity research and licensed out both
promising molecules as well as platform technologies. Ranbaxy has exports into over seventy countries, a
manufacturing presence in seven countries, and distribution or sales operations in over twenty five.7 It has
recently moved into cardiovascular, central nervous system and nutritional products. It also conducts
contract manufacturing. The company has supported the introduction of product patents into the country.
2. Cipla has been India's largest pharmaceutical company for many years, and has built a presence mostly
in generic drugs and contract manufacturing. Established in the early 1930s, it is one of India's oldest
pharmaceutical companies. Its recent successes have been built AIDS, respiratory drugs and drug delivery
systems. They have patented drug delivery platforms and stirred up controversies with MNCs through
their AIDS cocktails, combining off-patent with on-patent drugs, a strategy legal in India. The company
manufactures over 250 drugs from initial stages and has successfully commercialised many public sector
research outputs. In recent years, Cipla has also been a strong advocate of keeping product patents away
from critical public health drugs such as those for AIDS and has pioneered the introduction via
manufacturing of many hitherto unavailable drugs into India.
3 Sun Pharmaceuticals was a relatively late entrant in manufacturing, beginning in 1983 with the
psychiatry drug segments. It has since moved into chronic care areas such as cardiology, psychiatry,
neurology and gastroenterology. In addition, this product diversification has been partly responsible for
increased market penetration (as have numerous acquisitions, some from Indian-based MNCs) moving
them from a rank of 107 in 1988 in domestic market share to 5 1 in December 2001 and to 3rd nationwide
in 2002. It also retains its core expertise, ranking first nationwide by key customers for neurology and
psychiatry. They have acquired many bulk drug facilities in recent years.
4. Zydus-Cadila is one company of the Cadila conglomerate involved in health care, information
technology, agri-business and travel businesses. Cadila is also a flagship, multi-part company with
various healthcare divisions. Cadila Healthcare Ltd is to launch a 5* division Zydus Neurosciences. It has
a generic drug business. It was established in 1951 and has since developed a biopharmaceutical initiative
and has an R&D staff of over 150 scientists. Its founder and director was credited as a champion of the
6 IMS Health 2002
7 Ranbaxy company website, http://www.ranbaxy.com
process-patent-only Indian Patent Act of 1970 and a director of the IDMA, the Industry association
representing Indian-owned firms. Cadila was the first company worldwide to introduce a leprosy
immuno-modulator, Immuvac. The company has 445 products registered in 50 countries, a presence in
the US, Kenya, Nigeria and Russia and a sales presence in 43 countries worldwide. It has expertise in
gastro-intestinal, cardiovascular, pain management, respiratory, gynaecological drugs and biological-
segments.
5. Wockhardt is India's 5h largest company by sales and is 2700 people strong. It specialises in anti-
infectives, pain and inflammation, cough, psychiatry, medical nutrition and biopharmaceuticals. It
focused its New Chemical Entities in anti-infectives and anti-Sepsis and has an R&D staff of over 300.
It's R&D expenditure is now 7% by sales revenue, one of the highest nationwide. It is also one of two
companies in the leading five with an ambitious biotechnology R&D program, having completed human
insulin for market launch.
Biopharmaceutical firms
Some of the firms are drug discovery or service firms, others are drug development or manufacturing
firms. Three firms which are drug-development and manufacturing-focused, are described below to
highlight some of the common points emerging from multiple interviews. Findings from these and
remaining companies are described without attribute for reasons of confidentiality. These 3 company
profiles are sourced entirely from public domain information and thus are described here.
1. DRL
Dr. Reddy's Laboratories is a mid-size pharmaceutical company showing one of the highest rates of
Indian innovation in new chemical entities and out-licensing of promising molecules. It comes from a
history of bulk drug production and with a founder with experience in IDPL. DRL has grown rapidly,
entering the top 10 Indian firms in the last two years, and focusing efforts on both NCEs, NDDS as well
as the generic drug market. In addition, DRL has created an off-shoot, Aurigene Discovery, which
combines drug discovery with contract research services in genomics, among other things. DRL can be
listed under both pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical categories. It remains one of Hyderabad's star
companies and one of its biggest bulk drug manufacturers while still maintaining a smaller
biopharmaceutical segment.
2. BBIL
Bharat Biotech is a new company, starting up in only 1983. It is a dedicated vaccine producer, being one
of the first Indian firms to generate the Hepatitis B vaccine locally. It has the largest GMP manufacturing
facility for vaccines in Asia and has recently produced streptokinase.
3. Biocon India
Biocon began in the 1970s and has evolved into a biopharmaceutical company with enzyme and
fermentation expertise arising from catering to food and brewing companies. Using fermentation-based
drugs as an entry point, and fermentation as a route for genetic engineering, Biocon has parleyed its
strengths in enzyme studies into a drug manufacturing business, along with clinical testing and contract
research arms. It has been innovative in stabilisation of conditions for genetic engineering, and has
patented a solid state fermentation reactor which has resulted in higher yields. Biocon produces generic
drugs as well, particularly Statins. Its profile is further developed in later chapters.
USING THE CASE STUDY
Technological innovation is often studied through patents and publications, but the history of economic
development shows us that many developing countries have few incentive structures that rewards either
patents of publications. This has been the case in Indian pharmaceuticals, which has only recently begun
to patent vigorously. Indian publication data also poses mixed benefits, because while publication history
exists, companies have published unevenly. I use both these indicators to further analyse my cases, as
opposed to having them lead the methodology. Similarly, elements of firm strategy in building capability
are difficult to capture through surveys, and impossible through statistics. Detailed interviews, however,
do get to the heart of the matter. Finally, there is no better method of collecting historical data on the
company's trajectory than interviews. Because of the codified and tacit nature of technology and the
heightened competition between firms, surveys, no matter how rigorous, cannot capture information that
is inherently proprietary, or the processes that resulted in specific technological and economic choices
made. Although detailed interviewing cannot uncover all information, it is a research tool that comes
closest to the means of understanding and describing incremental changes and dynamic equilibria. The
case analysis has some disadvantages of its own: selection biases (particularly for surviving firms across
history) as well as the relevance and generalisation of findings. To balance out the benefits and negatives,
I have chosen the three types of indicators to track technical (process development) and non-technical
capabilities.
The table below, modified from de la Mothe and Niosi (2000, p. 232) indicates the advantages and
disadvantages of each secondary method. Thus a combination of available sources in addition to
interviews was used to provide a more complete picture to test existing explanations than any one alone
can provide.
Table 1 Secondary indicators
METHODS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES AVAILABILITY/CONCERNS IN
INDIA
Patent analysis Tracks location of Assumes high propensity Indian patent trends less intense than in
innovation/inventor and to patents, cannot capture OECD countries, problems of equating
close of knowledge the different economic Indian and international patents in
values of different terms of economic value
patents
Surveys based Can provide new Sampling errors, in any No detailed surveys available on Indian
on samples knowledge about from industry with proprietary pharmaceutical and biotech firms on
structure and industry and tacit information, technological and market advance, thus
structure there may be disclosure has potential to reveal new information
or description problems
Publication Can track important Same problem of Good availability, but limited
citations scientific supply and surveys; proprietary and applicability to early trajectories of
reveal networks of tacit information cannot firms. They have potential in tracking
innovators be captured in publicly technological assets in terms of
available documents founders, scientific officers
Databases, Large population groups Population errors Same as in sample survey case
population for firms covered
surveys
LIST OF SAMPLE QUESTIONS
The interviews were structured but open-ended and a non-exhaustive list of sample questions is included
below. Not all questions were used in every interview, but similar companies (in terms of size, technology
and research experience) were asked similar sets of questions and in the same order to the extent possible.
Biopharmaceutical companies were asked slightly different questions, because of the difference in
technologies/tools used. Because their field is moving more rapidly than in generic drugs, for example,
their strategies (and suitable policies to assist them) were different. Telephone interviews required fewer
questions since the time available was shorter.
1. Tell me about your personal scientific/technical or business history.
2. Why has you company A been so successful in recent years? What distinguishes it from other firms
B, C, D?
3. Do you perceive a " technological gap" between India and the US, say? How would you describe this
and can this be reduced, if so, how? Can you give me an example of technological advance of this
type within your firm?
4. What do you consider to be innovative? How do you evaluate this?
5. Are your company's challenges technological or strategic/business? Can you tell me how they are
different?
6. What has your relationship been with Public research institutes?
7. How has technology transfer experience been in this drug segment-from MNCs and from PRIs? Can
you give me examples of successes/failures?
8. How have you built process capabilities within the firm? Were the challenges in the laboratory? How
did you scale-up to manufacturing the drug?
9. Why did you select the specific host culture? What were your choices? Who identified the paths
available?
10. How have you combined your team to deal with this innovation? Where did you begin your search?
What public domain information did you use?
11. What have been your challenges in entering the US market?
12. Which regulations are challenging? Why?
13. What historically, have been the government policies most useful to your firm?
14. Why did your company move into X product segment?
15. How did your company find a new way to make product Y? Please describe the process.
16. How important is intellectual property regime change in 2005 to your company's future in the US
market?
17. Why did you select the transition country markets?
18. What is the trade-off between time to market and investment rates? How do you decide when some
technology is worth making, versus buying?
19. Is there a difference in your approach between product development and process development? Why
have you picked strategy S?
20. Which are your biggest markets?
21. What policies would most assist you today? Which assisted you most in your early history?
22. Which are the most promising areas for technological advance within your field?
Chapter 4 Trouble in the Making: Induced Process Development
and Manufacturing in Indian industry'
4.1.Introduction
This chapter is grounded in a re-analysis of existing innovation categories, products and processes and
buttressed by primary data from interviews and various secondary data sources. It builds the timeline
from first national policy push in the public sector effort to the emergence of large-scale private
capability in manufacturing, roughly corresponding to the period between the early 1950s and the late
1970s. In contrast to previous analytical writings on the Indian industry, the focus here is on the ways
in which learning was induced and sustained. This manner of advancement allowed later stages of
learning to emerge under very different environmental and technological constraints..
This chapter has three primary goals. First, it contributes a framework of understanding learning based
on public health drugs within the context of technological "entry" points. This framework also
emphasises that political vision and nationalistic principles of self-sufficiency were critical
components of the industrial policies that allowed India's pharmaceutical industry to prosper.
Although the vision was often preferentially applied, it was used to build indigenous capabilities.
Without this socio-political defence, the industrial framework for pharmaceuticals is likely to have
never taken off the way the history of other developing countries has shown. Divorcing the economic
or policy analysis from national vision and political will is a misguided venture.
Second, the chapter shows that government-led research and development efforts combined with a
massive push to build manufacturing capacity were important markers for the industry's inception,
survival and growth. It confirms previous research that early protections to shield the industry from
foreign competition -particularly through a process patent regime and restricted licenses for
manufacture to foreign firms, were critical for many Indian companies.
Third, it highlights that process development and manufacturing capability was a critical pre-cursor to
current innovation in the industry. Those companies that could scale-up from laboratory to factory
were more likely to be both later imitators and innovators. However, process capabilities were built
'With due recognition to an excellent title, "Trouble in the Making: Pharmaceuticals", The Economist (US),
August 31" 2002. As discussed earlier, the term "Process Capability" will is used here to refer to the capability
within a company of developing a viable manufacturing method for a given proposed (product) outcome. In the
pharmaceutical industry, process capabilities usually refer to process research, lab to factory scale-up and
manufacture. Here they refer specifically to process chemistry/biology and process engineering.
(and could only sustain in the very early stages) within a tightly controlled selection environment. This
theme sets the stage for the next chapter where process development forms the central bulwark for
innovation capability, and which emerged, strengthened, into an entirely different innovation
environment.
There were two distinct efforts between 1950 and 1980, one in the public realm, the other in the
private one. In the early stages, the public sector acted as the repository of most R&D as one
traditionally thinks of the term, with private firms engaged primarily in manufacturing in well-worn
paths. In the classical sense, the public effort provided access to technologies and some search efforts
that allowed private firms to learn-by-doing. However, the story was richer than this. The private
effort, at various times in the first 20 years of the policy initiative, straddled a variety of interactive
search and learning efforts, which later came to differentiate leading firms from others.2
4.2.The Indian pharmaceutical sector
There are many reasons to study the Indian case. India is the world's second largest country, has one
of the developing world's most sophisticated pharmaceutical sectors, and is the 4th largest producer in
the world and has a market value of about US$3.8 billion producing 8% of worldwide production
volume, but presently only 1.1% in terms of value, or 13*th worldwide (OPPI, 2000).' While industrial
R&D in India is approximately 1/3rd of total R&D expenditure, of which half is financed by the private
sector across sectors and has increased to about 70% of industrial R&D spending (Mani, 1999), the
pharmaceutical sector has traditionally not spent heavily in R&D. Indeed, industry averages range
from
The range of capabilities is uneven, but broad. It is one of the world's largest producers of bulk drugs
(active chemicals) as well as formulations (the branded medicine sold to customers). Indian
pharmaceuticals are growing at 14% or so per year and 58 foreign-owned multinational companies
(hereafter MNCs) have manufacturing bases in the country, but account for less than 30% of market
share in 2001. It is an industry characterised by huge volume, a large number of producers and
competition. There are 3 main segments to the country's firms, which the Indian Drug Manufacturers'
Association (IDMA, founded 1961), representing Indian-owned firms, indicates as being made up of
2 This can be shown by the characteristics of the current successes, but there is a selection bias. Unfortunately the
types of learning curves and improvements in search and productivity are unavailable that could contribute to a
longitudinal study of firm efforts.
250 large manufacturing firms and 9,000 small-scale units alongside approximately 7,000 unregistered
small-scale units in 1993 (cited in Lanjouw, 1997)4 Other estimates are a total of 2,257 units in 1969-
'70 and 20,053 in 1999-'00 (OPPI, 2000), and 12,000 firms, 2,900 large-scale units, employing almost
500 000 people (OPPI Annual Directory, 2000). All agree the market is competitive, which an
observer could glean from the sheer numbers of units and from business reports and investment
profiles of many publicly listed companies. The country also has a significant science and technology
infrastructure, and after China, is the world's largest emerging market. Institutionally, India offers a
mixed bag of national planning and socialism combined with capitalistic industries. It has had a rich
and varied technological planning history, with pharmaceuticals and chemicals as core industries in
this regard.
The sector also has global reach in more mature segments. Some Indian firms are generic drug leaders
worldwide in specific products. India is the 17't largest exporter of pharmaceuticals in the world and
had over 65 WHO certified production facilities and over 15 FDA facilities in 2000.' India is
estimated to have the third largest scientific personnel worldwide in absolute terms. Almost 70% of
India's high-tech exports is composed of pharmaceutical and inorganic chemicals.' Furthermore,
Indian public research institutes (PRIs) are seeing large increases in external collaborations as well as
commercialising PRI-led innovation in pharmaceuticals.
Indian pharmaceutical companies have strengths in generics product manufacture, particularly related
to process chemistry and engineering, and have increasingly becoming more sophisticated about
developing international R&D alliances. India's patenting profile is also primarily tipped in favour of
drug process patents. In addition, there has been a recent spurt of activity in the "buy" versus "make"
option for the latest technologies, with increasing acquisitions of manufacturing and research facilities
in the US and UK by cash-rich Indian firms.7
3 This difference between manufacturing output and value is related to the fact that India is indeed, a large
volume producer of "easier" (cheaper) drugs. However, it also hides the fact that it competes in the generic drug
market of other countries, where the drugs are cheap, but not necessarily "easy" as Chapter 4 describes.
4 The Organisation of Pharmaceutical Producers of India (OPPI) represents foreign firms in the country as well
and was founded in 1965.
s Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Fact Sheet on Chemicals. Also at
http://pib.nic.in/archieve/factsheet/fs2000/chemical.html
6 The high-tech export statistics for India are for manufacturing and do not include one of the fastest export
growth segments: high tech computer services.
7 Ranbaxy for example, has manufacturing facilities in 7 countries, including China, Ireland, India, Malaysia,
Nigeria, USA and Vietnam. It is currently the 9 th largest generics manufacturer in the US after entering in 1995
and had one of the fastest rates of growth (131%) of any pharmaceutical company within the United States.
(Company reports, citing IMS Health 2002). It is also the 1 lff largest generics manufacturer worldwide, exports
The learning by Indian firms in both mature and emerging product segments has been situated against
a rich institutional backdrop of early government intervention. The country is unique among
developing countries (indeed special among many advanced industrialised countries as well) in having
a high percentage of Indian-owned firms competing with multinational firms (MNCs) in the top 100
firms. The relative performance of Indian firms versus MNCs is also highlighted by Pant (1995) who
studied a sample of 218 chemical and 202 engineering firms and found no significant difference in the
extent of export orientation of foreign firms (MNC affiliates) and Indian ones except in the
pharmaceutical sector, where Indian firms outperformed foreign firms.
Lastly, while the world pharmaceutical industries show coalescence around core business skills
derived from chemicals and developed in consumer products, the Indian pharmaceutical firms are
mixed. Diversified business groups (DBGs) with varying backgrounds in telecommunications,
petroleum, power and construction, made ambitious forays into drug discovery and development.
Manufacturing still remained largely the province of medium-sized pharmaceutical bulk and
formulation producers. Hyderabad city alone, in the South, produced more than 40% of the country's
bulk drugs through mostly medium-sized manufacturing units.
The Indian pharmaceutical sector also provided a significant foreign exchange opportunity, in addition
to being a source of technology exchange, with pharmaceuticals now being 4% and growing, of total
Indian exports or totalling US$840 million in April 2000-March 2001 (OPPI, 2000). Furthermore,
Indian companies exported to more than 100 countries worldwide and were aggressively expanding in
transition economies, for example, being the second largest supplier of pharmaceuticals in Ukraine,
second only to Germany.' This South-South market expansion in developing and transition economies
represents almost 20% of potential world market share. (Scrip, 1998, p. 120) In recent years, Indian
companies also became more aggressive in the generics or off-patent drugs market, moving quickly to
assure exclusive licensing.' In the year 2000, Indian drug exports crossed the US$1.5billion mark for
the first time and various projections placed the value of the industry to grow to about US$25 billion
to over 70 countries, with field presence in 25 of them and manufacturing in the 7 listed above. In 2003 alone,
upto October, Alembic bought a Dutch company, Aurobindo Pharma bought a Chinese pharmaceutical unit,
Cadila Healthcare a French formulations business and Wockhardt bought C P Pharma (UK) (Centre for
Monitoring the Indian Economy, CMIE and various news reports.)
8 Compiled from Indian Embassy reports and trade reports of export councils.
9 A recent success, for example, has been Dr. Reddy's Laboratories (DRL) receiving FDA approval to market
Fluoxetine the generic for blockbuster drug Prozac from Eli Lilly for an exclusive 18-month period after going
off patent. This generates large payoffs and a monopoly position for generics manufacturers.
in 2010. In biopharmaceuticals, statistics are more difficult to come by, although estimates of current
revenues are US$380 million for all biotech applications to US$ 270 million for biopharmaceuticals
alone in 2002-'03.10
The pharmaceutical industry in the 20t* century has come to be characterised by a few notable
company names, many large multinational companies from the US and Western Europe, some
originating in the late 19* and early 20*h centuries. Markets are segmented based on regulatory and
patent regimes, per capita health spending and by insurance systems. The world pharmaceutical
industry is characterised by certain economic traits: market structure (oligopoly and concentration and
stability to the configuration), barriers to entry (product differentiation, economies of scale, predatory
pricing), multinational dominance and global spread. Innovation is thus defined by who does it, what
price or product/process strategies are adopted, how large their output can get and what barriers they
face-economically, technologically and institutionally.
The pharmaceutical industry has moved from advances in chemistry: specifically, discovery,
categorisation, and isolation of effective components of many age-old drugs such as the alkaloids,
quinine and morphine; from serendipitous and persistent discovery of organic synthesis clues arising
from by products of abundant industrial by-products such as coal tar; from advances in the fields of
pharmacology and chemotherapy. (Drews, 1997) These led to rapid growth in the field and a swathe of
new institutional arrangements for health insurance, university-industry relationships, and State
funding of research. It is these very same institutional arrangement, specifically managed health care
and costs of medicines (and those that will be reimbursed) that have significantly affected the direction
of innovation in the industry today, particularly in the US. These changes have since affected
companies in India since new policies introduced in the US to lower costs of health care, have opened
the market to other'(generic drug) entrants. In each sector, the companies that discover drugs may well
be different from those that develop or manufacture them.
The largest market for most lucrative drugs remained that of the US, accounting for 42% of worldwide
pharmaceutical sales, with a high per capita spending on drugs, and US ownership of seven of the
leading ten pharmaceutical companies worldwide, and nine of the leading ten in biopharmaceuticals.
10 Biospectrum, Vol 1, Issue 7, September 2003, p. 10, Corporate Office Gurgaon, Haryana, India. To put these
numbers in perspective, these revenues are a fraction of the R&D budget of the world's leading pharmaceutical
company, Bristol-Myers-Squibb, at US$5003 million or of the world's largest biotechnology
(biopharmaceuticals) company Amgen, with R&D spending of US$865 million.
While the technological changes after the 1970s created new opportunities for firms, in reality the
pharmaceutical industry worldwide looked remarkably static in terms of company names, company
brands and national ownership patterns over the last century." Worldwide, R&D spending in the
pharmaceutical industry was US $30.4 billion in 2001, a rise of 17% from the previous year. There
were also 48 blockbuster drugs, 8 of which recorded sales of more than US $ 3 billion each. The
generics industry alone will account for a large portion of the market since over US$80 billion worth
of patented drugs will go off patent in 2005. Structurally, mergers and acquisitions continued, with
about 37% of structured around drug discovery arrangements. The alliances were primarily for
therapeutic categories such as 21% for cancer, 19% for infection/anti-viral and 15% for neurological
treatments. Overall, pharmaceutical outsourcing was estimated at US$ 8 billion." Overall,
biotechnology companies grew in size and in research spending, as did pharmaceutical companies." In
the last few years, the leading products worldwide were lifestyle drugs and those catering to diseases
of predominantly urban, advanced industrialised markets.
4.3.Pharmaceutical technologies
The technological learning that firms engage in is not influenced by technological choices alone.
Nevertheless, the technologies provide differentiated challenges and opportunities to firms and may
limit them to certain types of product or process categories or to formulations or even packaging
alone.
Firms face three main types of technology in the drug industry:
1. The discovery of new drugs, usually referred to as Product technology
2. The development of viable production methods, usually referred to as Process technology
(note these may also include improvements to existing technologies) and
3. The use of multiple dosage forms (Formulations) and methods to store, transfer and distribute
therapeutics (Packaging and storage technologies)
"Besides mergers and acquisitions that concatenated their names, the leading companies stayed steady.
Structurally there is a further division of labor, with pharmaceutical companies separated from
biopharmaceutical companies. The top 3 worldwide pharmaceutical leaders by absolute R&D spending (often
with their own biopharmaceutical divisions) were Bristol-Myers Squibb (US), followed by Pfizer (US) and
Glaxo Smithkline (UK). Of the top twenty pharmaceutical firms, 11 were US firms (Bristol-Myers Squibb,
Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Abbott, Merck, Eli Lilly, Pharmacia, Wyeth, Schering-Plough, Medtronic and
Baxter), two UK (Glaxo Smithkline and AstraZeneca) two French (Aventis and Sanofi-Synthelabo), two Swiss
(Novartis and Roche), two Japanese (Takeda Chemical and Sankyo) and one German firm (Schering). (Source:
"The Corporate R&D Scorecard 2002", Technology Review Magazine, December 2002/January 2003)
12 All statistics quoted here from Ernst and Young, "Defining Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry", January
2002-September 2002, Partners in Vision
Worldwide, countries are seen to either have all three types of technological capability, or to have
specialised in one or other type. " Roughly speaking, many developing countries are primarily
formulators and packagers, while advanced industrialised countries possess all three types of
technological capability, but may focus mainly on product and process technologies.
The drug development cycle for both synthetic and biological drugs is complex technologically and
prohibitive financially. The nature of innovation and the costs of undertaking it are significant. Some
estimates put the cost of a new prescription drug reaching the market at US$802 million, while ten
years ago the cost was $231 million, in 1987 dollars. (Tufts Centre for the Study of Drug
Development, CSDD, and DiMasi et al, 1991, 200) A modem drug development cycle with distinct
product development and process development sequences are shown below. The process development
is also a three-step process from process research to prototype and pilot development to
commercialization from lab to factory. In industrial biotechnologies, a typical 3-step process consists
of preparation phases, fermentation phases and recovery and purification phases. In pharmaceuticals
using biotechnologies, the stages are similar.
13 Note, the high % of R&D spending of sales revenue for biotech versus pharmaceutical companies. Some
biotech firms have R&D spending rates that outstrip revenue streams, pointing to dependence on pipeline drugs.
14 Perhaps the dichotomy most evident in pharmaceuticals, matched in few other industries, is the importance
given to companies who undertake product, rather than process, innovation. This dichotomy has been translated
into the relative importance given to drug discovery findings versus companies that engage with process
development and manufacturing. Innovation in the industry is projected in the media and in much academic
literature on the industry primarily in terms of product technology, but process innovations are also important..
This is in part due to difficulties in measuring process innovation. Pisano (1997) shows the variation in
importance of processes over products and lists pharmaceuticals as "process enabled".
Table 4.3.1 Typical modern pharmaceutical drug development cycle
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS DEVELOPMENT PHASES
PHASES
Broad process category Actual process
contribution
Lead compound discovery Target, hit and lead
identification
Pre-clinical development Process research (Alternative Lead optimisation and
synthetic routes, Routes scaled Candidate drug pre-
up for laboratory use, Lab-level nomination (Medicinal
production for clinical studies) chemistry route)
Clinical development Process research and Concept testing (Early
Prototype and pilot plant scalable synthesis)
development (Scale-up to pilot
plant, Kinetics and scale-up
uncertainties, Production for
clinical trials, Design of plant
equipment)
Regulatory approvals Prototype and pilot plant End of early phase and
development and start of Advanced scalable
Ramp-up from laboratory to synthesis
plant (Scale-up to commercial
plant-level, Scale-up of processes
for commercialisation)
Marketing and distribution Ramp-up from laboratory to Advanced scalable
plant synthesis
Adapted from Pisano (1997) and Federsel (2003)
From the time of target, hit and lead identification, itself a process of many years of search and
experimentation, the time taken until launch comprises investment in lead optimisation (upto 2 years),
pre-nomination and nomination of potential candidates (less than a year), followed by testing of the
concept-including proof of principle and concept- (upto 3 years), development for product launch and
filing for registration with regulatory authorities (upto 2 years) and finally, launch itself (1 year
approximately). However, overlapping these product development segments are the contributions of
process R&D investments. These comprise medicinal chemistry work during the lead optimisation and
candidate pre-nomination and nomination phase and approximately two segments of early and
advanced scaling efforts. The first generation effort, of scalable synthesis, occurs during
approximately three-quarters of the concept-testing phase. The remaining portion of this phase and
that of the development for launch and launch phases uses the advanced or second generation scaling
effort.
The two sets of broad technology categories are therefore not independent from the product cycle's
standpoint, although the division of labour between different types of firms may relegate product
development and process development to separate organisational divisions within the same firm.
What characterises the process development in particular are the skills necessary to scale up operations
from laboratory to factory, or the ability to take a lab-scale process and have it operate without
hindrance in a production setting at industrial-scale." Some common process technologies that were
revolutionary in the pharmaceutical industry were those for fermentation, which enabled commercial
penicillin to be produced. Biotechnology is fundamentally based on process technologies since it
attempts to create proteins that are difficult to create through standard chemical synthesis. The
specifics of each stage are shown below for pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, highlighting the 'old'
(synthetic) and "new' (biological) ways in which drugs are manufactured. A fuller account of
differences between old and new types of pharmaceutical development is presented in the later chapter
on the rise of Indian biopharmaceuticals.
For this dissertation, the focus in interviews and in analysing secondary literature was on the elements
of business strategy that depend on process development that related to process chemistry and bio-
chemistry (the process research component) and the process engineering (the pilot development and
commercial plant transfer and start-up component). While undoubtedly other important production-
related skills are involved, such as mechanical engineering, computation, or even inventory control,
these are not at the core of this dissertation.
Within drug manufacture itself, there are two types of technologies that firms need to incorporate. The
main elements are (a) Bulk drugs (active pharmaceutical ingredients in drugs, API) (b) Formulations
(the move from bulk drugs into finished dosage forms -tablets, capsules, ointments etc.). The primary
source technology for production of pharmaceuticals is the technology of bulk drugs production.
However, few developing countries possess the capabilities of being able to manufacture bulk drugs
1 To use a now classic example, although acetylsalicyclic acid was first synthesised in a laboratory in 1853 with
acetyl chloride as an acetylating agent, it took more than 40 years with acetic anhydride as an acetylating agent
for a scalable, large-scale production system to be put in place. The result was the phenomenally successful drug
Aspirin from Bayer.
from scratch from local raw materials. Bulk drug producers can be of various types, generic or
specialised suppliers to other innovating firms.
Section I
Section I highlights that technological leaming is representative of more than economic and cognitive
activities alone. It is rooted in a socio-political framework that allows economic (particularly industrial
policies) to seek legitimacy and that stalls opposition. Learning occurred here through manufacturing
capabilities that were not built in all possible profitable segments simultaneously. They were
developed in certain product categories linked to "essential" drugs deemed important for the public's
health-particularly antibiotics, anti-infectives and vaccines. The link between public health and "entry"
into the product life cycle is described by the early policy choices for drug development and
manufacturing, and further developed by an examination of product profiles of leading companies
today and by examining which niches of public health they have built on.
4.4.Public health, private learning: Market entry and capture
" Technological self-reliance in food and medicine was
an important basis for decisions"
(Interview with policymaker, Oct 15 2003)
For the purposes of this research, public health drugs can be categorised as all therapeutic and
diagnostic products that serve large-scale health needs in developing countries, but are not restricted to
communicable diseases alone.
Neoclassical explanations for technology advance have tended to pay little or no attention to the socio-
political dimensions of economic choice. In these models, all firms know the "frontier", and all firms
make rational choices, based on their resources/factors of production, of which technologies to invest
in. There is little analytical room for the influence of the environment, in selecting firms for market
success that fit a specific national profile or set of capabilities. Analysis of past Indian data shows that
the role of public health in technological learning has been vastly underestimated. Besides its expected
socio-political function, it served to act as both an entry and market capture instrument.
While a few of India's leading firms today emerged after the most intense phase of intervention by the
State, many cut their teeth on government assistance. The sections below address the findings on the
key role of public health on a variety of fronts, most importantly, as a technology "entry point" to
domestic and foreign markets alike as well as a route to market capture of the large domestic market in
the early years. It also demonstrates how public health continues to be an important driver of gains to
Indian firms many years later, primarily through international procurement.
Before 1947, the country was heavily dependent on imports of essential medicines. The duration of
World War II proved especially difficult with large-scale scarcity of critical drugs. The early 20t
century patent regime appears to have primarily served the interests of British manufacturing firms,
and the majority of drugs were imported from Britain into India. Post-1947, Indian policy-makers and
nationalists across a wide domain of interests pushed for socialist medicine unsuccessfully though
national health schemes. Although these were unsuccessful, calls became ever louder for access to
medicines for all citizens.
Perhaps not surprising for a newly independent country, debates raged on the role that foreign
multinational companies should play in the manufacture and sale of essential medicines.
Technological self-reliance was seen as an extension of Swadeshi (indigenous) and Swaraj (self-rule).
The public sector effort characterised the 1950s and 1960s, while the 1970s and 1980s comprised a
critical second phase where nascent Indian-owned private sector capabilities had to be fuelled by the
State, channelled into essential medicines, and to be pushed to compete against foreign firms.
However, public health as a national goal, but subverted to build private indigenous companies is
particularly well highlighted in the case where the government licensed Salbutamol to Cipla, instead
of Glaxo.' 6
Indian independence in 1947 brought with it a nationalistic fervour for addressing its most basic needs,
in food security and health, however, until 1983, there was no formal national health policy for
citizens, nor was the public sector able to provide an impetus to the industry by itself. Nevertheless,
the Indian republic post-1950s embraced a vision of access to medicines, even if its actual efforts to
16 While this was being debated in the Indian Parliament, Glaxo protested the selective application of national
interest clauses, "Parliament stands for the right of the people to be heard on issues involving national interests.
Yet it is now being seen to be spending more of its time and attention on the causes ofprivate parties who wish
to further their own economic interests. Certainly, decision taken in respect to individual companies, could in
certain instances, have relevance to national policy. But when Parliament is drawn into protracted wrangles in
which individual interests appear to be the main consideration, it is not surprising that some of its own members
are provoked to voice their protest against the manner in which proceedings are conducted. Again, when the
Government, in arriving at its decisions, appears to apply the rules of national good to one party and waived
those very rules for another, national policies lose their meaning altogether." Glaxo News, Bangalore Depot
Special-a Glaxo Laboratories in-house publication, May 1982. Cited in J. S. Mazumdar, Background Paper in
Sen Gupta (Ed.), 1986.
sustain an ambitious pro-poor agenda with public health infrastructure as a focus met with failure. The
governments also sent out mixed signals about who could spearhead the effort for technological self-
reliance. Symptomatic of this policy malaise,, even as late as the Sixth Five Year Plan, the government
supported the public sector effort in principle but this was not reflected in its budget."
Pharmaceutical technology straddles multiple levels of sophistication, from simply importing and
repackaging imported medicines that are already fully manufactured to the ability to locally produce
bulk materials from raw materials that are themselves locally available. While public health medicine
supply can tolerate importing in finished medicines, public health drug security requires some
significant degree of indigenous capability. Independent India with its twin banners of meeting basic
needs as well as becoming self-reliant after a harsh colonial experience forged a new technological
identity around public health access and drug supply.'" Technology transfer experiences of the time
had been unsuccessful (see Sahu, 1998, for example), and foreign firms were tolerated because of their
access to the latest technologies.
Public health was a critical political economy instrument that channelled large-scale investments into
State-structured categories of drug manufacture. The early years were characterised with a widespread
fervour for access to medicines for the poor. But while "essential" medicines served to propel
manufacturing license allocation to Indian-owned firms and provided incentives for increased plant
capacity investments, the national focus on public health did something more. It created a system of
demand and supply-side initiatives in which public health drugs acted as a technological and market
entry point for Indian firms. Firms learnt by technology transfer (often via the public sector, which
itself had negotiated transfers from other countries) and then scaled-up and manufactured, assured of
significant local procurement and (later) exports. But the scale-up and manufacture was not always
straightforward. Process patents encouraged firms to seek new ways to the same end drug, and the
price controls forced this process to become ever more efficient. Thus the learning that firms were
channelled into reaped dividends in terms of (a) process capabilities-chemistry and engineering,
particularly in terms of yield for antibiotics and (b) more efficient plants (economies of scale over
time).
17 The Plan indicates, "the public sector should take a leading role", but the allocation was Rs. 150 crore for the
public sector and Rs. 250 crore in the private sector for drug production. (Rs. 1 crore = Rs. 10 million)
Government of India, Sixth Five Year Plan document.
18 In later years, at the 34th World Health Assembly of 1982 in Geneva, Switzerland, Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi in a well-publicised speech, expressed an attitude common in the country at the time, "The idea of a
One interviewee stated:
"Public health gives big markets, large collaborative
structures, thus steady advances."
(Interview)
In the 1970s, the concentration of formulation producers varied by category. Less technologically
challenging categories such as Antacids had 12 firms while cardiovascular formulations showed 6,
central nervous system analgesics 20 and, vitamins 16 and anti-pyretics 10. However, the most
concentrated category for technological and public policy reasons was broad and narrow antibiotics,
with 21 companies in this group alone.19 The largest segment of market share continues to belong to
antibiotics at 19.4% (Org-Marg) in 2000. The data indicates that Ranbaxy, Cipla, Zydus Cadila and
Wockhardt all began their technological trajectory in anti-infective segments and have since
diversified outward from this core area. For Ranbaxy and Cipla, anti-infectives provided the decades-
old launch pad for exports and for the push into generic drugs. The public health policy focus on anti-
infectives also provided a ready national procurement system and steady growth, although with
increasingly lower margins. In very recent times, the antiterrorism alerts in the US have driven up the
profile of antibiotics such as Ciprofloxacin, which constitute core products for Ranbaxy and Cipla.
Some companies like Ranbaxy have a sustained history in antibiotics, which has become a modern-
day asset in the US market, with its recent bio-terrorism scares. Anti-tubercular are in principle, an
attractive segment in all developing countries, where both TB and HIV (with patient susceptibility to
TB) are prevalent. Lupin, one of the leading manufacturers, holds over 40% of the anti-TB market in
the country, but has struggled to meet some efficacy requirements abroad.?0 However, TB medications
only have 2.4% of the market. Foreign firms have traditionally dominated "non-essential" segments of
the market and Indian companies like Ranbaxy and Alkem are positioned in the top 10 products due to
their public health drug capabilities in Cephalosporins and quinolones. (Org-Marg, 2001)
The table below was created to demonstrate the continuing effects of older policies on the product
structure and market orientation of India's five leading firms and some of the interviewed
biopharmaceutical firms. The entries were made based on potential candidacy for procurement-not all
companies have directly benefited from procurement. All come from significant process development
better-ordered world is one in which medical discoveries will be free of patents and there will be no profiteering
from life and death". (IDMA bulletin, 15, no. 25, 1984, p. 391).
'9 Singh (1985), pp. 72-81.
histories, many have benefited from significant demand-side incentives, particularly procurement (P)
for public health markets and some have directly benefited from past production allocation of
manufacturing licenses. Their public health core has also been important in their market access
strategies in the generic drugs market in the US and other advanced industrialised countries. Only
Biocon and Sun do not have public health drugs as a significant part of their product portfolio, and the
former emerged from a history of industrial applications, not health. All have significant plant
capacities and almost all have invested in GMP infrastructure.'
Table 4.4.1 Public health legacy of leading Indian pharmaceutical companies
Company Candidate for Market Access: Public health-core therapeutic
Procurement GENERICS (G)/US or segment (e.g. vaccines
(P) Other antibiotics or antibacterial)-See
next table
Ranbaxy Yes G US O Yes
Cipla Yes G US O Yes
Sun Yes (some GUSO No
Pharmaceuticals antibiotics)
Cadila Yes G 0 Yes
Wockhardt Yes G US O Yes
DRL Yes GUSO Yes
Bharat Biotech Yes G Yes (Vaccines)
Shantha Biotechnics Yes G Yes (Vaccines)
Biocon Yes G US Yes (antibiotics)
20 One study cites problems with Lupin's single drug rifampicin products sold in South Africa. The drug showed
varied bioavailability and pharmacokinetic variation between patients. (International Journal of Tuberculosis &
Lung Diseases (6(4):356-361, April 2002)
21 Although the top 5 firms are profiled here, the dissertation research studied a vast number of other firms
including some that no longer exist. In this section, as in other ones, the leading five are representative of a
broader sample of learning techniques and capabilities. However, these other firms are differentiated from those
who compete on cost alone and have no innovative products or processes as indicated by secondary data.
Table 4.4.2 Public health segments of leading companies
Vaccine suppliers also abound where procurement is vital. India's pulse polio drive nationally can
administer approximately 80 million doses in a day alone. In addition, as the domestic market crowds
(as is occurring in Hepatitis B more recently), companies began to move into overseas markets. The
Serum Institute alone exports products to over 130 countries, and is the leading producer in India for
both DTP and MMR vaccines.
Although these are not large revenue segments for many of the companies, they have strangely enough
found a new avenue back into the market for the same reason: a new need in advanced industrialised
countries in particular, and not enough manufacturers. In particular, large multinational companies
have moved out of these segments over time, providing opportunities for firms from developing
countries, which may be able to manufacture to US FDA and other standards.
Furthermore, the core focus and use of public health as an entry point has allowed a form of collective
learning with private firms and public research institutions (PRIs) coming together to commercialise
(particularly) public health drugs. The table below indicates the extent to which diseases relevant to
the Indian population such as vaccines for the rotavirus, rabies, malaria, TB, combined vaccines (pent
valence and other), dosage and delivery form, have resulted in alliances with PRIs (both national
laboratories as well as universities) and continue to be a source of competitive advantage for firms.
Firms that engage in public health research also have access to R&D financing from the government
22 A common distinction is that antibiotics are substances produced by living cells, while antibacterials (or
antimicrobials) are synthetic chemicals used to fight against bacteria. However, this classification has its own
problems since many antibiotic derivatives can themselves be partially or completely synthetic.
COMPANY ANTIBIOTICS OR VACCINES
ANTIBACTERIALS_
Ranbaxy Yes Yes (planned)
Cipla Yes No (possibility of conducting clinical trials
only for AIDS vaccines developed elsewhere)
Sun Pharmaceuticals No No
Cadila Yes Yes (launched)
Wockhardt Yes Yes (launched)
DRL Yes Yes (planned)
Biocon Yes No
Bharat Biotech No Yes (launched)
Shantha Biotechnics No Yes (launched)
and international donor agencies, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. A further benefit to this core
focus is that it provides almost automatic access for Indian firms to PRIs abroad as the table indicates
from data collected on recent collaborations. However, linking to public domain research is not a
guarantee of success. Even with barriers to transfer lowered, learning is not straightforward, as later
chapters demonstrate when discussing data from biopharmaceutical firms.
Vaccines are an "ideal-type" for public health drugs and Bharat Biotech International Limited, a
vaccine producer, among other specialties, is a classic example of how private R&D can be linked to
public efforts and funding when the research focus is public health. The box below indicates its
current portfolio of national and international public research linkages. Some are with national public
health programs in the India and the US, others are with international initiatives for public health.
Table 4.4.3Sample collaboration with public research in 2003
National Indian Institute of Science-Bangalore Third generation Hepatitis B-Vaccine
Centre for Biochemical Technology-New Delhi
JN Centre for Advanced Research -Bangalore
Institute of Biotechnology
Institute of Human Genetics-Bangalore
All India Institute of Medical Sciences -New
Delhi
International Centre for Genetic Engineering &
Biotechnology (UNIDO) - New Delhi. dvelopment ali a
candidate against Malaria
Institute for Virology, Pune
International Centres for Disease Control-Atlanta (USA) Rota Virus Infection
collaborations National Institute of Health-Washington DC
and grants (USA)
National Child Health Institute (USA)
National Institute of Allergy & Infectious Rota Virus Infection
Diseases (USA)
Stanford University (USA) Rota Virus Infection
Program for Appropriate Technology for Health Development & scaling up of a Vaccine
- PATH
Global Alliance for Vaccine Initiative - GAVI
(USA) Development & scaling up of a Vaccine
Malaria Vaccine Initiative - MVI (USA) candidate against Malaria
Development & scaling up of a Vaccine
Children's vaccine program- PATH candidate against Malaria
Spread Program, World Bank Development & scaling up of a Vaccine
candidate against Malaria
Source: Bharat Biotech International Limited company reports
Cadila alone has R&D collaborations with over 30 research centres in the country.
This focus on public health drugs to meet the large demand within the country and in other developing
countries, has not been relegated to synthetic drugs alone. Many recombinant technologies for public
health drugs in recent years have also been developed through collaborative efforts with public
research partners and with some public funding.
Table 4.4.4 Public-private collaborations for recombinant R&D
PRI Company Recombinant product
International Centre for Genetic Engineering Biological E Hepatitis B vaccine
and Biotechnology (ICGEB), New Delhi, M.S
University of Baroda
Institute of Microbial Technology (IMTECH), Bharat Biotech Streptokinase
Chandigarh Cadila
Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bangalore Cadila Follicle Stimulating Honnone
Centre for Biotechnology, New Delhi, M.S. Bharat Biotech Epidermal Growth Factor
University of Baroda Biological E
Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore Shantha Biotechnics Human Growth Hormone
Source: TIFAC "Recombinant DNA Therapeutic Products", January
India", Final Report, A. Maria, J. Ruet, M-H. Zerah.
2002, cited in "Biotechnology in
In addition, public policies geared towards production of antibiotics for example, impinged directly on
technological capabilities:
Table 4.4.5 The link between public health and manufacturing technology
Public health element Relevant policy Impact on Indian fuims
Manufacture of essential Local production and allocation to Indian firms Increased domestic
drugs (e.g. Antibiotics) market share in essential
Canalisation of raw materialsdrugs
Public sector manufacturing companies Increased production
Technology transfer of relevant strains to private sector capacity in antibiotics
More private firms
Compulsory licensing and Controller's powers in evelopm e
setting the terms of settlement.
Greater access to
technologies for Indian
Public procurement finns
Drug price controls Lowered risk, some
technology upgrading
Lowered prices in some
categories, evidence for
excess manufacturing of
non-essentials and
formulations
Companies such as Sarabhai Chemicals, heavily into antibiotics, ranked consistently in the top two
between 1980-'86, and was since overtaken by companies such as Ranbaxy, Cadila, Lupin, Cipla and
others. Ranbaxy and Cipla both developed considerable antibiotic and anti-infective portfolios and
Cipla subsequently went into AIDS therapies as well. Lupin grew as one of the largest tuberculosis
drug manufacturers in the world, and became the world's largest producer of ethambutol. Ranbaxy
ranked first in total sales today, was 9 h in 1983, twenty years ago. Its learning path has been structured
around antibiotics, particularly Cephalosporins.
The learning pathway for most firms was therefore structured to adapt to national policy empathy for
public health, even if many millions of Indians continued to lack access to basic health care. Prices fell
in some segments, the industry grew larger, and process capabilities were enhanced, as subsequent
sections demonstrate.
Section II
Section II lays the groundwork for introducing the policy environment in which the Indian
pharmaceutical industry was born. Not only was State intervention high in the early years of post-
independent India, but it continued at a high level of involvement for over a decade. The late 1960s
and early 1970s were critical periods for building capabilities, but these alone were not enough. It
attempts to anchor current capabilities in a historical climate where private firms were technologically
unsophisticated, and where the public research infrastructure was established to create the basis for a
later innovation climate.
4.5.1950s-1960s: A crucible for learning: the public sector effort
"IDBL and the public sector were critical in the Hyderabad
story. People don't like to hear it but the public sector was
very important." (Interview, June 12f 2002)
The Indian pharmaceutical industry began in the early part of the 20* century. The archival history is
sketchy on this front. Indian capability in pharmaceuticals arose predominantly from investments
initially made within the public sector companies and research institutes (PRIs) and increasingly
adopted and nurtured within the private sector. Indeed, in some cities like Hyderabad, the migration of
people and their capabilities from public sector laboratories such as IDBL has defined the basis for the
spurt in private sector pharmaceutical capability.23 Post Indian economic liberalisation, beginning in
23 Indeed, people like Dr. Anji Reddy, CEO of Dr. Reddy's Labs, were straight "imports" from public sector to
private and served to create the defining vision for the private domain research and manufacturing capability. A
the mid-1980s and galvanised by the balance of payments crisis of 1990, forced previously distinct
and largely isolated public and private sector R&D strategies closer together, the former because of
funding constraints and a renewed mandate to work closely with industry, the latter because of the
weight of the global regulatory regime for both patents and certification."
The table below provides a chronological view of the development of pharmaceutical and
biotechnological capability in India. Specific policy measures such as New Drug policy and the Patent
Act appear to have had significant effects on firm-level learning as the chapter shortly discusses.
Table 4.5.1 Chronology of institutional change in Indian bio-pharmaceuticals
Period Initiative and Effect
Pre-1947 British-friendly patent law. Imports dominate the market. Local production low and multinational
companies thrive.
1901 First Indian phannaceutical company reported open
1904-1907 British establish several research centres for tropical diseases.
1914-1918 World War I. Imports cut off. Local demand grows and local industry builds capability
1919 First drugs safety law enacted
1931 Drugs Enquiry Committee established to monitor prices and propose price controls.
1939-1945 World War II Imports cut off. Local industry continues to grow. India begins to
produce conventional drugs as well as vaccines and serums. Dysentery and leprosy drugs begin.
1950-1970 Indian independence and creation of the Republic. Period of rapid industrialisation building on
pre-World war II manufacturing experience.
Establishment of public sector research centre network in key locations. Hindustan Antibiotics
Limited (1954) and IDBL (1961), Hyderabad established, for example and becomes an industry
pioneer.
1955-1960 Second Five-Year Plan. Government places pharmaceutical industry together with
other chemical-based industries for integrated development planning.
1960-1965 Third Five-Year Plan. Government fuels public sector enterprises growth nationwide.
Manufacturers produce penicillin, streptomycin and antibiotics of the tetracycline group. Firms
establish foreign collaborations to acquire technical knowledge and develop synthetic drugs and
alkaloids.
combination of advances in the public sector and its capabilities, and its inefficiencies, led to the eventual
movement of skilled researchers out to seek their fortunes in the business sphere. However, these same people
thus also recognise the ways in which effective public-private collaborations around R&D and technology
transfer, can be structured.
24 WTO rules for patent law harmonisation appear to have created new need for State intervention.
1970-1972 Drug Price Control Order 1970 serves to severely regulate the market vis-i'-vis wholesale and
retail prices. Serves to increase competition and number of smaller companies.
Patents Act 1970 recognises only product patents and patents for production processes for 7 years.
Serves to create protections for Indian firms while they learn and excel at process chemistry and
engineering.
1978 New Drug Policy structures manufacturing capabilities through procurement and allocation
1980-86 1982 establishment of National Biotechnology Board. 1986, end of the Board's mandate.
Identified focus areas for biotechnology and hurdles.
1986 Establishment of the Department of Biotechnology (still in existence) under the Ministry of
Science and Technology to coordinate multi-disciplinary S&T capability building.
1986-1991 Objective to establish a network of biotech-competence in the country. Grants disbursed liberally.
Creation of the Centre for Cell and Molecular Biology, Hyderabad
Also creation of National Institute of Immunology, International centre for Genetic Engineering,
New Delhi (with United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, UNIDO, assistance)
Serves to deepen and widen the competence network and institutionalise biotechnology
importance in the country
1990 Establishment of the Biotechnology Consortium of India BCIL, a public-sector company to
provide public financing to industry in the absence of private venture capital.
1991 Balance of Payments crisis. India's New Economic Policy. Rethinking of State role. Funds crisis
deepens for national laboratories. Liberalisation of the Indian economy continues (begins in the
mid-1980s).
Multinational firms increase presence with relaxed controls on foreign ownership. However,
increased competition eventually forces some MNCs to exit the market.
1991- Continued DBT activity, including new Millennium initiatives to network private and public sector
present capability. CSIR laboratories continue to open up and work with industry. IISc and NCBS also
open up and deepen links with private sector. State-funded research in national centres continues
for public health remedies.
The story of Indian indigenous capability emerging through a strong Indian-owned private sector is a
complex one. Against a backdrop of in-country paucity of antibiotics, vitamins and anti-diabetes
drugs, a Pharmaceutical Enquiry Committee was established in 1953 to address industry-wide
imbalances in supply and demand of essential drugs (antibiotics and synthetic bulk drugs). The history
of essential drugs such as penicillin shows technological challenges in scaling-up and manufacturing
large volumes." The results were that industrial licenses were effectively tied to company agreements
to locally manufacture bulk drugs from initial stages. However, foreign-owned firms were reluctant to
do so. There appear to have been at least 5 distinct phases in India's move from dependence to
25 The US war effort required large volumes of penicillin but firms lacked the ability to obtain large yields.
Eventually, a "mission-mode" UK initiative led to the development of industrial-scale penicillin production to
treat the ravages of war, Landau, Achilladelis and Scriabine (Eds.), 1999.
technological self-reliance. 2 6 In the first phase, Hindustan Antibiotics Limited (HAL), with technical
and financial help from UNICEF and the WHO, and the Indian Drug and Pharmaceuticals Limited
(IDPL), with assistance from the Soviet Union, manufactured on a large scale to become the largest
producers in the Third World for antibiotics and for synthetic drugs of local supply. HAL and IDPL
were at the forefront of the public sector pioneering effort in pharmaceuticals until a private sector
emerged capable of investing in innovation. Their legacies have been mixed successes on technology
imports, but robust advances in indigenous antibiotic production and essential bulk drugs. An
important sector for indigenous activity was vaccines, where a series of Indian efforts in public
research institutes and universities were jump-started by the government.
The story begins with the initial investments in public sector capacity, a predecessor of private sector
capability today. The 1970 Patent Act did not act to create protection for domestic learning in a
vacuum. Indian technological capability in the pharmaceutical sector had already been established
early on with national research centres such as the Hindustan Antibiotics in Pimpri in 1954 and the
Central Drug research Institute in Lucknow, and the Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals (IDPL) in
1961 in Hyderabad, and later, the Pune-based vaccines research focus. The network of public sector
capability in pharmaceuticals was to reduce dependence on multinational companies (Singh, 1985).27
While the public research institutes suffered from a variety of inefficiencies, they provided
nevertheless an institutional mandate for dedicated resources in "mission-mode" for health research,
particularly those of a public goods nature such as vaccines. Their ability to create nation-wide
technological capability in manufacturing low-cost drugs, while also providing a platform for some
pockets of high-quality scientific research, created the base for both the pharmaceutical industry as
well as recent advances in biotechnology. They also provided an undeniable source of technically
skilled, professional managers who migrated to the private sector and thus created a network of
localised historical links between public and private R&D and manufacturing institutions. Indeed,
many interviewees were of this category.
26 This differs from Sahu (1998) who studies four phases. The data shows public sector investments, building
domestic manufacturing capabilities in the private sector, containment of foreign firms, further growth of Indian
firms in capabilities and size, and finally, export-launches of Indian firms in multiple overseas markets.
27 In addition, a variety of medical universities, teaching hospitals and a large, well-trained medical community,
had created the institutional mechanisms for referral, diagnosis and distribution of prescription drugs. Although
health insurance did not exist, a vast network of Central Government Health Service outlets provided the civil
and military services with prescription drug coverage to some extent and has since expanded the private
insurance and hospital markets to the middle-classes.
Technology was sourced into the public sector and the relatively advanced capabilities were built. In
HAL alone, first-time process development advances were made in penicillin, streptomycin and
gentamicin, among others. The sources of these technologies were varied, penicillin through the US
via the World Health Organisation and later upgraded from Toyojozo in Japan, gentamicin again
trough both the US via the WHO as well as the Hungarian company Medimpex (Sahu, 1998).2"
Process advances were also made in Streptomycin Sulfate and Ampicillin Anhydrous. The other major
public sector laboratory, IDPL with five sites had distributed capacity ranging from antibiotics,
synthetic drugs, and drug and chemical intermediates to formulations and surgical instrumentation. In
Hyderabad, its centre for synthetic drugs and in Rishikesh for antibiotics, IDPL successfully
manufactured 40% of India's bulk drug requirements as late as 1983. 24 drug technologies had process
development and manufacture in-house and pilot-scale-up was completed for 14 others. While only 6
countries worldwide knew how to manufacture Vitamin B6, IDPL also accomplished this and
provided consultancy services for many years to a variety of developing countries through the UN
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) partnership (Ibid.) Two decades after the founding of
the public sector effort, almost 90 drugs were manufactured locally that had been previously
unavailable. Categories of drugs needed across the country gradually became available, and at lower
prices, such as antibiotics (synthetic), analgesics, antihistamines, arthritic medications, some nervous
system medications, essential anaesthetics, some oncology drugs and routine vitamins, particularly
important for public health programs.
HAL also grew from its entry point into a single antibiotic for bulk drug manufacture, to a producer of
human and animal therapeutics and agricultural products. Its in-house R&D created Aureofungin
(commercialised since 1962), Hamycin (commercialised since 1962) and Penicillin G-Acylase
(commercialised since 1992). In addition to IDPL and HAL, with manufacturing capability, a variety
of research efforts in chemical research were founded, such as the Haffkine Institute was founded in
Mumbai around plague research, the Indian Institute of Chemical Technology (IICT), Central Drug
Research Institute (CDRI) and the National Chemical Laboratory (NCL). Drugs like paracetomol29,
ethambutol, metronidazole, were subsequently manufactured in the country and exported. For high
value added drugs like AZT, and cyclosporine indigenous technologies later became available.3 * CDRI
has since also developed a one-a-week contraceptive pill (Saheli), the only non-steroidal contraceptive
28 Schering (US), with best technology for Gentamicin, was unwilling to sell without equity in HAL Sahu, 1998).
29 CDRI scientists found a new process for manufacturing the painkiller Paracetamol by using phenol instead of
paraminophenol, which was scarce in the country.
30 AZT, or Zidovudine, an anti-AIDS drug, was manufactured using a variant of the original process, by IICT
and was subsequently transferred to Cipla for manufacturing.
pill worldwide. Local resources and skills were also nurtured to some degree, with commercial impact.
Within Ayurveda, an Indian traditional medicine, new therapies were found. CDRI helped create
entirely new drugs: Guggulipid for cholesterol reduction from the plant Commiphora mukul
("Guggul"), Memory Plus TM using baculosides extracted from the "Brahmi" plant used extensively in
Ayurveda, for memory enhacement, Vincristine, a high value-added oncology drug developed from
Vinca Rosea plants ("Sadbahar")" Private firms speak even today of the effects of the public sector's
importance in both research and development as well as manufacturing in the initial foray of entering
the domestic market and capturing key segments for national production and national needs.
Interviewees cited the importance of (a) public infrastructure, even if needing upgrading (b) public
R&D advances, even if significantly under-commercialised (c) public sector personnel and their
migration to the private sector.
The public effort in pharmaceuticals, arising as it was amidst significant heavy industry investments in
industries such as petroleum, steel and chemicals, was an effort marked by significant long-term
effects-both negative and positive. The public research and development network appeared to have
been marked by some significant successes in both pharmaceutical and later, biotechnological, areas.
It was also successful at building a relatively sophisticated physical and skill infrastructure for a
developing country, and the skill-base in some sub-fields such as structural chemistry, for example,
was equal to the best in the field worldwide. In pharmaceuticals in particular, as the next section
demonstrates, the public effort was successful in pioneering the private sector foray into large-scale
and numerous manufacturing efforts. It is here, in the induced learning process, that the public effort
was most successful technologically, and through long-term professional development, and subsequent
migration, that its impact was felt most. The private sector was transferred key technologies sourced
through the public R&D units, then policies were geared in conjunction to induce private firms to
invest in scale-up and manufacture, in many cases this being accomplished successfully for the first
time in the public sector itself.
Nevertheless, the process was, perhaps not surprisingly, marked by considerable inefficiency and
systemic contradictions. While the best skills were born in public laboratories, they were not nurtured
in public research over the decades.
3 Traditional Indian herbal names are shown in parentheses and quotation marks.
"The fact that the public sector was a driver for initial
technology capabilities does not preclude the fact that it was
also marked by lack of overall inventiveness and repetitive
projects."
"In CSIR there are no younger people. I developed (XX) for
drug discovery there. No information was available, efforts
were isolated and my group was trying to reinvent the wheel"
"(Interview, July 5 2002).
That technology transfer is an inherently costly, uncertain and expensive process can be gleaned from
the experiences of both public sector undertakings. For a variety of reasons, the transfers for
antibiotics were problematic, leaving HAL no choice but to develop in-house capability with initial
transfer packages being unfruitful. In addition, technology rapidly became obsolete, so in-house
efforts were also eventually stymied in their search and experimentation timeline. In particular, the
company was plagued by low yields in the fermentation process in antibiotic manufacture. Production
scale also became a problem with government policy resulting in a fragmentation of plant capacity and
unit size, resulting in inefficient yields. IDPL suffered with Soviet technology transfer and was
reduced to holding on to obsolete technologies and languishing inventories of machinery and produced
drugs. Substantial delays also took place due to problems sourcing raw materials, design and
equipment alternations, and the plant began production in 1970, almost 11 years after the initial Soviet
agreement. It continued for a long time to have idle installed capacity for obsolete bulk drugs and
formulations, while India's private firms were beginning to ramp up in more modern technologies
(Sahu, 1998) Obsolete technologies continued to be used, and in the 1980s and 1990s, some critical
drugs such as cardiovascular ones such as streptokinase were still being imported, with no promise of
public effort appearing likely.
This trend continued well into the 1990s when 'sick' public sector firms of all kinds were gradually
placed on an auction block for privatisation."
32 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and its 40-odd public research laboratories in industries ranging
from leather to pharmaceuticals. The "XX" in parantheses in the quote was utilised for confidentiality reasons.
33 The Indian government has recently given private companies 60 days to submit tenders for privatising HAL.
In the state of Andhra Pradesh with Hyderabad at its core, with 40% of the country's bulk drug production, some
of these public assets such as IDPL are now being converted into State and private consortia-run R&D units.
Section III
Section III devotes itself to a closer investigation of the policy process that allowed private sector
capabilities to evolve and the ways in which foreign firms were contained while local firms grew. In
particular, it develops a narrative about two important policies on patents and prices, the first of which
is usually viewed as the primary explanation for advance in Indian pharmaceuticals. The ways in
which local firms were protected by the government while they grew and the limits placed on foreign
firms are described in Sections III and IV.
4.6.1970s-1980s: Process patents and price controls
The initiation of technological entry into important segments by the public sector was underway, but
industrial production was complicated by a reticent and inexperienced private sector. Multinational
companies overran the market and planners were troubled by the death of essential medicines and the
cost of those that existed. To reign in foreign firms as well as to discipline local ones, the government
pressed into service two strategic tools: process-only patents and price controls. Both were structured
to transfer technological opportunity into the hands of Indian-owned firms and to build a vast number
of Indian manufacturing units. Process development-new routes to old drugs in the simplest form, and
new routes to new drugs in the desired form, were both objectives of the policy mix. The process
patent regime allowed entry into hitherto inaccessible technology areas by issuing compulsory
licenses, explicitly favouring process innovation, further driving down costs, but stepping up process
development innovation in the industry. Price controls followed and were first initiated to prevent
excess profiteering in essential medicines, but created significant pressures to drive down
manufacturing costs and create process innovations so that retail prices would reflect this trend.
Process patents:
A pro-poor stand of the Congress government created the 1970 Patents Act of India, which generated
protection for processes only, allowing Indian pharmaceutical firms to (a) provide versions of brand
name monopolies at very low cost and (b) build up significant process chemistry capability."
The high volume markets in India and in other developing countries made the last 30 years a
particularly profitable time for Indian pharmaceutical companies, despite the low wholesale and retail
costs of the drugs. The Patent Act made it more unlikely that foreign firms would conduct R&D in
India, but boosted process investments substantially in Indian firms and created the conditions for
erosion of market power in foreign hands. A few years after the introduction of the Act, in 1976, for
example, only 4 Indian firms ranked in the top 20 by sales, whereas by 1995, 13 of the top 20 were
Indian companies and had cornered almost 85% of the market. In fact, of the top 50 sales revenue
companies, 38 were Indian firms, and only 3 multination companies were in the top 10. (ORG-
MARG, various years) The Indian Patent Act highlighted the fact that the government was not averse
to licensing, which continued, nor to patents themselves, but was strictly against monopolies, which it
saw affecting the prices of drugs for the masses. Product patents were not recognised, but patents for
production processes were allowed patent production for 7 years. Furthermore, to prevent restrictive
practices, the State could award compulsory licenses to other companies should the patent holder
refuse to do so. The process patent-only regime had international repercussions and the Indian State
held steadfast to its mission of technology transfer to private firms and access to affordable medicines.
It was this dual purpose that carried the moral high ground that allowed private sector capability to
eventually be built." Unlike the perception that most drugs in the 'copying' phase were simply
representations of piracy of a sort, in reality, the State-private sector compact had diverse
characteristics: one the one hand, the State leaned on firms to upgrade technologically for "essential
drugs" in exchange for key technologies linked to profitable markets, while on the other hand, the
State structured markets to create indigenous capability in place of foreign firms. This latter set of
policies however emerged only after many foreign firms balked at having to produce drugs for the
"essentials".
However, the policy measures of the time, other than the patent legislation, and the resource
constraints faced by firms created choices between products and processes in a manner that product
life-cycle thinking does not straightforwardly suggest.
"We couldn't afford products, so we chose processes. "(Interviewee)
While a series of policy measures were put in place to assist indigenous firms, the 1970s and 1980s
reflected a growing repeated investment in processes rather than products. The public health push had
created sets of technologies which could be improved upon through processes, and the patent regime
3 The Patent Act was unremarkable in its core elements: process patents and lack of recognition of product
patents. Most countries in the world flirted with this combination of protections for decades, and many European
countries in particular, moved out of this regime as recently as the late 1990s.
35The juxtaposition of access to medicines and company growth was brought to light in one interview: "Patent
law was intended to help to protect small inventors, but has been perverted by bi pharmaceutical companies. I
am a doctor also, so Ifeel this way". (Interview, company board member, July 5 2002).
reinforced this trends, providing further incentives for cash-strapped firms to invest in areas other than
drug discovery, which most lacked both the technical and financial means to carry out.
In the early years, as both public and private actors appear to have faced each other with mutual
suspicion as carriers of technological assets and capabilities, public health drugs or broadly
categorised "essentials" acted to bring both parties together. The eventual re-structuring of the patent
regime to patents for processes alone, was done with private sector profitability and public health
access alongside.
"The generic drug industry told us, 'we don't have problems
with product patents, per se, but we must be able to license
key technologies. We don't mind paying royalties or sharing
revenues.....don't cut us out ofprofitable markets'
.... their R&D strategies came later
(Interview with policymaker, Oct 15 2003)
The process patent years had significant effects on Indian capabilities.
"The patent phase was critical for Indian firms to
develop capability. [Scientists) have to get experience
and do it. If they are bright, they will spot opportunities
and break away to do their own work."
(Interview, June 14* 2002)
On the one hand, it allowed Indian firms to license key technologies from foreign firms in the country;
on the other, with greater long-term implications for learning capabilities, it provided Indian firms
considerable incentive to find new processes to manufacture the same drug, which were then
potentially patentable. The ability to scale-up and manufacture an existing drug thus became a natural
path for many Indian firms, with search and experimentation over many years, putting them on a
trajectory markedly different from their developing country counterparts and many in advanced
industrialised countries.
Current explanations by scholars and some in the industry ascribe all subsequent successes to the
process patent regime. However, as later sections describe, this period of protections and the creation
of learning opportunities for indigenous firms, was primarily an initial and powerful pathway to
market success. Only firms that could successfully scale-up and manufacture, and in some cases,
compete with foreign firms, could thrive. These firms had to invest in distribution and marketing
networks and continue to keep their channels of technology access open. What this period succeeded
in accomplishing was to create a set of skills that could not be easily duplicated by foreign firms or
other local competitors. These were tacit capabilities that rivals could not quickly master unless they
had gone through the same time-consuming search and experimentation process to find a viable path
to an existing drug.
As with many other protections, the time finally came when international pressures to change the
patent regime became marked. In the 1980s, as the first international intimation of the impending
pressures emerged from the Trade in Intellectual Properties (TRIPS) of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Indian policy makers and private firms alike had to plan a time when
product patents might be re-introduced. The TRIPS Agreement anticipates that all members of the
WTO adopt minimum standards on patent laws and elaborates on the details of such laws, but rallies
against the historically appropriate idea that a national patent system should be commensurate with a
country's stage of development and evolve accordingly. A significant element of deliberation for
developing countries emerged from the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
adopted on Nov 14th, 2001, allowing each country the right to grant compulsory licenses (and
determine the basis of such award) on key technologies/inventions if they pertain to public health
problems.36 For India, there are a variety of features that need modification in the existing patent
regime to have it conform to the TRIPS requirements, among which are the increasing of the existing
term for pharmaceutical patents from 7 years to 20 and outside pharmaceuticals from 14 to 20 years,
thus extending the monopoly rights of companies. The Indian Parliament has enacted an Amendment
to the patent regime through the Patents (Amendment) Act 1999 to provide for "mailbox" and
exclusive marketing rights obligation, as well as the Patents (Second Amendment) Act 2002 to convert
the 1970 Patents Act to comply with TRIPS during the 10 year transitional period from 1.1.1995 until
2005 when the full conversion to the TRIPS requirements occur. Before 2005, a Third Amendment
will be introduced to provide a product patent regime for all areas of technology not presently covered
by the 1970 Patents Act. More details on the TRIPS Agreement are provided in the following chapter.
Price controls:
The policy successes of the 1970s arose by the combination of market restructuring through changed
appropriability conditions from the new patent regime, the skill-base that it engendered in process
development, and the further learning forced on firms by creating price ceilings. An additional
measure of preferential licenses also allowed firms further opportunities to learn.
36 WTO/MIN(01)/DEC/2
Price ceilings have been commonplace in many countries in this industry. Underlying the Indian push
for public health and 'essential' drugs was the concern that drugs be cheap and accessible by all
citizens. The Drug Price Control Order (DPCO) was instituted formally in 1970 and subsequently
revised in 1979, 1987 and 1995, and more recently in 2002, when greater numbers of drugs have been
removed from price controls." While the DPCO, 1970 indicated that a firm's pre-tax profit from sales
of pharmaceuticals should not be greater than 15% of its sales from pharmaceuticals, firms could set
their prices accordingly, since any excess revenue had to be given to the government. The concern was
with overall margins, not on a by-product basis. The revisions in DPCO, 1979, made the process
significantly more cumbersome for companies since the Order required price limits on 370 specific
categories of both bulk drugs and formulations.38 The Kelkar Committee of 1984 recommended
revoking price controls on many drug categories so as to liberalise the system and allow the sector to
grow with greater profitability. This resulted in the DPCO, 1987, which reduced the number of price
controlled substances from 370 to 142.These ceilings on prices resulted in extremely low drug retail
prices in many categories, and its legacy has been largely positive. While the decade had begun with
Indian drug prices for essential medicines among the highest worldwide, the following decade
concluded with drug retail prices among the lowest.3 9 Besides mark-ups on drugs being restricted, the
controls were strict because they set normative numbers (not directly associated with the cost of
production) on price ceilings, thus drastically reducing profit margins and forcing firms to find
cheaper processes to the same end. Overall profitability in the industry fell from approximately 15.5%
in 1969-70 (just before the introduction of the Patent Act) to 8.8% in 1980-81 (just after the
introduction of price controls) to 4% in 1985-'86 (just before the first wave of drug price liberalisation
in 1986 after significant industry lobbying). Nevertheless, the controls on the industry were still
significant." In recent years, low pricing levels also have curtailed market growth. In 2000, volume
37 Until the early 1960s, India had no price controls of any form. The Chinese invasion in 1962 prompted policy
makers to worry about the costs of medicines under a state of Emergency. The Drugs (Display of Prices) Order
was promulgated in 1962, followed closely by the Drugs (control of Prices) Order in 1963 and the Drug Prices
(Display and Control) Order of 1966, by which time all producers had to gain government permissions for any
price increases (History of Drugs Price Control, Role of NPPA in Drug Pricing, National Pharmaceutical Pricing
Authority.)
38 The actual pricing formula was Retail Price = {Material Cost (MC) + Conversion Cost for the dosage form
(CC) + Packing materials cost (PM) + Packaging Charge (PC)} X (1+ Maximum Allowable Post Manufacturing
Expenses (MAPE)/100) +excise duty. Note: MAPE was a mark-up on costs, allowed to cover sales and
distribution, and covered retail and wholesale trade margins. The 370 drugs were split into 3 categories, each
with a different MAPE, with essential drugs having the least at 40% MAPE and Category IV with 60% MAPE.
39 The Hathi Committee Report of 1975 stressed the importance of the public sector's role in the pharmaceutical
manufacture and availability and the DPCO revisions in 1979 reflected this concern to some extent.
4 Profitability here is measured before tax and as percentage of sales revenue. All figures from the Hathi
Committee Report, 1975, RBI Bulletins, OPPI various years.
growth was about 8% while price growth was just over 2%. Profitability on average is estimated to be
only about 8% where profit is calculated before tax as percentage of sales .
The classical thinking on microeconomic effects of price controls predict that if the price of a good is
artificially set lower than the equilibrium price in the industry, the supply should shrink-since some
firms find the process to be unprofitable, and demand exceeds supply. However, in the Indian case,
price controls were not a lone policy initiative. They were combined with earlier process patents and
later New Drug Policy measures, both of which created incentives for increased supply by indigenous
firms. While data was unavailable to show the number of firms that became unprofitable, the eventual
numbers show a significant rise in the total numbers of manufacturing units and their lowered average
profitability". Although price ceilings were introduced, they were selectively introduced for medicinal
products deemed 'essential" by the government, and exempted for small-scale units, and acted in
conjunction with process patent initiatives to spur process development skills, this time to lower cost.
Thus the traditional interpretation of process development acting primarily to cut costs can be rejected
in this period, as process capabilities took on a variety of goals, only one of which was to reduce drug
costs. Even this latter measure acted to further enhance process skills as firms acted to find additional
process techniques to cut costs. Largely due to a variety of policies spurring indigenous supply, the
salutary effect of price controls was felt in increased competition and a proliferation (helped along by
policies favouring small scale units) of small industry which was exempted from price controls as an
incentive in certain drug categories, Production of certain drugs like paracetamol was since also
reserved for the small scale organised sector. The intense competition led to Indian firms gradually
pulling back from formulations (which witnessed greater growth for a period and larger number of
entrants because of low price controls) and moving into bulk drugs (where MNCs had pulled back).
Formulations were also an area of branded inertia favouring incumbents, and Indian firms lacking
brand labelling, were at a disadvantage. Between 1970 and 1984, formulations grew by 12.5% while
bulk drugs were growing at a higher 19.5%.41
The Indian market became characterised by intense competition due to the stringent price-control
measures. Manufacturers scrambled to recoup investments once the price controls came into place, and
a large number of small units that were exempted from the DPCO sprang up to service the significant
4 One problem is that secondary sources of data on industry profitability show averages across all product
categories. Therefore, the effects of price controls only on specific product segments (the "essentials") where the
controls were particularly strict, cannot unequivocally be demonstrated. Overall, however, the industry grew in
numbers of firms but showed reduced gross profit margins.
42 Sahu, 1998, p. 80.
market demand. Many larger companies skirted the restrictions by focusing on "non-essential" drugs
that were out of purview of the DPCO.4 ' Gross profit margins, while quite low, overall, allowed some
companies which could invest in scaled up plants and more sophisticated, faster and in the long-term,
more profitable production technologies, to take a dominant position in the Indian market. The
favourable conditions within the DPCO for smaller units, led to a current estimated 18,000
manufacturing units in the country, and over 3 million employed (in manufacturing, pre-and post-
production areas). Of these, about 2,900 are large -scale units (Agarwal and Saibaba, 2001). Various
industry estimates put the percentage of modem medicines consumed domestically and produced
domestically at 90%.
While the controls led to increased process capabilities in mitigating price controls on profitability,
they could have led to even greater technological investments and upgrading of capabilities in
antibiotics, antidiabetics and the like. However, their success was mixed. With significantly lowered
prices and process capabilities, they also brought with them shortfalls in highly controlled drug
segments, especially essential medicines. The DPCO initially controlled prices on 347 bulk drugs. Of
these more than 220 were produced in India. The 347 drugs were split into four categories: (a)
Category I: Essential drugs" (b) Category II: Essential drugs (c) Category III: Non-essential 5 (d)
Category IV: Non-controlled.4 6 Private Indian and foreign firms alike increased their profit margins by
openly moving into non-essential and unregulated segments. Category IV formulations, in particular,
without price controls of any kind, flourished and India became an example of excessive formulations
of dubious utility. One estimate suggests that in the 1980s the country was producing between 40,000
and 60,000 formulations.4 ' By deliberately trying to increase access to essential medicines to the
poorest, the price controls had perverted the system to increase production of dubious therapeutics at
' The importance of public health as an entry instrument into manufacturing prowess, market gains and access
to key technologies is not incompatible with the fact that some Indian firms have avoided essential drugs and
have themselves not substantially invested s in discovering drugs for many common Indian and developing
country illnesses. Potential large volume sales do not necessarily cover the costs of drug discovery and
development when more assured market segments are available. In fact, the significance of public health as a
technological and market entry vehicle lies in its link to antibiotics and basic vaccines. Only recently have Indian
firms developed in-house variants on existing drugs for AIDS and TB.
44 The prices refer to wholesale prices and the mark-us was taken to include manufacturing profit margins, trade
commissions, advertising and marketing costs and distribution. Mark-ups for Category I was set at a ceiling of
40% and at 55% for Category II. All calculations and figures from Drug Price Control Order, Government of
India, 1970, 1979
45 Mark-up for the less essential drugs in Category III was allowed upto 100% and Category IV was altogether
unregulated in price.
46 Drug Price Control Order, Government of India, 1970, 1979. "Essential" drugs was a controversial category,
with both Indian and foreign firms alike disagreeing with the government on what should be considered essential
and to what extent the price of the drug be controlled.
much higher prices. Since then, the DPCO has gradually reduced in stages the number of drugs whose
prices it monitors and controls. Companies like CIPLA gradually gained recognition because of the
low Ciproflaxin and AIDS drugs costs. While prices were still out of the reach of most developing
country individuals, their public health cause provided a forum to question monopoly patents and the
enormous riches that accrue to large companies while certain critical drugs for tropical diseases remain
unavailable.
Indian advances have often been described primarily in terms of the process patent regime without a
full understanding of why such a regime proved useful beyond "copying" opportunities. Most
developing countries had similar policies, but only India built such an extensive pharmaceutical sector
because of its multi-pronged approach and its "entry points" that could be defended. Many of today's
advanced industrialised countries had similarly structured patent regimes in the recent past, but only
India was able to build such robust growth over two decades. Indian policies to create a self-reliant
nation were generated shortly after independence in 1947 and continued well into the late 1970s.
Indeed, if anything, this is a lesson in sustained efforts by both policy makers and the nascent Indian
private sector to ensure that their respective aims were fulfilled. Additional policy measures to build
the industry are now described.
4.7.Monopolies, MNCs and accelerated Indian learning:
Learning does not occur without significant changes made to the environment within which firms
reside and draw their resources. A protected environment for learning required the curbing of foreign
firm dominance in the domestic market. These policy measures have led to measurable discrepancies
between Indian and foreign firms in their investment profiles, with legacies dating back to this period
where foreign firms were less willing to invest in R&D lest their products be immediately copied by
Indian firms. It also shows how many Indian firms have since advanced in both technology and market
share relative to their foreign counterparts. A sizeable ethical yardstick of company performance was
applied to firms by policy-makers, the medical community and social activists. These were measured
for each company primarily in terms of (a) the extent of bulk drug production (b) the investments in
"essential" drugs (c) the technology-intensive profile of products.
Indian competition law dates back to the Monopoly Enquiry Commission of 1964. Its mandate
continued to influence policies such as the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956, the Industrial
Development and Regulation Act and all planning undertaken through the national Five-Year Plans.
47 "Farce of Drug Policy", EPW, March 8-15, 1986, p. 409
The Commission concentrated on generating high levels of production while ensuring the greater
social good, consistent with the directive principles of State Policy of the Constitution of India. These
centred on the desire to control ownership and material resources to best serve the common good and
to work against concentration of wealth and means of production to a few. The Monopoly and
Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, arose directly from these influences and from the workings of
the 1964 Commission and was influenced in large part by corresponding legislation on prices,
monopoly and fair trade in the UK, the US and Canada, among others.
The MRTP Act had the following goals: (a) The prevention of concentration of economic power to the
common detriment (b) control of monopolies (c) prohibition of monopolistic trade practices and (d)
the prohibition of unfair trade practices. (e) To ensure an environment conducive to healthy industrial
growth, fair trade and competition. While the Act was modified a number of times, it was only in 1991
that size became de-linked from tensions of market power and monopoly status.
The tensions in sourcing technology from foreign firms also created the patent policies. While the
MNC's reduced presence is in part due to the lack of product patent coverage, in reality, many re-
entered the Indian market, despite the same patent regime, after economy-wide liberalization in the
early 1990s resulting from India's Balance of Payments crisis. Indeed firms such as Hoechst Marion
Roussel made the decision to start introducing new products in the Indian market despite the almost
immediate imitative manufacturing by Indian firms, such as three new products in 2002 (anti-diabetic
Amaryl, cardiovascular Cardace-H and Tavanic, an anti-infective). While many took advantage of the
new market opportunity, only some, such as Aventis (List others) have invested in local R&D,
claiming that Indian companies would copy the results outright. Certainly, the patent regime and price
controls have acted to favor Indian-owned firms. The MNCs therefore survived on sales of branded
drugs and of mature product lines, many in low-technology segments such as cough syrups and cold
medications.
India's relationship to the MNCs was driven by two competing goals (a) to reduce national
dependence on them in essential drugs and (b) to source new technologies from them. While one
favoured curtailing their powers, allocating production away from them in essential medicines and
reducing their size, the other was geared to allowing them to profit in return for technology transfer in
antibiotics and vaccines. The move to allocate manufacturing licenses preferentially to Indian
companies emerged only after attempts to induce MNCs to manufacture locally and in essential
categories had largely failed.
The 1970s Patent Act combined with preferential allocation of manufacturing licenses for Indian firms
also served to change the tide of fortunes for Indian-owned companies. Multinationals overran the
market before the 1970s with almost an 85% market share. Local production was not required and
most MNCs manufactured elsewhere, imported their drugs and sold at a sizeable profit to the captive
Indian market. By the end of the 1990s, however, Indian companies dominated the market 60:40 and
many MNCs had to introduce local production to compete. The extent of Indian penetration into the
ranking of manufacturing firms is shown below for the top twenty-five companies in the domestic
market in 1998
The table below shows recent market shares of leading Indian and MNCs alike in the domestic market,
with shaded portions indicating Indian ownership.
Table 4.7.1 Indian and MNC domestic market share in Indian market in 2001
2001 Company name % Domestic market share
rank
1 Glaxo-Wellcome (MNC) 5.7
2 Cipla (Indian) 4.7
3 Ranbaxy (Indian) 4.0
4 Hoechst Marion Roussel (MNC) 2.8
5 Su n P ha rma11 (I ndian 2.5
6 Zydus,Cadila (Indi )2.4
7 Knoll Pharma (MNC) 2.3
9 Pfizer (MINC) 2.1
IO 2.1
Total: 30.9%
Source: Operations Research Group-Marketing and Research Group (ORG-MARG), 2002 India.
The noticeable features are that only 10 foreign firms feature in the top 25 firms. Furthermore, the
market concentration is sizeable while no single company exceeds 7% market share. In addition, some
Indian firms are domestic product leaders even if they are below the no. 10 rank (For 1997-'98, e.g.
Alkem for Cephalosporins was outside the list and Lupin, for TB bulk drugs was at no. 8). High R&D
spenders relative to sales are also well below no. 10 (for example, Dr. Reddy's Laboratories). (ORG-
MARG Research Ltd. India Pharma Market, for rankings between September 1997-August 1998)
The market restructuring that protected Indian firms in the early years, combined with price controls,
created a competitive environment, with indigenous firms slowly taking market share from foreign
ones. The market was also marked by concentration of the largest firms, but considerable flux in their
positions. Today, the leader holds a tenuous 5.7% and the top 10 combined hold 31% of the total
market. While most known MNCs operate in the country, only 4 of them hold a place in the top 10. In
1976, for example, only 4 Indian firms ranked in the top 20 by sales, whereas by 1995, 13 of the top
20 were Indian companies and cornered almost 85% of the market. In fact, of the top 50 sales revenue
companies, 38 were Indian firms, and only 3 multinational companies were in the top 10. Indian
companies are pushing further into the top 10 list, with companies being replaced often in this
ranking.48 While Glaxo-Wellcome holds first position, its market share has decreased slightly over the
last 5 years, while Cipla and Ranbaxy, both Indian-owned companies, have increased theirs.
Indian companies flourished relative to MNCs since the 1970s when a series of far-reaching policies
were initiated to assist Indian firms. In 1998, Indian companies occupied 68% of market share, UK
companies had 10% of the market, the US and German companies had 9% and other Europeans had
4%. (ORG-MARG Research Ltd., various years). However, Indian advancement in market share did
not preclude high competition. In the same year, the top 5 companies held 19% of market share, those
occupying 6-10* rank shared 11%, 11-15 10%, 16-20 9% and 21-25 6% and all others 45%.
Process patents without product patents allowed Indian firms to rapidly create drugs developed by
foreign firms if the were able to find a new route to the drug. This created a disincentive for some
foreign firms to remain in the Indian market; others stayed to enjoy the market's size. Foreign firms,
especially multinational companies (MNCs), were not persuaded to manufacture from bulk drug
stages. Various instruments of coercion such as the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act,
were used to limit the power of MNCs. At the same time, policies were constructed to allow them
enough freedom so they remained as a source of superior technologies, although many MNCs enjoyed
dominance with outdated products in the local market since local competitors were few at the outset.
48 That competition is heavy is also evidenced by the fact that market share leaders in the Indian market are not
necessarily the same as product leaders in the domestic market. Alkem, for example, an Indian-owned firn, has
But the far-reaching effects of the Patent Act and the New Drug Policy had implications beyond R&D
and into manufacturing. Some leading MNCs did not conduct R&D in India nor were their
manufacturing facilities USFDA approved, since they did not export significantly out of the country,
unlike Indian firms.
Traditionally, MNCs depended on the parent company for capital requirements and thus their local
capital base was quite low. They also depended heavily on the parent's product portfolio and other
proprietary assets, rarely conducting R&D abroad. This was the case in India, where MNC local
offices conducted hardly any novel work, and whose R&D budgets as a percentage of total operational
income was low relative to leading Indian pharmaceutical companies. In addition, they had no drug
discovery programs or biotechnology efforts to speak of relative to the leading Indian firms. Glaxo,
Aventis and Pfizer had no significant locally-based research in India in late 2001, while at the same
time their Indian counterparts were actively upgrading their research capabilities. Ranbaxy had already
entered drug discovery in anti-infectives, respiratory, urology, cardiovascular and oncology segments,
other technology platforms and biopharmaceuticals. Cipla had no biopharmaceutical element, but was
attempting some drug discovery and development in anti-fungal, antihistamine and AIDS areas, while
Dr. Reddy's Laboratories was conducting discovery research in diabetes, oncology, anti-infective and
pain management. It had also begun search efforts in vaccines and biopharmaceuticals.
The tables below indicate the relatively low levels of R&D intensity of MNC subsidiaries in India
compared to leading Indian firms and the limited extent of drug discovery, platform development or
biotech investments. Companies like Astra Zeneca are examples of a change in this thinking.49 As an
indicator of the relative vigor in recent years of Indian firms, even those not among the top 10 by
market share, and the corresponding stagnation of foreign ones, a comparison is useful between Pfizer
(India), one of India's leading MNCs and Glenmark Pharma, a mid-size Indian pharmaceutical
company. Both had comparable operating profits of 18-20% in 200 1-'02, but the Indian firm had
substantially higher operating revenues from the previous year (+39% versus 11%), primarily driven
by an expanded product portfolio and new product launches by Glenmark, particularly in diabetes
drugs. Pfizer performed well on low dependence on raw material sales. 50 But its performance is less
the 6 most sold product, Taxim, a Cephalosporin, but the company does not rank among the top 10 firms by
market share.
49AstraZeneca has recently invested approximately US$1 Imillion in its Bangalore R&D facility for furthering
research in tropical diseases, most notably tuberculosis.
50 Raw materials form a small proportion of sales at 31% and Pfizer has also lowered this through cost cutting
over a long period.
attractive overall because its interest costs in particular, are low relative to Glenmark. " However
although its net profit is low, Pfizer's return on Net Worth (RONW) is high because of low capital
employed and ready-to-use brand names among others."
Some of the reasons for the growth of Indian companies are the targeting of both domestic and export
markets, increased R&D expenditures by Indian companies and thus increased expectations from the
market, increased generic drug opportunities, out-licensing to foreign companies, increased patenting
by Indian firms and targeting of high margin therapeutic categories such as cardiovascular and
diabetes. In particular, exports have fuelled Indian companies rise. There has been a recent further rise
of exports from 26 firms over 5 years from 1997-2002, coinciding with a time of increased R&D
spending as well. Data from the Bombay Stock Exchange demonstrates that sales of these 26 leading
Indian firms had almost doubled while local MNCs saw sales rise slightly. Profits for the Indian firms
were also significantly higher on average, their R&D spending growth going from an absolute total
amount of Rs. 50 crore in 1997-'98 to 240 crore in 2001-'02, a rise of 380%. There was a very slight
increase for foreign firms. Exports also rose 230% in the same five-year period, although most foreign
firms were only beginning to revisit the possibility of using India as an export base for their products.
Finally, market capitalisation rose sharply for the 26 Indian firms (Ranbaxy more than doubled, Dr.
Reddy's up 431%, Cipla up 4 times) while except for Pfizer, all other foreign firms saw a decline.53
Undoubtedly, both the absence of product patents and the price controls imposed by the Indian
government on many drug segments kept MNCs away, but the rate of most MNC investments
worldwide in R&D locally have been low by most accounts. Furthermore, Indian firms have shown
high profitability even with controls of certain drug segments. However, neither the MTRP nor
requirements of local production induced MNCs to move into essential bulk drugs locally. The Indian
government forced the hand of both Indian-owned and foreign firms alike through process patents and
price controls by making the former move into technologically new and complex antibiotic and anti-
infective segments. At the same time it created conditions where the latter were forced to hand over
key technologies or where local firms were encouraged to find new routes to the same drug. The years
spent grappling with dependence on MNCs for technology, yet seeking the growth of local industry
defined India's vision that technological capabilities could not remain neutral to firm ownership.
s Local MNCs cannot take advantage of tax benefits for overseas sales.
52 Business Line, The Hindu, "As Different as Chalk and Cheese", July 14* 2002.
Section IV
Section IV further investigates the continued growth of Indian firms and the Drug Policy measures
that allowed the eventual consolidation of private sector capability through a series of protected spaces
for learning that excluded foreign firms from some drug categories. In particular, it explores the
hypothesis that large size benefited companies to upgrade technologies. It also uses varied indicators
from business reports to demonstrate that Indian firms emerging from their particular policy
environment have recently managed to create a competitive advantage around manufacturing ability
and R&D investments relative to foreign firms in the country.
4.8.Trouble in the making: The New Drug Policy, production and size
Building private sector manufacturing capability
"The public sector cannot be a substitute for in-house
technology capabilities" (Interview, July 6 h 2002)
While the public sector had initiated the technology acquisition, adaptation, diffusion and creation,
private skills had been uneven and their access to technologies limited. The restructuring of the
selection environment begun with the process patents and price controls, continued with the
introduction of the New Drug Policy in the late 1970s. Until then, foreign firms had been tolerated.
However, the preference for indigenous firms as manufacturing hubs and for production of key
technologies became complete with this policy measure.
The Drug Policy of 1978 saw as its goals the following:
i. To develop self-reliance in drug technology ii. To provide a leadership role to the public
sector iii. To aim at quick self-sufficiency in the output of drugs with a view to reduce imports
iv. To foster and encourage the growth of the Indian sector v. To ensure that drugs are
available in abundance to meet the health needs of our people vi. To make drugs available at
reasonable prices vii. To keep a careful watch on the quality of production and prevent
adulteration and malpractices viii. To offer special incentives to firms which are engaged in
Research and Development ix. To provide other parameters to control and rejuvenate this
industry as a whole with particular reference to containing and channelling the activity of
foreign companies in accord with national objectives and priorities.
(source: Government of India, Drug Policy, 1978)
5 Business Standard article, "Desi vs. MNC pharma battles, Desi success", citing Bombay Stock Exchange
indicators, 5th June 2003.
Foreign firms were under considerable pressure to manufacture essential drugs and to introduce new
product varieties into the country. However, most continued to make non-essential, but highly
profitable tonics, concentrating heavily on formulations at the cost of bulk drug, most of which they
imported in. Indian policy-makers had to grapple with technology dependence on foreign firms on the
hand, with the absence of widespread private sector manufacturing capability of bulk drugs on the
other.54
The primary technology for production of pharmaceuticals is the technology of bulk drugs production.
However, very few developing countries possess the capabilities of being able to manufacture bulk
drugs from local raw materials. In addition, this has historically been the province of multinational
companies. MNCs rarely produce bulk drugs from locally available raw materials, and thus Indian
policy was structured to advance technological learning through this route. The government
recognized that bulk drugs manufacture had become a monopoly of foreign firms and policies were
explicitly geared to prevent this, as well as to prevent abuses of transfer pricing when MNC local
subsidiaries bought materials from the parent company to manufacture bulk drugs locally. One explicit
policy was through the "canalisation" of bulk drugs, the importation of bulk drugs through a
government-initiated corporation, to (a) prevent transfer pricing by the MN4C (b) to ensure a steady
supply in the Indian market and © to ensure a steady price to Indian producers. (Sahu, 1998 also
documents this measure superbly)
Buoyed by policies that kept foreign firms at a distance, and that reduced uncertainties for indigenous
firms, Indian companies began to participate in larger numbers in an upgrading process. While not all
firms attempted this or succeeded, policies induced them to step through the grades below until they
could bulk manufacture from locally available raw materials.
1. -Import finished medicines and repackage
2. -Import bulk materials and formulate them
3. *Import penultimate and intermediate products in bulk and formulate them
4. -Import basic raw materials and produce bulk drugs from various stages
5. -Produce bulk drugs from locally available raw materialsCapability of very few countries,
particularly DCs
54 Companies like Cipla, operating since the 1930s were the exception, rather than the rule.
The New Drug Policy (NDP) imposed by the Janata Party Government in 1978 was instrumental in
categorising and allocating production licenses for three categories of drugs- 17 essential ones (public
sector only)", 27 drugs (Indian firms only) and 64 items (open for all applicants).5 6
The table below highlights the drug production reserved for the Indian sector-public and private alike
in the middle column.
Table 4.8. ]New Drug Policy (1978) production allocation lists
(In alphabetical order)
PUBLIC SECTOR-ONLY DRUGS INDIAN SECTOR-ONLY DRUGS
Analgin Ampicillin
Folic Acid Bephenium Hydroxynaphthoate
Gentamycin Caffeine (Natural)
Morphine Chlorpropamide
Oxytetracycline Diazepam
Penicillin Diethylcarbamazine Citrate
Phenobarbitone Doxycycline
Polio Vaccine Erythromycin
Quinine Glybenclamide
Streptomycin Griseofulvin
Sufadimethoxine Halogenated Oxyquinoline
Sulfadimidine INH
Sulfaguanidine Metronidazole
Sulfamethoxy-Pyridazine Nicotinamide
Vitamin B-1 Oxyphenbutazone
Vitamin B-2 Paracetamol
Pethidine
Phenylbutazone
5 For the list of "Highly Essential and Life-Saving Drugs" of the Drug Policy, Category I formulations included
items such as Aspirin tablets, DPT vaccines, insulin injections, Penicillin injections (including Procaine, G and
Benzathine Penicillins), Streptomycin injections. Category II formulations included Analgin and Amodiaquin
tablets, Chloroquin salts, Phenobarbitone tavles, Tetanus toxoid injections, Tetracyclines in different forms. For
the 17 essential bulk drugs, some listed were Vitamins a, B 12, C, Penicillins of various types, Insulin,
Tetracyclines and Prednisolone (Source: Background papers of the National Convention on Economic
Independence and Pespective of Drug Industry, New Delhi, 21 December 1974, pp. XLIX, cited in J.S.
Majumdar, 1986 in Sen Gupta (Ed.)
56 That ownership origin is significant was clear. Even with the clear demarcation of three categories of drugs,
some controversies emerged of preferential allocation of licenses to Indian firms. In a famous case, Glaxo (India)
was denied a license for manufacture of an effective anti-asthmatic drug, Salbutamol, and Cipla was awarded
production rights on the basis of indigenously developed technology.
Phthalyl Sulfathiazole
Piperazine
Sodium PAS
Sulfacetamide
Thiacetazone
Tolbutamide
Vaccines and Toxoids
Vitamin C
Xylocaine
Adapted from: Government of India: New Drug Policy, 1978, Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers
and Sahu (1998)
Note that categories were further divided; polio was on the public sector-only list of vaccines, whereas
all other vaccines were available for licensing to Indian private firms. No vaccines were allowed to be
produced by foreign firms. Technologically more sophisticated therapeutic segments such as cortico-
steroids, Vitamins B-6 and B-12 and other vitamins and drugs such as Cyclophosphamide were open
for local production by foreign firms. Even here, however, restrictions were placed on equity holdings
by foreigners who chose to manufacture "low technology" drugs. Those with investments in higher
technologies, were allowed equity of greater than 40%, but were then forced to mix product types and
bulk drug availability (a) such firms were forced to a strict ratio of 1:5 (bulk drugs: formulations),
while Indian companies enjoyed 1:10. (b) 50% of their bulk drug production was then available for
formulation companies to utilise. (Indian firms were subject only to 30% out-use, the rest could be
used within the firm. Public sector firms were subject to higher ratios of 40% to other formulators,
60% for use in-house). (New Drug policy, 1978. GOI and Sahu, 1998)
While the New Drug policy and its elaborate licensing structure suffered many of the same problems
as other "License Raj" policies, it was successful at inducing manufacturing capability into the private
sector through a combination of production allocation and government procurement and through the
explicit sidelining of MNCs in key drug areas. The table below shows the progression from the 1950s
to the 1990s of Indian indigenous bulk drug capability and the gradual metamorphosis of the economy
from being one primarily dependent on imported formulations to one manufacturing and consuming
bulk drugs from locally available raw materials.
Table 4.8.2 Increased self-sufficiency of Indian pharmaceuticals
YEAR PRODUCTION STATUS
TYPE
1950s Formulations Mostly imported MNC dominance
1960s Formulations Domestic endeavour on imported bulk drugs
1970s Formulations Some imports.
Bulk drugs Indigenous manufacture by domestic companies
1980s Formulations Marginal imports (<5%).
Bulk drugs Significant indigenous manufacture (based on
domestic R&D)
1990s Formulations Significant exports, minimal imports (<2%)
Bulk drugs Self reliant (exports > imports)
Source: Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers, Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals
Between 1995-2001, exports have considerably exceeded imports. By the 1990s, India had become a
net exporter of both bulk drugs and formulations, although formulations continued to be produced at
higher rates in recent years.
Figure 4.8.1 Twenty years of Indian pharmaceutical production
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Source: WIPO, 2002
The Indian industry is the largest by volume and in numbers of companies in the developing world. It
leads worldwide in the manufacture and export of drugs such as ibuprofen, and anti-TB drugs such as
ethambutol and Rifampicin. It is also the world's second largest producer of Hepatitis B vaccines
developed through an indigenous process. Of the leading bulk drug manufacturers in 2000-'01,
Ranbaxy and Dr. Reddy's Laboratories have also emerged as innovative drug firms in terms of their
NCE and patenting profile.
Since the mid-1990s, the imports of bulk drugs into the country lessened in part because the quality of
local manufacture has significantly increased, leading to MNCs using locally manufactured bulk drugs
instead of importation. Remaining imports were primarily due to patented molecules which were
either provided to an MNC subsidiary by its patent-holding parent, or because Indian manufacturers
were unable to produce the same. In some cases, imports are made on price margins from China,
where certain bulk drugs are manufactured much more cheaply than in India, as in the case of
Captopril bulk molecules, which is bought at a tenth of the Indian price. This combined with the fact
that Indian companies are beginning to become preferred vendors for specialty "customised" bulk
drugs (on specifications from an innovating firm), indicates that Indian firms do not compete on cost
alone. The industry evolved such that it manufactured at all stages of the value chain. It now has a
repertoire of approximately 350 bulk drugs from most major therapeutic categories. It has production
capability for all dosage forms: capsules, liquids, tablets, orals and injectible drugs.
Size as a strategic tool for national self-reliance
The subset of companies that could thrive in this environment explicitly structured by industrial
policies was further reduced to those that could scale-up operations. The 1970s were marked by
sectoral policies favouring large size. While national industrial policies favoured the small-scale sector
overall, based on Gandhian influences of returning economic power to small (cottage) industries,
sectoral policies were explicitly geared to creating bulk drug capability and building plant capacity in
the private sector with the hope that nation-wide shortages of essential drugs would become an artefact
of the past.17 While size is often interpreted as one representing dynamic economies of scale, in the
Indian case it appears to indicate in part problems within the external environment which many firms
avoided by sourcing internally and in part the ability to increase internal speed and scale of operations.
Nevertheless, it is not surprising that even India's largest and most successful firms are as yet unable
to develop a drug from discovery to market.
"None of the companies yet have the muscle to establish drug
development.... they have to do this abroad and have to
license this to bigpharma " (Interview, June 14th 2002)
"DRL couldn't afford the cost of development, therefore it
had to license to the US. It thus generated in-house expertise
and has now moved further up the value chain or close to
approval" (Interview, June 27h 2002)
s7 Indeed, many of India's pharmaceutical policies ran afoul of this small-scale industry bias and minor
modifications were made from time to time to further include small firms.
Yet, a few companies that have paid their manufacturing dues and built scale have also benefited from
revenue streams that allow them to move closer to discovering drugs themselves.
"Hyderabad-based companies have made so much money
that now it's simply a money issue combined with priorities,
and they can take any expertise and capital and develop
really innovative products! "(Interview)
The type of learning that Indian firms managed to embark on was related to the financial,
infrastructure (including equipment) and human resources they could devote to the process.
Manufacturing was a capital-intensive process, while process chemistry and engineering required
skilled personnel. Those firms that were able to invest in buying new technologies or upgrading
existing ones were more likely to be large. Plagued by quality control problems, firms also grew in
size to ensure in-house sourcing. Indeed, in recent years, different technological and organisation
challenges have generated the need for external collaboration. Some firms expressed the desire for
greater cooperation, especially those moving into biopharmaceuticals.
"We do too much in-house" (Interview, June 27* 2002)
The Industries Development and Regulation Act (IDRA) first brought into force in the 1950s
continued to exert a powerful force to shape indigenous production. It allowed drug manufacturers to
both diversify into new products as well as increase production by up to 25% thus setting the stage for
advances through economies of both scale and scope. The economies allowed drug makers to invest in
back integration into critical essential technologies associated with bulk drug manufacture. While in
the 1950s no indigenous private sector expertise existed to manufacture bulk drugs, by the 1980s,
Hyderabad city alone in Southern India was manufacturing upto 40% of India's bulk drug intake,
much of it produced by entrepreneurs with past histories in the public sector, often the local IDPL."
The diversification allowed into new products
If the IDRA acted to encourage all firms to diversify and invest in production, there could be little
doubt about where the government intended to go next. In 1970-, the Government of India withdrew
permission of diversification from foreign -owned firms. This was followed in short order by the now
well-known Indian Patent Act in 1970, and by further encouragement of economies of scale and scope
in 1972 by allowing Indian firms to further increase their licensed capacities of production, while
simultaneously diversifying upto 100%. Production of bulk drugs for companies in the organised
58 Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, one of India's most innovative firms today, was begun in this fashion.
sector was licensed versus projected demand for the following year. While production of most
antibiotics met demand projections, other categories, such as antidiabetics, particularly insulin
production, an essential, was in shortfall, showing that such a strict licensing system with government
setting projections, was not necessarily the most efficient way to meet clearly pressing health needs in
the country.
The table below highlights some important policies related to size. Except for the Monopoly and
Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) which limited market power (usually related to size), the
other policies were only indirectly size-related, but had long-reaching effects on the growth of Indian
firms. In particular, the IDRA and the New Drug Policy initiated considerable capacity expansion in
Indian-owned firms, and allowed diversification in products for upto 100%. By doing so, firms were
being channelled into significant back-integration into bulk drugs.
Table 4.8.3Chronology of Indian government policies regarding drug manufacturing
Year Policy Effect
1951 Industries Development and Varied. For pharmaceutical production, licensed
Regulation Act (IDRA) manufacturing out to public, private and foreign firms
alike, by quota system based on national plan targets.
1969 Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Curtails growth on companies with dross assets greater
Practices Act (MRTP act) than Rs. 20 crores or with a dominant undertaking of
market share greater than 33% (1982) and 25% (since)
No amendment to IDRA. Drug manufacturers were allowed to diversify into new
products. Also allowed increase in production by 25%
1970 Government withdraws
diversification permission to foreign
firms
1970 Indian Patent Act Restrict monopoly by multinational firms
Reduced patent validity from 16 to 14 years overall, and in
drugs to 7 years, raised royalties needed to renew licenses
and did away with product patents, increased grounds for
compulsory licensing, gave the Government unrestricted
use of patents for its own use,
1972 Indian firms allowed to increase
their licensed capacities and to
diversify up to 100%
1973 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act Restrictions on foreign equity holdings upto40% in non-
(FERA) core industries. Pharmaceuticals seen as "core", the Act
allowed companies exceeding MRTP and FERA clauses to
nevertheless participate in pharmaceutical growth.
1978 New Drug Policy (NDP) Divided drugs into three main reservation items for
selected allocation and production (17 for public sector, 27
for Indians, 64 open to all). Linked FERA to upgraded
technology and manufacturing requirements.
As the table shows, the concerted policy push died down after the late 1970s and Indian firms found
themselves in a newer domestic environment in the 1980s. The diversification allowances were also
carrots to companies to provide them larger profit margins through the sale of formulations (finished
dosage forms -tablets, capsules, ointments etc.), There were additional rewards for bulk drug (active
ingredients in drugs) production through procurement and preferential allotment of manufacturing
licenses and sticks (primarily price controls). The main goals were the move away from formulations
into bulk drugs. From 1948-1968 there was a MNC monopoly, from 1969-1978, policies were
explicitly geared to removing the MNC monopoly, 1978-1985 was the period of the development of a
strong national sector and significant numbers of process improvements and some product innovations
and 1985-2003, innovations in both products and processes.
A policy measure that rebelled against the large size of leading Indian firms and foreign ones alike was
allocation of certain drugs for production in the small-scale sector, such as Antibiotics (Chromphenical
powder and palmitate, Ampicillin trihydrate, erythromycin, amoxycillin, rifampicin, ciprofloxacibn,
cephalexin), Antibacterials (Trimethoprin), Sulpha drugs (Sulphamethoxazole), CNC stimulants(
Caffeine), Vitamins (Nicotinamide) and Tranquilizers and sedatives such as Diazepam. (Sen Gupta
(Ed), 1986)
While economies of scale in production of bulk drugs certainly also contribute to size, large
companies have dominated the pharmaceutical sector worldwide in part because of the financial and
production requirements for clinical trials and advertising. In India, these factors were differently
moulded by policy measures of the 1960s and 1970s. Indian firms were not forced to invest in drug
discovery at all or as much in clinical trials, and sold their products in segmented markets, not
globally. Price controls also removed the incentive to invest in advertising to the same degree. Thus
the reasons for large firm growth differed in India, where production targets and allocation and
procurement incentives worked towards creating larger firms. However, an important additional
reason (and one that subsequently plagued Indian biopharmaceutical work) was the lack of reliable
supply networks and quality of materials. This created pressures on firms to vertically integrate to
ensure standardisation of materials and routines.
Institutionally, the thrust of the DPCO and the Patents Act, was to create an environment in which
process research and development was rewarded, shortened patent protection periods served to fuel
competition and lack of a product patent regime served to bring down costs on existing MNC drugs
within the country. Furthermore, the preferential status awarded to small-scale manufacturing units
served to fuel the growth of almost 18-20,00 Indian manufacturing firms and a vast supplier network
to the more research-intensive large-scale firms, both public and private. The proliferation of such a
large number of manufacturing sources also served to increase the possibilities of process
experimentation, diffusion of new techniques, and the lowered costs of new routes of manufacture.
But most importantly, it allowed both technological challenges to new routes to the same end, as well
as the medically complex requirement to show continued efficacy and safety at similar levels. The
process technologies also served to create economies of scale in investments in chemists, chemical and
mechanical engineers and integration across firm investments in manufacturing ability.
Part of the difficulty was persuading foreign firms to manufacture bulk drugs locally. While some of
these firms were willing manufacturers of the less technology-intensive formulations, they were slow
to manufacture bulk drugs as the table below demonstrates.
Table 4.8.4 Foreign firm reluctance in bulk drugs
Company Founding year in Year of commencing Year of commencing
India formulation bulk drug production
production (As of 1978)
Abbott Laboratories 1946 1960 Not produced
(India)
Anglo French Drug 1923 Not before 1955 Not produced
company (Eastern)
Roussel 1956 1956 and after Not produced
Pharmaceuticals
(India)
Smith Kline and 1950 1963 Not produced
French (India)
Source: Adapted from Chaudhuri, 1986
The Indian sector -public and private combined dominated the bulk drug production and the foreign
firms the formulation production, by a huge margin. The public sector's contribution was significant in
technology sourcing, transfer, development and production. The table below shows actual numbers in
the critical years when the State was attempting to curb the dominance of the MNCs. In the middle
1980's, some years after the first institution of the New Drug Policy, the industry continued to be
concentrated. For 48 product groups, there were 21 firms with monopoly power in more than one drug
category, and for 17 product groups, 13 firms with duopoly power in more than one drug category.
(Singh. 1985) High levels of concentration existed in almost all segments and even where large
numbers of producers existed for similar goods, price competition was not necessarily the main factor,
and companies compete on promotion/advertising expenditures. Price competition appears to have
been higher in the small-scale industry segment. (Abrol and Guha, 1986).
A criticism of Indian drug policies has been the de-linking of the industrial growth side from the actual
health needs of the people. While the normative standards on price and production volume have had
their benefits, the disadvantage to such a policy has clearly been the lack of correspondence with
actual drug intake requirements. The assessments were made on past production and growth trends
and future growth projections of the industry, rather than health statistics per se (except for the
requirement of drugs in national health programs) (Maitra, 1986) Since pharmaceuticals as an industry
lies with the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilisers rather than the Ministry of Health, this institutional
gap is undesirable, but hardly surprising.
While product differentiation can be considered one proxy for some innovation, it can also degenerate
into the production of irrational drugs. The regulatory mechanism is meant to ensure that novelty is
always worthwhile clinically. However, even so, each producer has a host of brand names and
combinations of similar drugs attempting to compete on the basis of brand, not price alone or least of
all efficacy. Some of the increased combinations can also prove dangerous as they increase the risk of
unsafe drug interactions.
In 1986, there were over 60,000 formulations in the Indian market, of which 9000 formulators
differentiates their brands minimally to be noticed in the market. This compared unfavourably to the
WHO Essential Drug List of the time, which described 7 fixed dose ratio combination drugs out of its
total 250 essential drugs and recommended that essential drugs only be marketed in generic form.
(Abrol and Guha, 1986)
While segment allocation had its benefits by providing incentives for Indian companies to develop
abilities in certain strategic areas, the table below shows that the legacy of these policies (especially
price controls) lingered unattractively in the extent to which "non-essentials" captured market share.
The table indicates the share of tonics, vitamins and cough and cold preparations in the domestic
market. Note that particularly high percentages are also produced by MNCs. For example, between
1980 and 1986, the turnover (in Rs.) of MNCs in the top 20 companies by market share in antibiotics
was only 38%, while Indian firms-public and private-was 62%. Among the top 85 companies, the
MNC contribution was similarly static at 35% and Indian firms produced 65% in Rupee terms.
However, in simple formulations and vitamins, MNCs produced 73% and Indian firms only 27%.
(ORG Survey, cited in Sahu, 1998). The Indian Patent Act of 1970 also created incentives for Indian
firms to find new processes for existing drugs, but also reduced incentives for MNCs to introduce
more sophisticated drugs into the country (other than the requirements forced on them through the
later New Drug Policy of 1978) since the drugs could quickly be produced by Indian firms using
different means. Some have argued that even with 40% equity, companies have been granted the same
footing as Indian companies and that should change since in other countries, companies with even
10% foreign equity are characterised as foreign companies. (Abrol and Guha, 1986).
The instances of non-essentials and hazardous drugs selling well in the market are numerous.
Becosules (B Complex) ranked second in 1984, Baralgan (deemed a hazardous antispasmodic) ranked
5h. (ORGMAT, 1984 May). This type of market inertia and the relatively low levels of regulation in
the domestic market continue to work in favour of companies that spent more on advertising.
The fact that price regulations continued to be problematic in channelling efforts towards non-essential
drugs was further evidenced by lack of enforcement. MNCs in particular, in the mid 1980s, continued
to over-charge on some of their highest selling products (usually formulations) with the help of legal
filings against government orders. The over-pricing ranged upto almost 45% in the case of Becosules
(20s pack) from Pfizer and various Glaxo tonics at 90-100% (Guha, 1986). The data also confirms that
price controls on essential drugs created a perverse situation where non-essential medicines such as
tonics, supplements and sough and cold preparations, with higher profit margins, ended up with larger
market share. National policies skewed in favour of Indian firms were justified by the fact that foreign-
owned companies dominated the market in non-essential drugs.
4.9.Summary:
While being late to the use and adaptation of a set of scientific and technological advances brings
definite costs, the gains can also be substantial as pointed out by Gerschenkron in 1962. In the
pharmaceutical sector, Indian companies have profited by sticking to mature segments and by
manufacturing both bulk drugs and formulations. They have exploited the generics market and in
recent years have begun to use modem biotechnologies to enter new product markets, create new
processes for manufacturing drugs and to diversify further into process-based innovation in the related
food and chemical sectors. In this chapter, three particular policies with far-reaching impact on the
industry, process patent-only regime, price controls and the New Drug Policy were discussed, the
latter highlighting the significance of a recurring theme in Indian policies: access to medicine.
These contributed to significant learning measures while simultaneously restructuring the market to
allow this to happen. Other countries that held expectations of their indigenous firms to compete
against foreign multinational companies were to be disappointed The Indian policies acted as selection
mechanisms to nurture capable firms, but they also created an environment in which an entire industry
could be indigenously built. This period demonstrated that there was nothing 'natural' about the
conditions under which the private sector grew at its earliest phase. Although companies had existed
from the early part of the century, it was only in the nationalistic post-independent period, where an
entire industry could be made to thrive. Learning occurred at firm level in conjunction with
considerable environmental restructuring, suggesting that firm-based explanations alone are
insufficient. Furthermore, patents, although extremely important for this industry, are also an
insufficient explanation since a variety of other important measures were also in place. The selection
environment structured by the State through strict price controls, selected public sector allocation for
certain therapeutic categories and public procurement, all drove the prices of drugs down, rewarded
new routes to the same end, and create competition in both input supply and manufacturing. India
emerged with strong capabilities in process engineering, chemistry and manufacturing. However,
while the process capabilities are seen to be important, they are depicted in some interviewees as a
somewhat embarrassing vestige of an outdated patent regime, not as a competitive advantage that has
buoyed Indian products more recently. The next chapter further highlights the limitations of patent
regime explanations.
While market access-first domestic, then foreign, has determined technological learning trajectory for
Indian firms, this has been far from a free-market conforming path. Key prices of drugs neither
reflected true scarcity, but instead reflected targeted demand projections of Indian planners.
Production allocation, similarly, was structured to reflect desired standards in self-sufficiency, rather
PHASE POLICY MEASURES
Sub-phase I: 1950s- Entering the domestic market: technological capability and
1960s the public sector
(The Public Effort) Entry/capture points through public health and "essential"
drugs were important for learning.
Sub-phase II: Process patents, price controls and production allocation
1970s- 1980s licenses.
(The Private Effort)
than actual capacity. Indeed, this often resulted in inefficient production shortfalls and lack of
investment in certain key therapeutic areas. However, the combination of structured entry points in
antibiotics and vaccines, along with the deliberate building up of plant capacity through government
incentives, largely determined Indian technological trajectory. The disciplinary carrot and sticks
employed were associated with price regulation and incentives for domestic market access. Thus,
Indian firms were gradually pushed into core technologies while at the same time foreign firms were
forced into local production, higher technology investments and smaller market shares. Indian firms
were also rewarded with additional production licenses for indigenous technology developments, such
as Cipla's Salbutamol technology. However, Indian firms were not subject to strict revocation of
licenses for not meeting demand, or for inertia in investing in new technologies. Another problem that
arose was that serious shortfalls in some essential drugs resulted from the combination of ceilings on
drug prices and restrictions on who produced the drugs. The price controls alone made production of
certain essential drugs an unsustainable business venture, and allocation criteria by ownership meant
that unless public sector labs could produce and upgrade to keep up with technology changes and
demand shifts, the production of certain essential drugs remained well below target.
Overall, however, Indian policies were successful in wresting control of the domestic market away
from MNCs and placing it in the hands of Indian-owned firms. Many policies, especially the New
Drug Policy, the Patent Act and Price Control Order, all acted to induce manufacturing capability into
Indian firms and channelled through public health drugs. Large firms emerged at the helm. The New
Drug Policy in particular, had far-reaching consequences, with Indian firms establishing a dominant
position in certain key categories such as antibiotics. Both price controls and process patents acted in
the same direction as far as technological entry was concerned into critical drug segments by making it
easier for Indian firms to seize critical technologies, while they acted in misaligned ways as far as
incentives for entry into those segments by making it less profitable in those segments. Price controls
had their disadvantages and critics were correct in their assessment that such policies also led to
allocation inefficiencies. Unwittingly, they also appear to have forced some firms abroad to seek
higher profit margins. The changed selection environment in which these firms found themselves and
the ways in which this environment structured their further learning is the story of the next chapter.
The achievement of early Indian S&T policy is not technological advancement relative to leading
companies in the US or UK, per se, although that has occurred in some instances, but industry-
building in number, scope and size of establishments. It also suggests that policies cannot be easily
compared across countries since the trajectory has been inspired by different sets of national priorities
and local skills. India's strategic hand was public health access, even if it was an unevenly developed
policy. It allowed some nurturing of Indian firms against multinational presence. In recent years, these
policies have also allowed the move into newer technologies and the strengths (admittedly, also
problems) of the public research institutes and some universities. Overall, the growth of manufacturing
companies has permitted increased revenues, which have then given rise to increased R&D spending
and the further absorption of newer technologies. This selection for success has permitted more Indian
owned firms surviving and prospering than would most likely have occurred, although the null
hypothesis can only be proven by the untimely demise of indigenous pharmaceutical firms in other
developing countries.
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Chapter 5 "Learning-by proving" through process development
Section I
5.1 Standards and Regulations as tools for learning
In product life cycles, the progression from emergence to maturity occurs without mention of entry.
The graded technological learning path alone did not show how Indian companies entered the market.
In analyzing the Indian case in Chapter 3, it became clear how significant the entry point was: public
health drugs, buttressed by preferential allocation and significant procurement possibilities, both
national and international. These reduced demand-side uncertainties, allowing firms to invest
resources in upgrading technological in-house efforts. Since then, firms have moved out of "essential"
drugs and into a wide range of non-communicable and profitable segments such as cardiovascular,
neurological and "lifestyle" drugs. Here we discuss learning, entry and growth from the viewpoint of
export markets and their associated regulatory standards. This corresponds to a "Learning by Proving"
phase, with tiered learning, from approximately 1980 to the current day. There were three types of
novel learning mechanisms in export sub-phases: one associated with tiered cGMP compliance
worldwide, another associated with vaccines procurement, and the third with the more publicized
generic drugs market.
Technological learning and advances in process capabilities have not occurred in a vacuum in this
industry. Not only is the pharmaceutical industry worldwide typified by a series of regulations, it is
also considerably different from one country to the next as governments and medical agencies choose
to monitor the health sector closely and adapt it to their own national priorities. Drugs also fall under
the purview of ingestible substances and thus Food and Drug Administration agencies (FDAs) exist
across the globe, each with their own institutional histories and monitoring purviews. Furthermore, the
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries have additional sectoral characteristics that mould
the environment within which firms strategise, such as health insurance, price regulation, safety
regulations and immunisation protocols. The conventional view of regulation is that it complicates the
workings of "free" markets and creates more barriers of entry for firms. Since the pharmaceutical
industry is particularly regulation-prone, it provides an excellent example of how Indian companies
respond to regulations of various types and a useful contrast to the newer biopharmaceutical industry,
which is explored in the following chapter.
Indian firms moved abroad partly in response to price controls in the domestic market, which made
export markets ever more attractive. Unlike the 1950-'60s where government policies appear to have
had clearly directed goals for technology acquisition, creation and transfer from public to private
sector, or the 1970s when significant efforts were made to protect indigenous firms and build their
manufacturing capability, the 1980s were characterised by a relative lack of policy vision for this
sector. In particular, a series of relatively unforeseen events of the mid-1980s and early 1990s set
impromptu tests of how well Indian firms had learnt the lessons of yesteryear. This chapter describes
how some of today's leading Indian pharmaceutical firms traversed a regulated path from one country
to the next in their export-push.
This chapter is divided into two sections. Section I deals with the regulatory and standard-setting
environment in which technological learning has occurred in the Indian pharmaceutical industry. The
section draws on a combination of reinterpretation of existing data from the industry and insights
drawn from primary data interviews with leading firms. It concludes by laying out a framework to
analyse a specific path for firms led to the position they now find themselves in. A case is built for
how regulation has compelled Indian firms to meet standards, at the same time that it has honed past
process capabilities. Thus, the environment (here, selection on the basis of "proving" certification
quality) rewards those firms that respond rapidly to standard-setting and regulation. The selection
environment here is shown to be a complex mingling of national and international events that set in
motion a set of opportunities that firms "endogenised" through past process capabilities. This is
demonstrated by (a) describing three environmental characteristics often described in the language of
one-time "shocks" (and subsequent perturbations)-the US Wax-Hatchman Act, the WTO TRIPS Act
and India's Balance of Payments crisis (b) showing progression of Indian firms from one tier of
regulatory standards to another (c) data on FDA compliance by Indian firms, particularly to the US
FDA and cGMP standards (d) the importance of public procurement in vaccines and sera linked to
strict technology standards at international level. The underlying dynamic of process development
capabilities allowed firms to advance within this selection environment. Firm-level capabilities were
on part of a richer story of global institutional and export opportunities.
"Learning-by-proving" provides an additional dimension to past thinking on learning types. While
many useful contributions have recognised the importance of demand-led technology upgrading, there
has been little analysis to show sequence of changes, and the ways in which learning is linked to
product maturity in developing countries. The chapter attempts to draw the reader's attention to how
capabilities can be nurtured by a selection environment when a judicious mix of steady demand mixed
in with both high levels of competition and some integration of technology upgrading can be
sustained. In this chapter, two specific variations are discussed of export market demand-side triggers
for firm-level learning. The first, international procurement, dodges some of the pitfalls that can
characterise poorly-run national procurement programs, and blends assured demand and immense
markets, with some level of international competition and high quality standards. The second, the
generic drugs market, mixes heavy competition with strict regulation, with an added fillip given to
innovation where it can be demonstrated even in mature segments. In particular, the evidence argues
for a broader interpretation of ways in which the production environment is structured, such that firms
face standards with varying parameters that provide "new" learning over time. This type of learning is
linked to information symmetry since regulation here provided Indian firms a means of common
information with international competitors, particularly in the generic drug business. Information
symmetry has also been a necessary, but not sufficient measure, to ensure high quality vaccines.
However, regulation and standard-setting is technology dependent, and the later chapter on
biopharmaceuticals highlights how information asymmetries can continue to be problematic.
Section II is devoted entirely to how Indian firms have produced some innovations even in the mature
generic drug industry and how a variety of other, non-technical advances have been made. The section
analyses how process development capabilities within a sub-segment of leading firms, assisted by
previous decades of assistance from government nurturing, evolved into instruments for global
competition in the generic drug industry. Contrary to the conventional thinking, data analysis shows
that both technical and non-technical types of learning occur even in mature product segments and
innovation did not have to rely on cost reductions alone. But with the opportunities from the opening
up of the US generic drugs market also come uncertainties of future paths. The chapter underlines that
the environmental conditions under which Indian firms have advanced is changing, even as firms
adapt to them, leaving the future optimistic but insecure nevertheless. Learning at firm level is being
shaped by impending changes to the Indian patent regime, institutional changes to contain rising costs
in the US health industry, and the changing nature of regulation arising from unexpected effects of
newer methods and technologies.
5.2 Export-led learning in the 1980s-1990s: "endogenizing" external
opportunities
The economic environment of the 1970s in which Indian firms had built basic capabilities in
manufacturing was to be affected in the coming decade by three major events. The first, external to the
country, in 1984, was a landmark change in the US pharmaceuticals market by the introduction of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. The second, in 1985, was the initial pressures for IPR homogenisation at the
Uruguay Round of GATT. The Trade in Intellectual Properties (TRIPS) agreement was to gradually
come to dominate the debate on the pharmaceutical industry in developing countries. This coincided
with a third, internal event, and a partial liberalisation of the Indian economy commencing in the
middle 1980s.'. All three events of the decades served to increase pressures on Indian firms to upgrade
their process development and manufacturing capabilities.
1. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 1984 (Waxman-Hatch Act)
Estimates are that the average clinical trial process took at least 7 years and the cost of the drug from
start to finish ranged from 100$ to $500 million. For generics drug manufacture, when the patent
expiry date was reached, producers needed to go through a similar process to manufacture and market
generics. Even though the generics drug producers did not have to support sunk costs to do market
surveys and technical feasibility studies, they still needed to support the expense of the safety and
efficacy tests needed by the FDA.
All this changed when the US Congress passed the Waxman-Hatch Act in 1984 that was created to
compromise between providing generic drug companies with greater access to the prescription drug
market (and lower prices to consumers), while at the same time restoring patent life to innovating
companies for products who lost patent life during the FDA's regulatory process. The implications of
the changed environment for Indian firms is discussed in detail in Section II.
2. The Trade in Intellectual Properties (TRIPs) agreement, Uruguay and Doha
Much has been written about the TRIPs agreement and how it will revolutionise the industry
worldwide. Indeed, there has been little else in the worldwide press on this industry. Various authors
such as Singh (1985), Keayala (1996) and Lanjuow (1997) in their analysis of patent laws and their
effects, have taken up where much earlier discussions in the late 1960s and early 1970s ended, when
India's Patent Act was being discussed. While the jury is out on what the actual impact will be on
Indian pharmaceuticals: higher or lower drug prices, more or less access to basic medicines by the
poor, more or less innovation (particularly on public health drugs), more or less R&D spending, more
or less competition, more or less MNC participation in the domestic economy; the interviews showed
Although the Balance of Payments crisis is seen to have heralded in India's economy-wide liberalisation in
1991, in reality, some degree of liberalisation (in the specific sense of lifting of licensing regulations) was
occurring across multiple sectors in the mid 1980s.
an interesting response to this question. Leading firms have already begun preparation for the change
to a product patent regime in 2005.
Discussions are underway in Indian government and industry regarding the core elements of the
"Scope of Patentability" provisions within TRIPS, where analysts (see Keayala, 1996) have suggested
that India tighten the use of the word "invention" so no frivolous claims can be filed, that "product"
should only apply to New Chemical Entities and not to formulations, dosage firms, new uses or new
combinations of off-patent products. As this dissertation goes on to suggest, although TRIPS acts to
limit the future policy options to developing countries, the diversity of learning paths and the extent of
capabilities that have been developed indicate that some flexibility in policy-making may yet be
available.
5.3 Proving standards
The pharmaceutical (and biopharmaceutical) industry is characterised by a vast array of
regulatory instruments. Considerable variation exists across countries and drug types. In
particular, what varies are the relative efficacy of reporting requirements, enforcement and the
institutions that monitor the industry. Also different are the supporting institutions that allow firms to
grapple with the costs of regulation, such as public funding or venture capital, and those that assist
firms in obtaining information on regulation (patent offices, information bureaus in professional
associations or nation-wide standards for common practice for manufacturers, pharmacists, doctors or
hospitals).
The inspiration of pharmaceutical industry regulation in most countries arise from the idea that:
1. Safety is paramount since the product is directly ingested, injected or applied topically. Since
the drug can make the difference between life and death in many cases, the interests of the
patient need to be safeguarded, including the hopes of the patient.
2. The consumer often has the product selected for him/her by a doctor; the consumer himself
does not necessarily make a rational choice. Information asymmetries are significant between
producers and consumers, with the latter not having specialised information necessary for
judging the product.
3. Indeed, even health care workers are often not trained to judge many of the qualities of the
product. (Advertising may be restricted, for instance, among other measures)
4. Depending on the existence and structure of the insurance industry, price effects can vary
hugely and their impact on consumers is highly specific to the type and coverage the insurance
provided.
5. Furthermore, to ensure quality, efficacy and safety, manufacturing guidelines can be stringent,
as exemplified in Good Manufacturing Practice. When manufacturing hiccups, the end
product may contain either too little actual medicinal value, or too much contamination,
leading to lack of efficacy or toxicity. Because laboratory scale processes are directly
converted to commercial scale where possible, there are problems with uniformity in safety
and efficacy that emerge at industrial level.
Indian firms face a fragmented standardisation and approvals system within the country. The burden
of proof in worldwide standards has fallen to individual firms. One interviewee stated,:
Standardisation and reliability are poor in Indian labs.
...People haven't stored valuable serum samples for later
studies. Ethics committee review boards from India are not
taken seriously abroad even though they comprise good
clinical doctors and good case loads."
(Interview, July 6th 2002)
The standardisation of quality is also a challenge for Indian companies from the input supply. Firms
have to find local sources where possible, and costs of setting up cGMP facilities and certified supply
routes can be expensive.
"In the case of contract research, it isn'tjust like the IT
industry. Reagents and equipment is imported. Therefore, it is
actually more expensive to set up a service in India"
(Interview, July 6 2002)
Although the regulatory system is fragmented, companies nevertheless acknowledge the involvement
of the government and the efforts to streamline the process. The scale of the Indian market also
requires controls as product impact and liability are multiplied manifold.
"Governmental functions come into play with regulatory
issues when you market to one billion people"
(Interview, July 6 h 2002)
5.3.1 The Practice of Good Manufacturing: GMP/cGMP
Current Good Manufacturing Practice (cGMP) provides a certification for manufacturing companies in
pharmaceuticals and sets standards for the industry. As Indian firms moved abroad, many eventually
set their sights on entering the US market for generic drugs. An example of the most highly regulated
market for pharmaceuticals, the USA, requires the following broad conditions be satisfied before
drugs can reach the market. The constraints that the FDA places on companies involve the extent of
regulation of the process (and setting standards) through the entire product development cycle from
drug discovery to market. At each stage the company files relevant material with the FDA to prove
compliance (in the event the company specializes in the entire chain) or the specialist company files in
any one or more segment.
Manufacturing companies face particularly stringent hurdles and must show a variety of well-
established standards. This requires not only compliance with existing regulations, but also the ability
to change internal organisational structures rapidly. The following section lays out the FDA
manufacturing guidelines.
Any human therapeutic or vaccine protein using any biotechnology method are called "biologics", or
biological pharmaceuticals and come under the regulatory purview of the Food and Drug
Administrations (FDAs) of various countries. The US FDA, in particular, requires firms to comply
with particularly strict guidelines for how biologics should be manufactured and produced for sale.2
Recombinant human proteins are of specific interest as they are often intravenously or by injection
consumed by human beings.' "cGMP" or Current Good Manufacturing Practice straddles the range
of "Manufacturing, Processing, Packaging and Holding of Drugs"4 and includes requirements of
workers, physical infrastructure, equipment, the actual manufacturing process (production and process
control), packaging, labeling, holding (storage) and distribution (as well as handling returns). It also
specifies guidelines for company records and reporting mechanisms, quality control monitoring and
documentation.' Thus, for many companies, the most relevant cGMP guidelines are for
1. Tools and processes-such as fermentation or upstream processing, purification or downstream
processing and quality control
2. Descriptive documents, data collection documents and numbering systems
3. How to establish validation protocols for a new protein, new infrastructure or entirely new
facility altogether.'
2 For a full description, see http://www.fda.gov/cder/
3 See also Walsh, Gary and Denis Headon. 1994. Chapter 4. Therapeutic Proteins: Special considerations, in
Protein Biotechnology, John Wiley and Sons, New York.
4 These refer to FDA regulations, listed under the Code for Federal Regulations (CFR) 21, CFR 210 and 211,
also 21CFR600 and 610.
5 Documentation alone includes (a) standard operating procedure guidelines and descriptions, protocols of
various kinds for process and production controls, master production records (b) data collection formats such as
forms, batch production records, log books (c) numbering systems-equipment part numbers, lot numbers, form
numbers etc (d) data files for everything ranging from equipment history to files that track products, parts and
equipment and allow traceability at all times.
6 Thus Indian companies are having to establish validation protocols, many for the first time, which have 3
components (a) installation qualification (IQ) including equipment identification information, equipment utility
requirements-such as services of water, gas, nitrogen, drainage and exhaust etc, and equipment safety features,
such as pressure valve releases, alarms and appropriate triggers. (b) Operational qualification (OQ) calibration
requirements, such as measurable parameters, methods of measurement, monitoring and the appropriate range,
triggers and limits such calibration parameters, pre-operational activities, operations and acceptance criteria and
(c) performance qualification (PQ) to create reliable and reproducible working performance even in extreme
conditions. This includes preliminary operations, performance qualification procedures and performance
qualification acceptance procedures and criteria.
For example, the USFDA thus requires that not only companies establish Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs), but also that they act as written commitments that the company specify the (a)
procedure (b) assigns responsibility (c) reasons for the task (d) constraints and parameters of the task
(when it can be or should not be applied). Finally, FDA inspections occur to check that the company
complies with these standards.
In addition, Process Validation7 itself is a complex set of procedures. It is a requirement of Current
Good Manufacturing Practices Regulations for Finished Pharmaceuticals,8 and includes, but is not
limited to, sampling and testing of in-process materials and drug products (Section 211.110) and
control of Microbiological Contamination (Section 211.113).9
Interview data and secondary data analysis demonstrate that GMP guidelines are a useful tool both for
the study of productivity increases, and for ways in which it coerces firms into achieving certification
and ramping up production. The skills needed to achieve GMP are not simply in the realm of obtaining
certification as proof, but lie in the ability to demonstrate quick-turn around time to getting a product
certified for specific markets, for undertaking contract manufacturing, and importantly, for persuading
regulatory authorities that samples are not only of high quality, but that they are of high consistency,
and that future trials will not be jeopardized by the inability to manufacture in quantity for the market
once approval is granted. These two themes, of quality, consistency and quantity all ensure speed to
market and national reputation of the industry.
5.4 Indian responses to regulation: tiers, "consolidation plateaus"
Unlike the histories of export-propelled growth as a core element of NIE industrial policy, the Indian
pharmaceutical industry went through stages of development abroad. The pharmaceutical industry thus
differed significantly from other Indian ones by the intent of industrial policy. Import substitution was
Process validation is defined by the USFDA as "process validation is establishing documented evidence which
provides a high degree of assurance that a specific process will consistently produce a product meeting its pre-
determined specifications and quality characteristics ". (see http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/pv.htm)
8 21 CFR 210, 211 and GMP for Medical Devices, 21CFR 820.
9 In particular, in an area of relevance to much product differentiation from Indian companies, different tablet
forms, process validation procedures are integral to the quality and efficacy of the final product. As the
guidelines state, 'for example, in the production of a compressed tablet, afirm may switch from one type of
granulation blender to another with the erroneous assumption that both types have similar performance
characteristics, and, therefore granulation mixing times and procedures need not be altered. However, if the
blenders are substantially different, use of the new blender with procedures used for the previous blender may
result in granulation with poor content uniformity. This, in turn, may lead to tablets having significant differing
potencies ... In this example, revalidation comprises installation qualification of the new equipment and
performance qualification of the process intended for use in the new blender". "Guideline on General Principles
of Process Validation, May 1987, Dr. Arthur Shaw, Food and Drug Administration.
clearly intended though primarily two elements (a) backward integration of bulk drugs and local
production (later mandated through local content requirements, but initially through requiring MNCs
to manufacture bulk drugs locally). (b) Similarly, import substitution was catalysed through the
process patent allowance that generated process development resulting in new ways to make drugs
only available abroad. However, export orientation emerged as a peculiar offshoot of Indian planning.
Profit margins, squeezed extraordinarily low by price ceilings on "essential" drugs forced two paths
(a) firms, Indian and others, moved into production of non-essential drugs (although Indian firms were
provided production allocation licenses and procurement opportunities in the essential drug domain
and thus appear to have moved relatively less frequently than MNCs into non-essential categories). (b)
The second trend was more spectacular and less deliberate in Indian policy: firms moved into export
markets to increase profits, which were unattainable in the same categories at home.
While the guidelines on standards and regulation can be described through lists of criteria, the
interview data captures the challenges and benefits more completely. As described in previous
sections, the entry point into the product's life cycle was predominantly through public health
segments. Below a framework is developed for analysing technological and market advances based on
the innovation environment. Firms had been born in a relatively unwieldy and inefficient regulatory
climate. Guidelines had been in disuse and in need of an upgrade for some time. Approvals were
cumbersome and slow. This is where export markets have been so important.
""The greatest obstacle is GMP and regulatory hurdles. At
least 25 other companies fall into this same category. For
Indians, formulations and process chemistry are like ABC
now, formulations we can now learn to do the next day,
process chemistry in less than 12 months ". (Interview,
October 2003)
Interviews elicited a surprising similarity in responses among pharmaceutical firms and different (from
pharmaceuticals), but self-similar responses in biopharmaceuticals. Companies appear to have found
the Indian regulatory process time consuming and procedurally complex. Yet, despite the
inexperience, a subset of Indian firms learnt rapidly in export markets and grew in size and market
reach. Furthermore, more recently, GMP compliance, for example, can further reward larger
companies that make the investment in complying.' The coming sections construct a path for Indian
firms which has linked learning (technological and otherwise) to regulations and standards.
10 Various estimates suggest that because of their opening of highly regulated markets, GMP compliant
manufacturing facilities are 25-30% more valuable to Indian companies than facilities that do not receive GMP
100
5.4.1 Tiered markets: Interrupting the product's life-cycle:
Markets are not all of one ideal type: they take national, regional or other forms with considerable
barriers to entry and plagued by information variations. Indeed, in the pharmaceutical industry,
considerable segmentation exists within the "world" market. This sub-section describes the variation
and the pathway of leading Indian firms.
A typology of three main types of export markets can be constructed, each with varying degrees of
regulation-both in patents, but also in GMP. The patent regime of the tiers is less uniform, and less
clearly correlated to advance. The first, the Tier I markets, signify the lowest levels of regulatory
requirements, and are labelled "unregulated". In reality they are loosely regulated by GMP, and often
allow products on-patent elsewhere. Many Indian firms began their ascent out of the Indian market
and into the world, first through unregulated markets with quality standards and efficacy and safety
standards at similar, or lower; levels than in India. The table below shows Indian firms and the graded
markets they moved into. Unregulated markets of significant market potential (Tier 1) were the first
destination. Tier 2 and Tier 3 are regulated markets, the first corresponding to transition economies of
Europe, and Tier 3 to the highly regulated markets of the US and UK. The evidence is two-fold,
tracking export reach of companies and their compliance with GMP requirements of various national
authorities.
certification. However, the investments required upgrading or constructing facilities to achieve compliance
prices out most companies. Thus large companies become larger.
" Although compliance determines which countries the firm has access to, it is not a perfect one-to-one
relationship between GMP standards and country list since some countries have (a) minimal or (b) unclear
regulatory requirements and thus a firm with "higher" levels of GMP capability simply enter with no difficulty
or (b) don't enter until the regulatory climate can be clarified.
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Table 5.4.1 Graded market access
Company Indian Unregulated Regulated-Tier Highly
or minimally 2 Regulated-
regulated (Transition Tier 3
Tier 1 Economies
Including
Former Soviet
Republics)
Ranbaxy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cipla Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sun Pharmaceuticals Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cadila Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wockhardt Yes Yes Yes Yes
DRL Yes Yes Yes Yes
Biocon Yes No No Yes
Bharat Biotech (Vaccines and Yes Yes No No
recombinants)
Shanta Biotechnics (Vaccines and Yes Yes No No
recombinants) II
The fact that some of these companies were also suppliers to other countries through partner
companies does not discount the fact that they began by trying to capture a significant share of the
India first, albeit with considerable policy assistance.
On the basis of the regulatory standards, one can construct a taxonomy of learning levels and can
categorise (and test) three main types of Indian manufacturing firms based on their target markets:
1. Those that target the domestic market
2. Those that target the domestic and unregulated export markets
3. Those that target the domestic unregulated and regulated export markets.
The technological learning process appears to be sharply different in the production process between
regulated and unregulated markets, where current Good Manufacturing Practice becomes a critical
differentiator of quality, and affects speed to market. Indian cGMP-certified firms gain upwards of
25% in margins relative to non-compliant firms." Although many Indian firms continue to export
primarily to markets where regulatory standards are lower, leading Indian firms have been gradually
learning to challenge foreign firms in regulated markets and in profitable therapeutic segments." Thus,
an Indian firm that can demonstrate quality, and can develop APIs both for internal consumption as
well as for niche exports, stands to gain market share. It becomes a specialised generic drug player and
can begin to challenge first comer firms for certain API categories.
2 Interview data and confirmed from secondary interview quotes.
13 See for example, "Indian generic drug firms step up patent battle", Saritha Rai, New York Times, Friday,
December 26, 2003
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An important element of the learning is that the tiered structure of export markets created
"consolidation plateaus" where firms expand markets laterally (in countries with the same or similar
regulatory requirements) without having to advance technologically at the same time. Thus, important
revenue streams were brought into the companies at each tier, which could then be used to invest in
GMP compliance, and process capabilities to enter the next tier.
The table below was created to demonstrate the combined effects of entry and expansion for leading
companies. It shows the continuing effects of older policies on the product structure and market
orientation of India's five leading firms and some of the interviewed biopharmaceutical firms.
Procurement here was listed as a potential benefit reflecting their products, not whether companies
have actually benefited in recent years. However, an even more important common characteristic is
the extent of similarity in market access and GMP facilities (usually USFDA or UK MCA). All
companies have significant plant capacities and almost all have invested in GMP infrastructure.
Table 5.4.2 cGMP compliance and generic capabilities in India or abroad
Company Market Access: GENERICS (G)/US or Other CGMP facilities
Ranbaxy GUSO Yes
Cipla G US O Yes
Sun Pharmaceuticals G US O Yes
Cadila G 0 Yes
Wockhardt G US O Yes
DRL GUSO Yes
Bharat Biotech G Yes
Biocon G US Yes
The progression of leading Indian companies into the highly regulated markets (Tier 3) has occurred
in three ways: (1) GMP certification by the Tier 3 country authorities (2) marketing and distribution
networks established in Tier 3 countries and (3) R&D connections (often scientific advisory presence
or CEOS from Tier 3 countries), as the next two cases demonstrate.
Large companies such as Cipla, with a long history of exports, have approval from the State Institute
for the Control of Drugs, Slovak Republic, National Institute of Pharmacy (NIP), Hungary ,ANVISA,
Brazil, Medicines Control Council (MCC), South Africa, Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA),
Australia, Pharmaceutical Inspection Convention (PIC), Germany, Medicines Control Agency (MCA),
UK, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), USA and the World Health Organisation (WHO).
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5.4.2 Case I Ranbaxy
The Drug Price Control Order thwarted large profit margins at home and created an urgency to search
abroad for higher profits. Ranbaxy, like other Indian companies, moved abroad. For ten years starting
in 1986, the company exported APIs/bulk drugs at an average annual rate of Serum Institute of India%
mainly to other developing countries. (WIPO/PCT/MRU/01/10). Exports of APIs was begun to
Europe in the 1990s and total exports constituted approximately 40% to total revenues by the middle
of the decade. Ranbaxy then began moving into the export of finished drugs and collaboration through
joint ventures abroad. It also began moving overseas to establish manufacturing and sales.
The case of Ranbaxy, India's largest pharmaceutical firm by sales demonstrates the development cycle
of capabilities and the importance of manufacturing and process engineering in the move into generic
drugs as well as drug discovery. The company began in 1961 and in the ensuing 40 years went from a
manufacturing firm to one innovating in new chemical entities, drug delivery systems, and to out-
licensing its products to transnational companies. The Indian patent regime was beginning to face
overhaul when the Uruguay Round of negotiations began in 1991 at the World Trade Organisation. By
1993, Ranbaxy and companies like it had reoriented their strategy to expand internationally as
"research-based" companies. Ranbaxy itself began moving out of the protections awarded through the
Indian Patent Act and into the newer domain of non-infringement that its Ceflacor successes had
wrought. It alone accounts for almost 27% of total pharmaceutical sector R&D spending in 2002. Its
recent business strategy has reflected in part its historical trajectory, four segmented markets, with
exports approximately 60% of total revenues today, in over a 100 countries, with sales presence in
over 25 and manufacturing in 7 of them. The US market is its second largest market after India.
The analysis of firm-level profiles shows that India's leading drug firms all have some antibiotics and
anti-infective capability, and a few have it as their continued major revenue stream. In fact, Ranbaxy,
India's leading firm continues to enjoy advantages developed through anti-infective capability. Its
presence in the US market has allowed it to expand its antibiotics portfolio where most other generic
drug firms, even US firms, have phased out their antibiotics production facilities. In this sense, even
past sluggish markets for obsolete or unsophisticated drugs (many antibiotics, for example) have found
a new lease on life.
Furthermore, the investments in manufacturing and research into new drug systems evolved
concurrently and the emergence of Ranbaxy's new drug discovery capabilities arose out of process
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experimentation to find new benefits to existing drugs and new routes of manufacture, as in the case of
the once a day oral dose of Ciprofloxacin, in such demand recently in US markets after the anthrax bio
terrorism scare. From the business end, Ranbaxy also evolved from being an Indian company, to being
forced to find new overseas markets (50% of revenues come from exports). It then moved on to setting
up JVs first for manufacture, then marketing, public listing on foreign stock exchanges, then foreign
acquisition of manufacturing sites, capture a piece of US generics market, sales of its branded products
in US, then filing multiple investigational drugs applications and beginning clinical trials.
Ranbaxy was listed among the top 20 most competitive Asian companies in a 1997 Arthur D. Little
study of 4500 Asian companies. Its history is consistent with a staged path through tiered regulatory
environments. It is also consistent with a move from manufacturing to drug discovery over time, with
clearly overlapping phases when both process and product research was ongoing (and still continues to
be). Infrastructure to build visibility, quality and compliance with GMP standards has also shown a
steady progression. The table below shows how Ranbaxy, one of India's leading R&D spenders in the
pharmaceutical industry, has built its presence overseas through GMP certification and facility
approval (at Indian sites and subsequently acquired foreign sites), sales presence in the US and
strategic marketing alliances and finally, a gradual push into R&D visibility abroad.
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Table 5.4.3 Example of technological milestones for Ranbaxy
YEAR MAIN BUSINESS MILESTONE MAIN TECHNOLOGICAL MILESTONE
1961 Company incorporated
1973 Company goes public Begins Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs).
Multipurpose chemical plant established in Mohali.
1977 First foreign JV in Nigeria.
Penetration of African markets.
1983 Modem dosage facility begun in Dewas.
1985 A second pharmaceutical marketing The Ranbaxy Research foundation is started.
division is begun.
1987-'88 Modem Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) production
plant opened in Toansa.
Ranbaxy thus becomes country's largest antibiotics
manufacturer.
The antibiotics plant received US FDA approval
1990 Received US patent for Doxycyline
1991 Modem Cephalosporin facility begun in Mohali.
Received US patent for Cephalosporins.
1992 First JV with TNC: agreement with
Eli Lilly to market some of Lilly's
products in India
1993 First JV in China.
Corporate mission to evolve into a
research-based and international
pharmaceutical company.
1994 Regional HQs begun in Raleigh New Ranbaxy Research Centre opened in Gurgaon.
(USA), London (UK) A pilot fermentation plant is begun in Paonta Sahib.
Ranbaxy's first Global Depository
Receipts listed on the Luxembourg
Stock Exchange.
1995 Acquisition of US-based Ohm
Laboratories' manufacturing units.
Commissioned new FDA-approved new manufacturing
wing at Ohm laboratories.
1997 Ranbaxy crosses sales of Rs. 10,000
million and exports of Rs. 5,000
million.
1998 First entry into US pharmaceutical
market under branded product names
Ranbaxy emerges publicly Company completes successful pre-clinical studies and
positioned as a drug discovery files first Investigational New Drug (IND) application in
company India to start Phase I Clinical Trials
1999 Ranbaxy commences Phase I clinical trials for RBx2258
First out-licensing/reverse
technology transfer for drug
development. Bayer AG signs an
agreement with Ranbaxy for
exclusive development and
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worldwide marketing rights to an
oral once-daily Ciprofloxacin.
2000 Company completes successful pre-clinical studies and
files IND application for RNx4638, an asthma molecule
Company's first TNC acquisition:
Buys Bayer's generics business in
Germany, named Basics.
Company enters South America's
biggest market, Brazil, sales top
US$2.5 million in Brazil alone.
2001 Move into East Asia: Ranbaxy
begins new US $10 million
manufacturing facility in Vietnam
Company passes 2001 turnover of
US$600million
Surpasses sales of US$100 million
and becomes fastest growing US-
based pharmaceutical company.
2002 Files IND for Oxazolidinone RBx 7644, an antibacterial.
Sources: Indian Infoline 2002, http://www.indiainfoline.com, The Hindu, various months, company records,
Times of India, various months, US Patent Office.
Its research accomplishments have also been impressive. In the recent past over 50 products launched
in India and in Chemical Research, a technology for more than 40 APIs developed over the last 3
years. But the firm is not the only unit of analysis for tiered growth. The selection environment
represented in this phase of the industry's evolution by fragmented regulatory markets worldwide, also
induced tiered product launches and some associated technological learning (but largely compliance-
particularly with patents). More than 100 process and product patents have been filed, of which ~50
have been granted. Over 450 patent filings have occurred in the USA, Brazil, UK, Germany, China
and elsewhere. The table below underlines the strategy to patent in segmented markets and shows the
extent of process patents and API capability relative to New Drug Discovery.
Table 5.4.4 Patent Status of Ranbaxy as on 31st July, 2002
Type india usa europe PCT
Filed Granted Filed Granted Filed Granted Filed Published
PROCESS 115 29 53 27 25 6 52 32
APIs 78 25 39 22 18 6 36 21
PDR 37 4 14 5 7 0 16 11
NDDS 29 6 13 4 5 0 16 9
FERMENTATION 4 2 1 0 1 0 2 2
NDDR 23 0 17 6 0 0 17 8
Source: Ranbaxy company reports, various.
Bulk drugs formed about 38% of revenues in 1998 and are internally consumed in the manufacturing
of formulations, thus giving the company a cost advantage for the final product.
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The table below shows the gradual progression of the company into manufacturing sites abroad.
Table 5.4.5 Ranbaxy's tiered country entry
COUNTRY YEAR OF ENTRY
India 1965
Nigeria 1979
Malaysia and Thailand 1986-'86
China 1992
USA 1994
Source: WIPO, 2002
The next table below shows major target export countries, with Tier 3 countries explicitly shaded.
Table 5.4.6 Indian pharmaceutical exports and leading 15 countries, 1995-2000
(Tier 2 countries shaded)
COUNTRY 1995-'96 1999-'00
USA 4238 6718
Germany 3418 3252
Russia 3036 4932
Hong Kong 1919 3562
Netherlands 1436 2192
Nigeria 1199 2577
UK 1142 2568
Vietnam 885 1413
Singapore 868 2452
Sri Lanka 825 1242
Spain 765 1287
Italy 721 1514
Iran 634 1796
China 361 1371
Brazil 170 1627
Total to leading 15 21617 (62.8%) 38503 (58.1%)
Total exports 34432 66310
Source: Adapted from 39h IDMA Annual Publication, 2001
All three tiers continue to be attractive markets, the rate of growth of exports in the years 1995-2000 to
the US lower than those to "easier" Tier 2 countries, but increasing.
The product launches have been tiered as well, with small improvements made to the drug depending
on the regulatory requirements and the potential market.
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Table 5.4.7 Ranbaxy export product launches
Ranbaxy Product Generic version of brand Countries
molecule name
Keflor MR Ceflacor Cefaclor
Sporidex AF Cephalexin India, USA, SA
Coriem XL Diltiazem Hcl India, Malaysia, Myanmar
Difnal DR Diclofenac Sod Malaysia, Singapore
Roletra D Loratadine Pseudoephedrine India
Altiva D Fexofenadine India
Pseudoephedrine
Romesec DR Omeprazole Malaysia, Singapore
Cifran OD Ciprofloxacin India; Licensed to Bayer AG for
further development
Zanocin OD Ofloxacin India
Riomet OD Metformin India
Source: Adapted from company reports, website and press releases
Manufacturing firms have later used the acquisition route to establish a more global presence within
the tiered markets. The importance of regulatory requirements on firms is demonstrated by the level of
investments of Ranbaxy in acquiring key firms for their manufacturing capabilities approved by
regulatory authorities in their respective locations. Ranbaxy prepared for further advances in the US
and European markets by acquiring technologies from Crosslands and Gufic, and acquiring certified
manufacturing facilities for immediate product launch. The table below shows the acquisitions,
particularly those of Vorin in India, Rima in Ireland, and Ohm in the US. In addition, Ranbaxy like
other Indian firms is obtaining US FDA and other manufacturing certification across a wide range of
its own manufacturing facilities at home.
Table 5.4.8 Ranbaxy's acquisition pathway
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COMPANY CAPABILITIES ACQUIRED EFFECT
ACQUIRED INTO RANBAXY
Crosslands Research Dermatological expertise relevant Diluted the heavy dependence on antibiotics and
to dermatology, orthopaedics and antibacterial. Entry into four new segments of ant
gynaecology. fungal and anti-inflammatory, orthopaedics,
ophthalmologic and gynaecological medicine.
With this acquisition, Ranbaxy becomes the largest
pharmaceutical company in India.
Gufic 5 major brands acquired (Mox, Biggest selling brands in these segments.
Suprimix, Exel, Zole and Roxythro) Amoxycillin capability relevant for US market
and semi-synthetic penicillin and increased.
anti-helminthes, among others.
Vorin Laboratories Bulk Ciprofloxacin manufacture Increased market share
Rima 200 product manufacturing Entry into Europe for generic dosages of Rima's
Pharmaceuticals portfolio acquired portfolio and as an export entry vehicle for
Ranbaxy's own Amoxycillin and others.
Ohm Laboratories Anti-inflammatory drugs, OTC Increased generic drug market share and greater
analgesics focus global presence for highly regulated markets
5.4.3 Case 11 Sun Pharmaceuticals
The learning path is characterised for most early entrants by manufacturing experience that brought in
the revenues, which were then invested in acquisition and R&D investments. While most of today's
leading Indian firms traversed the manufacturing path, gradually assimilating capabilities and
revenues, and patenting and launching products in a tiered fashion, regulation has also motivated
recently manufacturing firms to choose acquisition directly instead of manufacturing alone, as a rapid
path to growth. Such firms acquire drug specific manufacturing sites for later certification, or buy
those already certified as cGMP compliant. The table below shows major acquisitions by Sun
Pharmaceuticals (begun in 1983), India's fastest growing pharmaceutical company in 2002-2003. The
acquisitions combine brands with often corresponding acquisitions of certified facilities in key regions
to cater to specific markets.
Table 5.4.9 Acquisition pathway of certified manufacturing facilities for Sun Pharmaceuticals
PLANT ACQUIRED DISTINCTIVE FEATURES
Tamil Nadu Dadha Pharma's plant, 1996 Oncology specialization
Knoll Pharmaceuticals Bulk manufacture of APIs in Ahmednagar
Gujarat Lyka Organics Ltd, equity 1996, Bulk manufacture of active cephalexin for international
merged 1999 sales
MJ Pharmaceuticals, Ltd, equity stake 1996 Insulin manufacturing plants. Approval for many dosage
form lines (sterile dry powder injections, small volume
injections, tablets, capsules, liquids and ointments, soft
gelatine caps and aerosols). UK MCA approval. Filing
for US FDA approval shortly.
Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, equity US-based manufacturer of generic pharmaceuticals, US
stake 1996, acquisition 2002 FDA approved plant. 5 ANDA approvals received in the
last year, and 5 more products await approval. Caraco to
source APIs from Sun's plants (one plant is USFDA
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Source: Adapted from Sun Pharmaceuticals company reports, website and press releases.
A more detailed analysis of Sun's learning path highlights the intertwined focus on manufacturing
with acquisitions of key technologies and the push into tiered markets-India, Asia, Russia, Canada,
USA. Scientific breakthroughs were not at the heart of this learning path. Mature brands in psychiatry
are bought, and then manufacturing commences at a modest scale. Region al expansion occurred and
complementary assets in distribution and marketing are developed. The first product diversification
into cardiology drugs begins. The first significant manufacturing milestone is the acquisition of the
MNC Knoll Pharmaceutical's manufacturing plant.
14 ANDA refers here to the Abbreviated New Drug Application of the US FDA.
II1
approved, another awaits FDA inspection) to compete as
an integrated manufacturer. 14
Pradeep Drug Company, 2000 WHO cGMP approved site for manufacturing APIs and
intermediates for India and the neighboring markets
Natco Pharma, 1999 A basket of brands (turnover-Rs50cr) for high-value
segments of respiratory, gastro-enterology, orthopedics,
I_ anti-infectives and pediatrics
Milmet Labs, acquisition, 1999 Acquired brands in ophthalmology.
Table 5.4.10 Acquisition and advancement path for Sun Pharmaceuticals
Year Milestones
1983 Sun Pharma starts operations with 5 psychiatry-based products. Initial coverage is limited to
Calcutta. Within a year the company expands to cover all eastern states. A small
manufacturing facility for tablets/capsules is set up in a shed at Vapi.
1986 Administrative office is set up in Bombay. Coverage extends to Western India.
1987 Marketing operations are expanded nation-wide.
1988 Initial products in cardiology are launched. The company is reported in a market audit by the
prescription tracking company, ORG* for the first time- rank 107th, 0.1% Market share.
1989 The corporate office is shifted to Baroda, in the western state of Gujarat. Products used in
gastroenterology are introduced. Exports begin, with marketed to neighbouring countries in
Asia.
1991 A proposed research centre, SPARC, is constructed. Rank 70th.
1993 SPARC is inaugurated. Moscow, Toronto offices opened. Products registered in 10 markets.
1994 After an IPO in October, the company is listed on stock exchanges in India.
The company's first bulk drug plant at Panoli starts production.
A dosage form plant at Silvassa starts production.
Major expansion at the existing plant in Vapi is completed.
One product now features among the top 250 pharma brands in the Indian market.
A separate division, Synergy, is created to market Psychiatry/ Neurology products.
1995 A division, Aztec, is begun for cardiology products.
Inca, a new division to market critical care medication to intensive care units commences
operations. International marketing is strengthened with offices in Ukraine and Belarus.
1996 A bulk drug unit at Ahmednagar is acquired from Knoll Pharma.
A stake is acquired in a generic dosage form manufacturer; the Detroit based Caraco Pharma
Labs. An equity stake acquired in Gujarat Lyka Organics Ltd.; a manufacturer of cephalexin
bulk active with a USFDA approved intermediate. An equity stake acquired in MJ Pharma, a
manufacturer of several dosage form lines with a UK MCA approved plant. The company
ranks 27th with 2 products ranking among the country's top selling 300 pharma brands.
Product registrations are now in place across 24 countries.
1997 TDPL, a company with a diverse product offering (oncology, fertility, anaesthesiology, pain
management) is merged with Sun Pharma.
The company's second R&D facility is established for dosage forms and supporting
documentation for North America and European generic drug markets.
1998 Brands acquired from Natco Pharma. For entry into opthalmology, Milmet Labs is merged
into Sun Pharma. The company's new formulation plant at Silvas commences operations.
1999 Rank is in top 10 in the domestic market. The bulk cephalexin manufacturer Gujarat Lyka
Organics is merged with Sun Pharma. 6 brands now feature among the leading 300 pharma
brands in India.
2000 Ranked 5th among all companies in the domestic market. Pradeep Drug company, a Chennai
based bulk active manufacturer is merged with Sun Pharma. The company announces a
dedicated research campus for NCE initiatives with investments of Rs. 40cr over two years.
Source: Adapted from Sun Pharmaceuticals company reports, website and press releases.
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Although much of the evidence shown here has been drawn from domestic market leaders, the story of
tiered advance is richer than this. Capabilities in certain therapeutic categories have also shown tiered
growth, shaped by the selection environment (and demand) of that product set. Although the
competition in the top layers of the domestic market is intense, it does not reflect that market leaders
may not be segment leaders or vice-versa. For example, Alkem leads in Cephalosporins but is not in
the top 10 companies by total market share. Neither is Morepon Laboratories, which is the second
largest generic manufacturer worldwide for the non-sedative, antihistamine Loratadine, which is the
4t largest drug worldwide in terms of market size (estimated at about $3 billion). Morepen exports to
over 50 countries. It also exports to the more difficult regulatory markets of North America and
Western Europe.
One can test the tiered structure further. Bulk drug manufacturers such as Aurobindo Pharma and
Orchid show a relationship to this tiered path. Indeed, the challenge in recent years for Indian firms
has not been exports, but the high levels of investments necessary to sustain speed of adaptation to
regulatory requirements. Their target markets and the associated institutional climate have affected the
technological growth paths of these three types of companies, in particular, the extent of technological
intensity of manufacturing itself and the desire to build proprietary assets. But both steps 1 and 2 often
lead to 3, as larger customer bases provide search and experimentation opportunities for dosage forms,
clients and volume markets for APIs.
For 1 and 2, Indian companies have developed extensive marketing and distribution expertise, only in
step 3, do companies link up significantly with foreign companies to distribute and market Indian
pharmaceutical products. However, as Indian companies gradually move through the "manufacturing
push" to invest more heavily in drug discovery and development, later costs for clinical trials may also
be born by more established foreign companies.Those companies that cannot move from Tiers 1-2 or
2-3 suffer as their knowledge base stagnates and their wage advantage shrivels.
5.5 International public procurement: demand-led learning
In the previous chapter, we saw how public health afforded some entry points for Indian firms into the
domestic market and the previous section underscored how learning was linked to graded regulatory
paths. This section analyses how the ideal-type public health drug, vaccines, have been supported and
upgraded by procurement at international levels. Those firms that could adapt their learning to
regulations abroad and could meet demand were rewarded. Indian firms had emerged from benefiting
from the public health focus of government policies and the volume sales in the domestic market.
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Although profit margins were sharply lower after price controls were introduced into the "essential"
segments, firms were still assured of two elements: (a) large domestic volume sales direct to
customers and (b) public procurement through the government particularly for vaccines.
This section shows that another significant form of regulatory impact on learning has been
international procurement of public health drugs through international agencies. While vaccines and
sera have specific paths for procurement, also important are drugs considered to be in the public
interest such as antibiotics and anti-infectives. These are usually high-volume and low cost products
and have a significant place in public hospitals and clinics. Although procurement within countries has
often been criticised for its inefficiencies and linked to protectionism for domestic firms, international
vaccine procurement has provided a thought-provoking variant of infant industry protection. Here,
vaccine suppliers from developing countries have a potentially immense market, but which are linked
to high quality standards. It also encourages some level of innovation on the part of these firms since
the procurers have an incentive to assist current suppliers to adapt to new public health concerns and
increase production to supply to lesser developed countries.
"These programs have played a huge role in sustainability and supply
of vaccines because they do not have large commercial markets. At the
same time GMP requirements keep changing, so companies need
procurement to really make the process viable. This is a guarantee to
us and to others to have markets available. It also recognizes
companies and thus makes new collaborations possible, while also
helping with the standardization ofplatforms. " (Interview, June 2002)
Vaccines and sera are not like other drugs. Their quality and control considerations are significantly
different, and thus their procurement guidelines also differ. For vaccines, procurement cannot be made
on the basis of price since quality considerations are of utmost importance. Vaccine efficacy and
safety cannot be determined solely in the laboratory, thus making the uncertainties and technical
challenges for manufacturers acute. Only a few companies worldwide make vaccines of high enough
quality to be procured internationally for expanded immunisation programs (EPI). The fact that
vaccines are highly temperature sensitive means that both the manufacturer and the procurement
agency rely on considerable support infrastructure to keep the vaccines effective and safe.
The box shows the social and economic characteristics of vaccines, which make them, requite special
consideration in manufacturing and procurement.
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Box 1 Special characteristics of vaccines
National impact: Vaccination coverage is designed for all infants and thus has an
immense national impact on public health. 2. Biological product: Since vaccine
production is a biological process with living organisms as inputs, so production/quality
control require cGMP and good laboratory practice (GLP) compliance. Lab testing alone
cannot determine a vaccine's safety ad efficacy. 3. Captive consumer: Vaccination is
generally mandatory and the consumer has neither choice nor (usually) the ability to judge
the quality of the vaccine. 4. Semi-captive market: The worldwide vaccine market is
characterized by less than 20 vaccine exporters. 5. Difficult handling: Vaccines are heat-
sensitive with a limited shelf-life (two years maximum).
6. Credibility/quality: The burden of proof on vaccination programs is high. Public
acceptance of vaccination is vital and depends on the safety and efficacy of the treatment.
The more people decide not to get vaccinated, the greater the risk of disease spread to the
rest of the population. 7. Low cost: Traditional vaccines are cheap per dose and are often
provided free. This can result in lowered perceptions of value of vaccines.
Source: Adapted from WHO/VSQ/98.05
On the one hand, theory predicts that 'easy' markets and government protection will result in firms
stagnating and suggest that competition and free markets are the solution. Others suggest that
procurement has its place in helping firms learn. Public health procurement is unique for the global
scale in which acquisitions are made. Only a limited number of industries allow such possibilities."
However, some examples exist in other parts of the health industry (medical equipment, for example,
in public hospitals), the energy sector, defence and related industries (bomb detonators, land mine
clearing machines etc) and education sectors, thus opening up technology procurement as an important
potential tool for technology access and upgrading. 6. The interview data for this dissertation provided
a unique opportunity to question firms about international procurement, a case where firms compete
with others internationally to bid for procurement by the international agency. Therefore, the standard
critiques of protectionism do not apply straightforwardly to such schemes, but they nevertheless do
provide a system by which firms can find reliable (and large) markets. The firms, however, must
demonstrate high levels of product quality, consistency of batches and the ability to supply large
volumes on demand. In more recent years, this procurement role has been significantly taken over by
15 Public procurement by private supply can occur in some sub-sectors of energy, education, public services such
as waste removal or recycling, and defence. While public procurement is often automatic for public suppliers,
the focus here is on procurement for private companies, where technological learning and upgrading
requirements can be linked to the demand for products. In vaccines, for example, both public and private
suppliers exist in India, but the data focuses on private suppliers of vaccines as primary recipients of the
"learning-by-proving" advantage.
16 While any public agency can, in principle, be a consumer (example, book supplies, garbage trucks, or hospital
equipment) it is of particular value for developing countries that the procurement be linked to standards of
increasing levels of sophistication.
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international organisations. They have two functions. First, they provide a launching pad into new
markets by the former's certification system for public health procurement, particularly for vaccines
and secondly (and more importantly) they act to procure large volumes of certified drugs from strictly
selected manufacturers. Interviewees stated repeatedly the importance of public procurement for
vaccines, and guaranteed markets (despite slow growth) for antibiotics.
Two international agencies with large procurement programs are the World Health Organisation
(WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). UNICEF alone supplies vaccines to 40
per cent of the world's children.17 UNICEF spends US$220 million on vaccines and immunization
supplies (the largest group expenditure on commodities) out of a total budget of $541 million worth of
supplies for children in 162 countries and territories. (UNICEF reports).
One interviewee, reflecting the importance of these agencies said,
"In particular, the Serum Institute of India showed all
companies the potential importance of institutional buyers in
vaccines. " (Interview)
Three elements in particular are vital for procuring agencies: quality, reliability and availability. Thus
a high quality manufacturer, who cannot deliver large quantities of the vaccine at short notice, also
fails the test on availability. An additional concern is that clinical trials need to be rigorous in methods
and testing as well as conducted on appropriately sizes trial populations. Suppliers pre-qualify by
registering in their home countries through the National Control Authority (NCA) 8 and through an
International Competitive Bidding (ICB) procedure 9 . They also furnish additional information to the
NCA and WHO/UNICEF.20 21 The technical challenges can be considerable depending on the type of
vaccine, the extent of use and the speed of response time needed for supply. They also depend on how
stable the vaccine type is to external conditions. The role of the international procurers is also to
1 UNICEF works with both governments and other partners to strengthen and increase in scale and scope
existing immunization programs and has co-founded the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
(GAVI), "a partnership dedicated to strengthening immunization systems and increasing access to new and
under-used vaccines" and goes to the poorest nations and includes hepatitis B, Hib (for some types of meningitis
and pneumonia) and yellow fever. "Priority is given to the 40 nations where routine immunization coverage is
lowest and to the districts within those countries where children are least protected."
18 See "Regulation and licensing of biological products", WHO Technical Report Series No 858, 1995
19 The NCA reviews all bids and acts as a selector.
20 The supplier must be a manufacturer (or importer of bulk product for filling, labelling and repackaging) and
must provide a 1. Certificate of registration /licensing in country of origin 2. Documentation on quality control
(QC) and sampling procedures 3. Copy of most recent GMP certification. 4. -Production and quality control
summary protocols. 5. Certificate of analysis from NCA in country of origin. 6. Statement of licensing status in
other countries. (Source: WHO/VSQ/98.05, "Guidelines for the international procurement of vaccines and sera",
Global programme for vaccines and immunization, Vaccine supply and quality, World Health Organization,
Geneva 1998). For UNICEF, companies must show qualification for - EN ISO 9001 / EN 46001 and EN ISO
9002 / EN 46002 standards.
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coordinate worldwide agreement and uniformity on methods, substrates and virus strains; supply and
demand, licensing, standards setting and regulatory guidelines for packaging, distribution and
return, among others.
The vaccine industry is compartmentalized into 5 segments by manufacturers: US and European
MNCs, OECD local manufacturers, emerging worldwide suppliers and developing country local
suppliers and biotechnology companies. The importance for the mandate of international agencies in
sourcing vaccines from developing countries has gained in importance. In 1986 there were 7 suppliers
of 4 vaccines and 0% were located in developing countries/emerging economies. Ten years later in
1996, through deliberate procurement policies, there were 14 suppliers for 5 internationally procured
vaccines and 50% were located outside the First World. This number has continued to increase to 58%
for 6 vaccines, but the suppliers have dropped to 12, partly a function of stricter guidelines.22 In
addition, there is a shortening lifespan of product development cycles for pediatric vaccines (For
example, in the US, DTP introduced in 1948 took 48 years to find a replacement DTaP, while DTP-
Hib introduced in 1993 took only 7 years to be replaced by DtaP combination vaccines. The shortest
period of replacement was 2 years for Hib polysaccharide introduced in 1985 to be replaced by Hib
conjugate).2 ' The table below shows vaccine types with intent to highlight technological and process
capabilities necessary. It should be read in conjunction with the subsequent tables to identify lack of
capabilities on the Indian aide, despite accomplishments. The reasons for the gap in capabilities for
some categories are diverse: lack of process capabilities, lack of local relevance for some sub-
categories of capabilities, lack of infrastructure, lack of demand, for example. However, there are
other developing countries that do have capabilities in these other areas, even if the number of their
firms or the spread of their capabilities is much narrower than India's.
21 See also WHO/GPV/VSQ at www.who.int/gpv-supqual/unprequalprod.htm
22 Milstien, J.B., S.N.Glass, A.Batson, M. Greco and J. Berger. 2001. "Divergence of vaccine product lines in
industrialised and developing countries", unpublished manuscript, presented to the Strategic Advisory Group of
Experts, Department of Vaccines and Biologicals, WHO, cited in "Technological Development of Vaccine:
Projections to 2015", June 2003. Ministerio Da Saude, Fiocruz, Fundacao Oswaldo Cruz.
23 Ibid. DTP=Diphtheria and tetanus toxoid, DtaP= Diphtheria and tetanus toxoid with acellular pertussis
vaccine, Hib=Haemophilus influenzae type b, TT=Tetanus toxoid
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Table 5.5.1Vaccine types considered and processes involved
VACCINE SPECIFIC TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESS DETAILS
TYPE GOAL
Attenuated microbial cells Growth and purification of microbial Fermentation in defined media; recovery of whole
cells adapted or engineered to delete microbial cells by centrifugation/washing or
pathogenicity, retaining altrafiltration methods; formulation, filling.
immunogenicity.
Live microbial vector Growth and purification of non- Fermentation in defined media; recovery of whole
pathogenic microbial cells carrying microbial cells by centrifugation/washing or
added gene for an immunogenic altrafiltration methodology; formulation, filling.
protein.
DNA vaccine Extraction and purification of plasmid Fermentation in defined media; recovery of whole
DNA from bacterial cells containing microbial cells by centrifugation/washing or
desired gene in the plasmid. ultrafiltration methodology; cell lysis and removal of
cell debris (filtration, centrifugation or expanded bed
chromatography); removal of host impurities, RNA,
enomic DNA, proteins and endotoxins (salting out,
PEG precipitation); concentration (ultrafiltration
methodology, PEG precipitation); purification of
plasmid DNA by IEC and/or SEC; concentration and
buffer exchange; sterile filtration of final bulk;
formulation, filling.
Purified protein, excreted Growth of recombinant bacteria, yeast Fermentation in defined media; removal of microbial
or cell associated or cell culture where recombinant cells by centrifugation or filtration; mechanical
rotein, cell lysis (for cell associated disruption of cells, removal of cell debris,
proteins), isolation and purification of solubilization (if necessary); concentration of soluble
the protein. rotein by ultrafiltration methodology; protein
purification by chromatography, concentration, buffer
exchange, sterile filtration and stabilization;
formulation, filling.
Conjugated Growth of bacterial culture, extraction Fermentation in defined media; primary recovery of
polysaccharides and purification of capsular cells; isolation/extraction of polysaccharide by
olysaccharides, preparation of carrier hromatography or precipitation; chemical
protein, conjugation to carrier protein. characterization of the polysaccharide; concentration
and drying of bulk. Purification of carrier protein (see
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purification sequence described above). Chemical
modification of polysaccharide; linker if required;
chemical processing of carrier if required;
conjugation; separation of conjugated from un-
conjugated species by chromatography; concentration
of bulk conjugate, sterile filtration and stabilization;
formulation; filling.
Live attenuated viruses Growth of cells (from cell banks of Cell culturing (risk free medium) in bioreactors, roller
continuous cells or isolation of primary bottles, hollow fiber, cell cubes, flasks, or microcarrier
cells), infection with attenuated virus, culture with various types of feeding; virus infection;
isolation and purification of virus. cell controls; removal of cell or cell debris by
centrifugation or ultrafiltration methodology;
purification of virus if required, concentration;
stabilization, formulation; filling.
Multiple antigen peptide inking of synthetic peptide antigens Peptide synthesis and purification; backbone synthesis
vaccines to a synthetic backbone (eg and purification; linking of antigens to backbone;
polylysine). purification of multiple antigen peptide product.;
sterile filtration; stabilization; formulation; filling.
Virus-like particles Growth of cells, infection by virus or Cell culturing (risk free medium) in bioreactors, roller
recombinant virus producing non- bottles, hollow fiber, cell cubes, flasks, or microcarrier
eplicating, non-infectious, particles culture with various types of feeding; virus infection;
with intact immunogenic antigens, cell controls; removal of cell or cell debris by
isolation and purification of the virus- centrifugation or ultrafiltration methodology;
like particles. differential separation of virus-like particle from virus
if required, purification and concentration;
stabilization; formulation; filling.
Live viral vectors Growth of cells, infection with Cell culturing (risk free medium) in bioreactors, roller
genetically engineered replicating non- bottles, hollow fiber, cell cubes, flasks, or microcarrier
pathogenic viruses containing added culture with various types of feeding; virus infection;
gene of interest, isolation and cell controls; removal of cell or cell debris by
purification of virus. centrifugation or ultrafiltration methodology;
purification of virus if required, concentration;
formulation; filling.
Source: column text reproduced verbatim from WHO, Initiative for Vaccine Research (IVR), 2003
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The interviews suggest that both national and international procurement resulted in large revenues for
companies. In national procurement for antibiotics, they provided steady demand for otherwise
sluggish growth segments24 . More importantly, they reduced the risk for Indian companies investing in
greater anti-infective production, for example, and assured their sales to the government. The table
below shows the list of Inactivated polio vaccine (IPV) and Oral Polio Vaccine (OPV) Manufacturers
to the WHO vaccines and biologicals unit as of October 2002. The number of Indian manufacturers in
2526this category is the highest from any single country. Public sector companies like Haffkine Bio-
pharmaceuticals have also become active suppliers again. In 1999, WHO-GMP certification was
awarded to the company for oral polio vaccine blending facilities and the company subsequently
obtained a UNICEF procurement order for supply of oral polio vaccine in India.
24 For many antibiotics, technological obsolescence has characterised Indian efforts.
2 Despite many able manufactures of vaccines, India still imported some polio vaccines in 1995. The scenario
for imports has changed for Hepatitis B since many companies now indigenously manufacture it. Furthermore,
the New Drug Policy of 1994 lifted price restrictions on genetically engineered vaccines produced by
recombinant DNA technology and specific cell/tissue culture targeted drug formulations for 5 years from date of
manufacturing to provide an impetus to the private sector to ensure adequate national supply.
26 A newer organisation, the Developing Country Vaccine Manufacturers Network (DCVMN) helps
companies upgrade and meet procurement requirements.
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Table 5.5.2 Worldwide Inactivated Polio Vaccine suppliers to WHO
COMPANY COUNTRY
Glaxo Smithkline Biologicals Belgium
Scientific Institute of Public Health Louis Pasteur Belgium
Bio-Manguinhos Brazil
National Vaccine and Serum Institute China
Kunming Institute of Medical Biology China
Statens Serum Institut Denmark
Egyptian Organisation for Biological Products and Vaccines Egypt
Aventis Pasteur France
Agence Francaise de Securite Sanitaire de Produits de Sante (AFSSAPS) France
Chiron Behring Germany
Bharat Immunologicals and Biologicals Corp. Ltd/ India
Haffkine Bio-Pharmaceutical Corp. Ltd. India
Panacea Biotec Lt. India
Serum Institute of India Ltd. India
P.T. BioFarma (Persero) Indonesia
National Agency of Food and Drug Control Indonesia
RAZI Institute Iran
Institute Superiore di Sanita Italy
Japan Poliomyelitis Research Institute Japan
Birmex Mexico
National Institute of Health Pakistan
Institute of Poliomyelitis and Viral Encephalitides Russia
Dong Shin Pharmaceutical Co. S. Korea
Green Cross Corporation S. Korea
Korea Vaccines Co. Ltd. S. Korea
SBL Vaccine AB Sweden
SVM The Netherlands
Evans Vaccines UK
Poliovac VietNam
Institute of Immunology and Virology Torlak Yugoslavia
Source: Adapted from "Vaccines and Biologicals, Access to technologies", H WHJO/UNICEF
Consultation with IPV/OPV Manufacturers, Bharat Biotech April 2003, Geneva
Other Indian vaccine companies are Biological E (TT, DTwP and working on DTP-Hep B), Panacea
Biotec (Hep B, DTP-Hep B, OPV), Serum Institute of India (Measles, mumps, rubella, TT, DT, DTP,
Hep B), Shantha (Hep B, working on Hepatitis E, Typhoid, Tuberculosis, Combination vaccine
against Hep-B + DPT), Bharat Biotech (Hep B, single-shot typhoid, working on malaria and
rotavirus).
27 The challenges to developing vaccines using biological materials are detailed in the case studies developed in
the next chapter.
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The Indian governmental requirements for the Immunization Programme Department requires six
different vaccines for infants and for pregnant women. The following table lists some of the leading
vaccine providers to the Government of India with their annual dosage capacity
Table 5.5.3 Procurement from leading Indian vaccine suppliers
Vaccine Name of manufacturing unit" Annual Capacity
(In million
doses)
Tetanus Toxoid Biological E 120
Serum Institute 96
Haffkine Bio-Pharmaceuticals 71.2
Central Research Institute 30
Pasteur Institute of India 30
State Vaccine Institute 10
DT Vaccine Biological E 24
Central Research Institute 20
Pasteur Institute of India 15
Haffkine Bio-Pharmaceuticals 10
DPT Vaccine Serum Institute of India 97.5
Biological E 80
Haffkine Bio-Pharmaceuticals 44.8
Pasteur Institute of India 40
Central Research Institute 25
Measles Vaccine Serum Institute of India 100
BCG Vaccine Unit of MOH(FW), Tamil Nadu. 35
Oral Polio Vaccine Radicura Pharma 540
BIBCOL 300
Haffkine Bio Pharmaceutical 240
Biomed 156
Source: Ministry of Health and Human Welfare, Government of India, also at
http://health.nic.in/vaccines.htm,
Data compiled from the WHO's databases also shows that 6 Indian companies are compliant with
WHO requirements for vaccine production, and some have specific specialties for process
development varying with the biological under consideration.
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Table 5.5.4 Quality, Capacity and Background of WHO Vaccine Manufacturers from India
Company Functional National GMP compliance GMP clinical
Regulatory Authority29  certificate batches
Bharat Biotech International Yes Yes Yes
Bharat Immunologicals and Yes Yes Yes
Biologicals (public sector)
Biological E Yes Yes ----
Panacea Biotec Yes Yes Yes
Serum Institute of India Yes Yes Yes
Shantha Biotechnics Yes Yes Yes
Source: Adapted by the author from the WHO, Initiative for Vaccine Research (IVR), Vaccines,
Immunisation and Biologicals, Database on Contract Manufacturers. Also,
http://www.who.int/vaccines-access/quality/contractmanufdb/index.htm
The Serum Institute, a Pune based company, is also the country's largest manufacturer of MMR
(100% of local measles vaccine needs) and DPT vaccines (60% of local needs). Their quality
assurance and regulatory compliance profile highlights the challenges in scale, with DTP vaccine
batches ranging between 2-4 million doses.
For the Asia region, for example, the table indicates that for DNA vaccines alone, some specific
capabilities are available, but the gaps in capabilities (or the time lag in registering for these
capabilities) are evident. These are skills not offered relative to other Asian (predominantly public
sector Iranian and Indonesian institutes) and European and US private suppliers indicating that there is
some learning that has not occurred.
28 Some are public sector units at national level, others run by State governments.
29 The WHO requires functional NRAs to be able to produce guidelines, systems and enforcement to ensure siz
critical functions: 1. a published set of requirements for licensing 2. surveillance of vaccine field performance 3.
system of lot release 4. use of laboratory when needed 5. regular inspections for GMP; and 6. evaluation of
linical performance.
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Table 5.5.5 Contract manufacturers in Asia and their capabilities for vaccines and biologicals 30
Source: Adapted by the author from the WHO, Initiative for Vaccine Research (IVR), Vaccines, hnmunisation and Biologicals, Database on
Contract Manufacturers. Also, http://www.who.int/vaccines-access/quality/contractmanufdb/index.htm)
Services Attenuated DNA Live Purified Conjugated Live Multiple Virus-like Live viral
microbial vaccine microbial protein vaccines attenuated antigen particles vectors
cells s vectors viruses peptide
vaccines
Product development 2 1 2 3
Process development 2 2 3
Cell Banking GMP 2 2 2
Analytical 5 5 5
Develooment
Fermentation 3 3 5
Downstream 3 3 1
Drocessin
Final Bulk (clinical 2 2 2
grade)
Formulation and 5 5 5 6 6 2 6
filline
Animal test facilities 4 4 4 4 4 4
30 Since this database was first developed, more Indian suppliers have met other category requirements.
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This unprecedented access to first world and third world markets alike is analogous to privileged
access of Taiwan and Korea into the US market, for example. These were important elements of their
growth, particularly when viewed as part of a changing selection environment. Third world market
access and the certification of quality from the WHO have guaranteed procurement, while the
introduction of these manufacturers into new countries via the WHO has also resulted in new markets
for other non-WHO certified drugs directly to consumers. These "voluntary' regulations of quality
provide a powerful incentive for Indian firms to produce for the world public health market and
upgrade technology and infrastructure to this end. From an international procurer's standpoint, the
following list captures the main advantages of Indian companies."
Table 5.5.6Advantages of Indian companies:
Skill type Competitive advantage
Ability to manufacture APIs Low cost, local sourcing, proprietary base, vertical integration
and self-reliance, good quality
Process development Alternate routes, high process patents, rapid engineering to
capabilities: new drugs
Low cost for high skills: Low manufacturing, research and regulatory costs
Rapid adaptation to Strong manufacturing history, strong technical skills,
regulatory requirements infrastructure, low regulatory costs, good quality
As the table on comparisons of Indian and European or US vaccine providers demonstrated, there are
some technological gaps for Indian vaccine suppliers. Not all vaccines with local relevance are being
pursued with equal alacrity, nor are all capabilities for local vaccine needs completely indigenous, in
part the reason why international collaborations continue to be attractive. Furthermore, a tiered path
for vaccine development using recombinant technology is less than straightforward as biological
substances have different standards and monitoring guidelines relative to synthetic drugs. The
segmented markets and suppliers established through WHO guidelines, also places some limits on
market expansion in the long-run. Nevertheless, international procurement continues to play an
important demand-side role to promoting upgrading and some gradual innovation, while it also
increases export reach for indigenous vaccine suppliers. Such programs provide a promising variant on
traditional technology procurement at national level.
31 No international procurers were interviewed. This list was catalogued from interview statements of suppliers
and scientists working on vaccines.
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To broaden the understanding of two different elements of export demand as manifestations of the
later selection environment, the chapter now turns to a close cousin in learning effects, but a distant
relative of public procurement as a policy instrument: the competitive generic drug industry. As Indian
firms waded into foreign waters, the biggest market opportunity presenting itself was from generic
drugs. These arose after significant structural changes were put in place in the US market intended to
induce more competition while still protecting an innovator's incentives. As another instance for how
the selection environment propels certain capabilities to the fore, regulatory standards related to the
generic drug industry have moulded firm strategies as they walk the fine line between "imitation" and
innovation.
Section II
5.6 Generic yet Innovative: Process development and generic drugs
This section uses a variety of primary and secondary data on patented and other products in the generic
drug industry, highlighting how some Indian firms have used many of the same pathways for
advancing (dosage/formulations) that today's leading firms have used in the past. However, India's
generic drug advances are primarily further manifestations of process capabilities. Many of these
opportunities have evolved out of core strengths in public health drugs outward into higher value-
added "urban" drugs for cardiovascular, lifestyle and cancer treatments. Importantly, generic drugs
have proved to be a challenging learning path for firms, not technologically, but in the "learning-by
proving" that the generic drug regulations require from firms. This has brought learning of a different
kind: horizontal and vertical product differentiation opportunities for off-patent drugs and providing a
small windows for Indian firms to patent products that can be shown to be sufficiently different from
the incumbent's. I
This chapter attempts the following: First, to show that even mature product segments have
considerable learning opportunities for developing country firms if market advance is linked to
upgrading and quality standards. Second, that learning is not automatic. Clearly many firms chose not
to enter this path (or could not) and both technical and non-technical components of learning occur
side-by-side. Third, process capabilities have been further honed by the strict requirements of
regulation, and novelty has arisen out of considerable product differentiation skills. All the evidence
underscores how dependent on the specific environment evaluation (and valuation) of how innovative
a new product is.
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5.6.1 A second demand-driven opportunity: lowered barriers to entry
The early regulatory environment until the 1980s placed considerable burdens on firms to show
novelty, safety and efficacy. However, these came with considerable rewards when these standards
could be met. The Waxman-Hatch Act, in its attempt to increase competition, reduced the regulatory
hurdles to introduce generic drug competition into the market. The New Drug Application for entirely
new molecules was reduced (Abbreviated) and did not require the extent of clinical testing to show
safety and efficacy. It was deemed sufficient that the drug be shown to simply be bio-equivalent to any
previously approved drug by the US FDA. This change in procedure had the effect of considerably
reducing the time (although still substantial) and expense required to file a drug application. Indian
companies took advantage of this new regulatory system to enhance their speed to file, (and thus to
market) when their application was approved. It however, required Indian firms to be able to
demonstrate that they could manufacture immediately on approval, and that they could manufacture
consistently and to meet market volume demands. The Act also initiated opportunities for those firms
that had mastered APIs and formulation creation, and could thus concentrate their energies on
demonstrating the (minimum) standards for novelty, and perhaps, a patent challenge.
Generic drugs are cheaper for two reasons: (a) the generic drug manufacturer does not have to bear the
costs associated with drug discovery and development undertaken by the brand name company" -the
costs include R&D and marketing expenses (b) as patent expiry occurs, multiple manufacturers may
be approved for the generic drug, thus increasing competition and reducing the price further. However,
generics still need to meet the same facilities requirements for manufacturing approved by the FDA.33
"A generic drug is identical, or bio-equivalent to a brand
name drug in dosage form, safety, strength, route of
administration, quality, performance characteristics and
intended use." 34
Interviews revealed some important features of technological and non-technical learning. Although
generic drugs are a mature product line (possibly "the" most mature, by definition since the product
32 Although in the case of patent challenges, a non-infringing method of manufacture is one of the criteria for
application.
3 The Congressional Budget Office of the US Government estimates that consumers save approximately US$8-
10 billion yearly at retail pharmacies by buying generics, and hospitals save much more. (Office of Generic
Drugs, USFDA).
34 Office of Generic Drugs, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Centre for Drug Evaluation and Research. Also,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd
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has reached some maximal standardisation), the challenges are still significant for firms to gain market
entry, introduce product arrays, show novelty and challenge incumbent firms.
The generic drug industry provides a specific cross-section on firm-level learning in mature product
segments and the highly regulated (although less so than for entirely new products) environment in
which this learning occurs. Alternate processes have been developed, leading to new products such
that patent challenges can be launched. But generic drug manufacture is an inherently diminishing
returns game unless one can be the first to market, in which case the US market allows a 180-day
exclusivity incentive. For this period of time, the market is essentially a duopoly, between the original
brand-name manufacturer and the generic drug challenger, and profit margins can be very high, even if
the price of the drug is already lowered due to the onset of competition. Thus, Indian firms have had
two ways to advance. First, they attempted to be the first to market, still rare or they created additional
novel properties for existing generic drug categories.
Furthermore, although generic drugs are a potential opportunity for all pharmaceutical developers, in
reality only a small fraction of drug manufacturers are able to exploit this market opening. This is
primarily because firms have to be first to file, to develop speed to market, the ability to produce non-
infringing manufacturing processes, ramp-up capability, and marketing and distribution links. Only
those firms who had most if not all of these characteristics, are able to compete.
However, the ANDA still requires considerable investments for the firms ahead of the approval
process and uncertainties regarding approval itself along with the fact that the FDA can also approve
other firms for the same generic drug in order to stimulate increased competition on the incumbent,
thus lowering drug prices. What this means is that generic drug producers need to (a) reduce the
prospect of FDA rejection or requirement of submitting further information to satisfy regulatory
guidelines and (b) attempt to be the first to market the generic drug itself, thus leaving behind the other
FDA-approved producers and securing a close to monopoly position among this secondary market for
a short time. (Recall that the original drug manufacturer-the original patent holder also stays in this
market anticipating future price reductions, but still earning revenues on their brand name out in the
market). To satisfy (a), the producer not only has to have a complete, sophisticated and technologically
and scientifically rigorous dossier for the FDA, but also that to reduce the possible time taken for
approval, the producer needs to ensure that its own submission must be considerably superior to
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rivals', in the absence of any information of how far ahead they may be. The average approval time
requires 2-3 resubmissions and can take on average 19 months. (Scott Morton, 1999)
The generic drug must duplicate the active pharmaceutical ingredient (API). In addition, those firms
that can show superior efficacy or other novelty can also apply for a patent challenge.
For FDA approval, a generic drug has to meet the following requirements:35
1. "Contain the same active ingredients as the innovator drug (inactive ingredients may vary)
2. Be identical in strength, dosage form, and route of administration
3. Have the same indications
4. Be bio equivalent
5. Meet the same batch requirements for identity, strength, purity and quality
6. Be manufactured under the same strict standards of FDA's good manufacturing practice
regulations required for innovator products."
Furthermore, generic drug manufacturers have to compete with the incumbent directly. Brand name
firms are linked to approximately 50% of generics, and make copies o their own patent-expired drugs
and sell them under the generic name. (USFDA, Centre for Drug Evaluation and Research).
A New Chemical Entity (NCE) can only be manufactured and marketed after the producer has
received a New Drug Approval (NDA) from the US FDA.36 Not only does the drug have to go through
the expensive, time consuming and scientifically rigorous process of clinical testing to FDA
specifications, but it also means that producers work in a climate of high uncertainty, unsure if their
drug will ever reach market and make a substantial return on in-house investments in the early stage of
drug discovery and/or drug development.
Generic drugs present a particularly attractive market opportunity for developing countries. The table
below shows some patent-expiry timelines of some well-known drugs, which provide a significant
market and technological learning opportunity. In the last years of the 20t* century alone, many high
value drugs have seen patent expiry. Between the years 1990-'99, about $17 billion worth of brand
35 US FDA, http://www.fda.gov/cder/ogd
36 Although the regulatory processes of many different countries are similar, the US FDA approval process is
described here because it is seen to be the amongst, if not the most rigorous of all the regulatory processes
worldwide, and because the US represents the target market of choice for most Indian drug companies.
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name drugs lost patent protection. The more lucrative breakthrough is occurring now with
approximately US$42 billion worth of branded drugs facing patent expiry between 2002-2005. The
normal calculation is that generic drugs are priced at about 20% of the brand name drug, thus
estimating that the generic market is now valued at US$8.5 billion and is estimated to grow to about
US$60 billion in 2005. Even at a limited 10% of market share of this potential pie, Indian firms could
still make about almost US$lbillion. Between 2002-'04, for example, 27 cardiovascular and central
nervous systems treatments, 16 oncology drugs and 11 respiratory drugs lose patents."
While the Waxman-Hatch Act provided some incentives for innovation to first movers companies, it
also stimulated competition in the US pharmaceutical industry and simultaneously gave a tremendous
new market opportunity to producers worldwide. For the first time, generics drug producer faced a
simpler regulatory process, the Abbreviated New Drug Approval (ANDA), needing now to only show
bio-equivalence of the intended generic drug to any drug previously approved by the FDA. The
ANDA applies to drugs first marketed after 1962 and is much cheaper than the NDA, thus causing
many new producers vying to be the first to introduce a new generics drug once the patent expiry date
for a specific drug had passed. Between 1976-'82, only two of the top 13 drugs appeared to face any
generics entry in the first year, whereas after the passing of the Act and studied in the period 1990-'93,
11 had seen generic drug competition within two months of approval.3"
5.6.2 Indian paths of "generic innovation": a guarded yes to novelty
A signature element of governmental strategy emerging in the 1960s, and consolidated in the 1970s,
was the push to create private Indian-owned firms that could back-integrate into bulk drug capability
while also enjoying economies of scale and scope. The increased investments in both plant capacity as
well as product diversification, allowed firms to corner the domestic market while simultaneously
moving ahead in formulation markets built on low-cost advantages secured in in-house produced bulk
drugs.
While product diversification allowed Indians firms to preferentially enter different product markets,
the introduction of process patent protections also spurred firms to develop multiple paths to the same
end product. This resulted in intense competition, lowering the price of existing drugs for which
37 Figures from USFDA, Ernst and Young, 2001, Kheria, 2002.
38 For the 1976-'82 period, see Cook (1991) in Caves, Whinston and Hurwicz (Eds.) and Cook (1998) for the
period 1990-'93.
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multiple production paths were created, but also resulted in increased competition in newly entered
product markets.
Pharmaceutical companies had low levels of R&D investments in 1976, two years before the New
Drug Policy that gave such a spurt to manufacturing. Nevertheless, even shortly after the policy was
enforced, Indian companies were investigating new routes for process development, but not new
drugs, and their R&D investments stayed relatively low, ranging from Rs. 105 million in 1976-'77 to
Rs. 500 million ten years later, Rs. 1850 million in 1996-'97 and rising to Rs. 3700 million in 2000-
'01."9 Only in very recent times has the R&D expenditure of a few companies as a percentage of sales
exceeded 5%, while comparable levels by leading global pharmaceutical companies are in excess of
15% of sales revenues.
The learning trajectories offered by generics are richer than most analysts have given them credit for,
since they are usually dismissed as 'copies'. In fact, these drugs are often not exact copies, and
because of India's continued process patent regime, different processes for the same end chemical
composition or bio-equivalent version are patentable, thus leading to many new search and
experimentation learning options for firms. Furthermore, on-patent drug filings give the bare bones of
the composition and in the more modern filings, entire families of molecules can be patented, leaving
developing country firms (and also generic drug manufacturers in advanced industrialised countries)
no option but to use entirely new sets of molecules an non-infringing processes in many cases to
devise the same end product. Data from interviews and supplemented by secondary data indicates that
Indian firms in both traditional pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals have faced challenges by (a)
"reverse engineering" through process development, which was allowed under the Indian Patent Act
(b) finding new processes so as to benefit from the process patents awarded as well as to work around
price controls (i.e. which limited profit margins. Thus firms had incentives to also bring down costs by
innovative new processes) (c) scaling up processes to factory floor so as to benefit from industrial
incentives such as reserved licenses for certain drug categories. Even for 'straightforward' generic
manufacturing, a certain level of experimentation always exists for in-house process development.
In the early environment when even leading Indian firms were predominantly attempting to search for
processes that 'reverse engineered' a new product patented elsewhere, firms nevertheless had some
element of search and experimentation to conduct. As the patenting trends became more strict (in part
39 WIPO (2002). All figures in absolute unadjusted terns.
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to curb this very tendency of firms to imitate new products), firms had to conduct more in-house
efforts to move past the last patented step of the process.
But for Indian firms to earn significant revenue streams and advance technologically, the learning-by-
doing production system must change, or else companies face diminishing returns manufacturing
identical copies over time. The challenge is to achieve slight changes in production parameters which
can provide continual learning-by-doing. Thus even in generic drugs, there are two main ways to add
value and enhance technological capabilities.
The first has to do with modifying an existing molecule in such a way as to show new features and
therapeutic value. These are patentable in themselves, such that although the entry lies with a
relatively straightforward generic opportunity, the financial reward and learning is high if new
technological features can be added. For example, the shelf life of most liquid suspensions is short.
Keeping with its history of strong dosage form capability, Ranbaxy has created effervescent liquids.
This dosage form accomplishes two things (a) by creating an amorphous state, the drug's shelf life is
effectively increased and (b) increases uptake efficiency when the patient consumes and liquefies the
effervescent medicine.
The second lies in New Drug Delivery Systems (NDDS). Here Ranbaxy alters the frequency of dosage
form, which has two main effects (a) reduces cost to consumer and to manufacturer (b) increases
effectiveness of overall dose. Ranbaxy has done this by altering the molecular structure in the generic
drug so as to exhibit these properties when provided in an altered dosage form and frequency.
Those companies that can accomplish one or both of these innovations in the generic drug market and
manage to compete in regulated markets on basis of low cost for high skills and speed to market, have
a clear competitive advantage. Indian companies now dominate worldwide the Drug Master Files
(DMF) and ANDA filings with the US FDA. For the last quarter of 2003, there were more DMFs
filed by the Indian companies than by any other national group. The larger number of ANDAs is to
also to assure a higher chance in the 180-day exclusive marketing approval lottery. Including the last
quarter, there were an anticipated 112 Indian ANDAs in 2003 (up from 40 ANDA filed in 2001 and
lower than 392 filed by Indians in 2002). In master files, the progress has also been brisk. 58 DMFs
40 All data from "Indian firms set to dominate drug registrations with FDA", Hindustan Times, Chandigarh
edition, November 23rd 2003.
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were filed in the first six months compared to a total of 50 filings in 2001 and 86 in 2002.4' However,
many drugs in this category are not novel, technologically, and only a few appear to challenge the
companies' abilities.
Biotechnology companies such as Biocon have also entered high-value segments such as Statin
production from their traditional base in biological extracts.
Table 5.6.1 Biocon US DMF submissions
DATE DRUG MASTER FILE SUBMISSION
JNE 00 LOVASTATIN USP
JULY 02 PRAVASTATIN SODIUM
JULY 02 COMPACTIN
AUGUST 02 SIMVASTATIN USP
AUGUST 02 LOVASTATIN TECHNICAL(SFP)
JANUARY 03 MYCOPHENOLATE MOFETIL
JANUARY 03 MYCOPHENOLIC ACID
JANUARY 03 PIOGLITAZONE HYDROCHLORIDE
Dosage forms provide one way in which firms can continue to add incremental new features while
extending older product lines. Both Ranbaxy and DRL, for example, have introduced an array of new
tablet and capsule dosages that reflect intelligent marketing as opposed to new technologies.
In the case of Fluoxetine (brand name Prozac), Dr. Reddy's Laboratory simply invested in creating a
40 mg dosage because it had discovered that the most highly prescribed dosage for Prozac was two 20
mg tablets. The company's burden of proof was then to show that its 40 mg tablet dosage form could
have the same therapeutic effect. It emerged as the first Indian company to receive a 180-exclusive
marketing approval from the US FDA in July 2001.
The patenting profile of all leading Indian companies lies squarely in the domain of process
developments, with only some minor efforts at new product development. However, the process
developments and the search activities to find new ways to enter the US market, have resulted in some
ingenuity. The publication record also demonstrates the importance of process development
capabilities.
41 This must be offset against the reduction in patent expiries beginning mid-way through the coming decade.
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But what leads companies from processes to products? Is there such a pathway? The gradual move of
the industry's process capabilities appears to have been some combination of the process patent
regime, which encouraged new process routes for the same end drug, and stricter product patents,
which forced greater search efforts among leading firms to a non-infringing path. These were part of a
broader selection environment that made some technological choices (processes rather than products)
One interviewee expressed support for stricter product patents that induced
firms to be more innovative:
"Foes of this change are people who aren't capable of doing
something novel" (Interview, June 17th 2002)
Specifically, the trend to patent appears to have induced some level of intensity of recent effort
among academics and public research laboratories. Another interviewee stated,
"The patenting trend is useful. We have too many
armchair scientists " (Interview, June 14th 2002)
However, it is unclear whether the trend simply reflects past efforts that are being formalised through
patents, or any new research efforts. This is unlikely to be measurable for some time to come.
A handful of Indian companies have made the first ventures into novelty by introducing sufficiently
differentiated products and by challenging existing patents through "Para IV" filings and through new
chemical entities. In the case of early innovations arising from Indian pharmaceutical firms the novelty
was to provide new formulations, new platform processes or new process development pathways, as
was the case of Compos from Ranbaxy (Valium) and Salbutamol from Cipla.
Table 5.6.2Early private sector successes for alternate processes
Company Indian name Patented brand name Generic name Drug product
Cipla Salbutamol Ventolin Albuterol Sulfate Anti-asthma
(GlaxoSmithKline)
Ranbaxy Calmpose Valium (Roche) Diazepam Tranquilliser
Generic drugs emerge as a singular learning path for how developing countries can advance
technologically. "Generics" have been seen primarily as 'copies', but as this section emphasizes,
generic drugs afford an unusual opportunity in a specific institutional setting, for technological
advancement. In particular, they highlight entry conditions and how firms can advance their market
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share once they have entered a particular drug segment. For developing countries, the path holds
special significance because of entry barriers, regulatory hurdles and incumbent security of the
patented product. Furthermore, the generics drugs market allows multiple firms entry for the same
generic drug, which means firms enter without knowing how many others have also applied for the
same approvals, and although they are sequenced in turn through the approval mechanism, they create
high costs and uncertainties for firms, particularly those who may be relatively new to a particular
drug segment, even if the date of patent expiry and type of drug segment is known in advance." In
addition, the number of producers of the generic drug is linked less to the price of the drug at a given
time and more to the anticipated rents from the particular drug segment." What this means for Indian
firms, is that information of what rents to expect is an area of some concentrated effort and so speed to
market is also of the essence.
Indian firms have been decreasing the time required to introduce a patented drug to market in
countries that do not have a product patent regime. They have also reduced the time to introduce off-
patent drugs to market, often because they have already been selling the drug in the Indian market, or
exporting the specific drug to countries with no product patents. Indeed, because of the diversity of
regulations worldwide, with different national systems adopting policies for local needs, there may be
no lag at all, but lead-time, with Indian firms launching the product in India many years before patent
expiry, and waiting to launch in international markets. Often, the product is launched immediately and
some Indian-owned firms have been the first worldwide to receive approval to launch and/or to receive
exclusive marketing approval for limited time from the US FDA.
Indeed, relative to China, the patent profile appears distinctly focused on process innovation within
this industry relative to others, and showing the preponderance of innovation around existing chemical
entities. Furthermore, a closer look at Indian firms such as Ranbaxy shows the patenting profile
follows closely that of its peers. As a patenting leader, its publication and patent profile below indicate
how much the focus is manufacturing (scale-up) and process chemistry.
The table below indicates the short introduction lag for India's leading generic drug firms, and an
introduction lead where Indian approvals (based on the no-product patent regime) have come before
the patent expiry date. Note the variation in product types, showing a gain in diversity as process
42 However, the FDA simultaneously approved 3 generics drug producers in Oct 1993 for alprazolam and 9
generic drug producers in December 1993 for naproxen. (IMS health data and FDA)
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development skills improved over time. The high lead time of 10-12 years in many cases, also
indicates that technologically, there is little preventing Indian firms from producing these drugs (as
they have already introduced them in the Indian market). A few, such as Ciprofloxacin, have shown
novel properties-predominantly a viable dosage form (once a day), that has resulted in the brand name
company seeking an alliance with the Indian generic drug firm in question.
Table 5.6.3 Select examples of development timelines for Indian generics
(In alphabetical order)
DRUG FIRST PATENT INDIAN TIME LAG FROM
INTRODUCTION EXPIRY APPROVAL/MARKETING FIRST
(APPROX.) INTRODUCTION
(APPROX.) AND
LEAD (BEFORE
PATENT EXPIRY)
Aciclovir 1981 1997 1988 7 (9)
Albendazole 1974 1995 1988 14(7)
Asternizole 1983 1999 1988 5(11)
Captopril 1980 1997 1985 5 (12)
Cefaclor 1979 1994 1991 12(3)
Ceflazidime 1983 2000 1988 5 (12)
Cefotaxime 1980 1997 1988 8 (9)
Cefotaxime Sodium 1980 1997 1988 8 (9)
Cefuroxime Axetil 1988 1997 1990 2 (7)
Cefuroxime Sodium 1978 1994 1988 10(6)
Ciprofloxacin 1986 2001 1989 3 (12)
Enalapril Maleate 1984 1999 1989 5(10)
Famotidine 1984 1999 1989 5 (10)
Ketoconazole 1981 1998 1988 7 (10)
Netimicin 1980 1994 1988 8(6)
Norfloxacmi 1984 1998 1988 4(10)
Ranitidine 1981 1997 1985 4(12)
Source: Author's calculations, Keayala (1996) and Lanjouw (1997)
While the lead and lag times act as one indicator of advance, the following case study of a generic
drug firm emphasizes that while not technologically sophisticated, generic drugs are nevertheless not
without effort. They require revenue streams and the ability to shoulder considerable risk and
uncertainty. While the firm benefits from low local R&D labour costs, it faces considerable GMP
investments.
4 For more on modelling of how competition evolves in the generics drug market, see David Reiffen and
Michael Ward, 2002, "Generics Drug Industry Dynamics", Report prepared for the Federal Trade Commission.
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5.6.3 CASE: In-house R&D, generic drug and biopharmaceutical investments
"It is the ability to know and extrapolate what the remaining 10% of
the patent information is....." (Interview).
Company X is a leading Indian pharmaceutical firm, beginning more than two decades ago and having
entered the market through capabilities in antibiotics, anti-infectives, among others. It has since moved
into biopharmaceutical research, although this continues to be a small portion of its revenues. It began
manufacturing products patented elsewhere and remained open to alliances for technology transfer and
contract manufacturing with both Indian and foreign firms. It also committed itself relatively early to
investing in in-house R&D capabilities and has since shown considerable advance in process, platform
and some product innovation. Company X feels that any Indian company can easily develop processes
for drugs developed elsewhere because of the country's health needs, past process patent laws, as well
as because skilled labour is cheap and plentiful for this industry. In particular, it feels that although
antibiotics and other public health drugs are mature segments, they will always sell easily and allow
the company to invest in other areas of research.
Furthermore, it stresses strongly that India does not have a low-cost manufacturing advantage, but a
low cost R&D advantage because people, not capital requirements, are inexpensive. This advantage is
likely to erode over time, as MNCs choosing to conduct R&D in India are likely to hire from the same
pool. "We're still enjoying our R&D cost advantage, but not for long". The technological learning,
company A feels, was accomplished much earlier in the company's (and nation's history). It, and other
companies like it, are now facing an uphill task to learn and adapt to new regulations and new business
environments.
Process capabilities are central to its success, and it went down this route because" "we couldn't
affordproducts, so we chose processes." It adds that people write off generic drugs as mere copies.
However, although technological challenges are now minimal, they were surmounted through gaining
market share by adding minor novelties-dosage form, lowered frequency, fewer side effects etc.-all the
time. These do not present interesting technical challenges any more, but huge financial and regulatory
ones. "People think that generics is a zero investment business. But it is very investment heavy in
comparison to rewards when prices drop. The R&D depreciation is a very, very heavy percentage in
generic drugs. No one has really measured this well. The only saving grace is that no sales and
marketing is needed in this segment. " Thus, a firm that wants to be innovative in products as well,
needs to learn to cope with these other challenges. "The greatest obstacle is GMP and regulatory
137
hurdles. At least 25 other companies fall into this same category. For Indians, formulations and
process chemistry are like ABC now, formulations we can now learn to do the next day, process
chemistry in less than 12 months ".
While it is undoubtedly easier to modify an existing design than to create the design in the first place,
it is still a technologically challenging task given the patent barriers surrounding the innovation. In
addition, the tacitness of the procedure is itself protection even were a patent not in place. Innovative
advances that skirt patent barriers or that tweak certain parameters of the design, process or product to
introduce a new variant of design, process or product on the market, demonstrate a form of
technological learning that is not necessarily bounded. I.e. there is no automatic ceiling to this type of
learning and firms in this path are not necessarily doomed to be forever imitators.
Levels of technological capability in generics manufacturing range from manufacturing ability to
modification of APIs, formulation changes and drug delivery changes, among others. This requires not
only the ability to distinguish and search around patent families, but also the ability to meet regulatory
requirements of the specific authorities. In addition, patent applications can be filed for":
1. Engineered excipients
2. Individual or combined delivery devices
3. Preferred API salts, active metabolites or approved APIs
4. Unexpected results from API mixtures
The task of the firm is then to outline all possible patent families, which then safeguard future
revenues.
During the era of stringent production licensing and price ceilings, many firms circumvented this
process and profited from non-essential drugs such as tonics and dubious preparations. Even then,
companies gained from process capabilities in creating formulations and dosage forms. In more recent
years, firms that targeted the generic drugs market built their market advance on dosage forms. The
Tables below indicate examples from the late 1990s of Indian firms that have introduced differentiated
products in the US market. These products are often different in dosage form, some demonstrating
additional efficacy or better delivery. In each of these cases, the case for novelty has been made to the
US FDA. The patent profilc of Indian firms has also evolved in a similar direction, represented in the
4 "API Management Practices", Contract Pharma Magazine, Jan/Feb 2003
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concentration of papers and patent applications focused on process improvements and modifications of
existing drugs. (Mani, 2002)
Case Ranbaxy
In the case of Ranbaxy, the foray into manufacturing began in 1965. Its manufacturing successes
began with Calmpose, the generic version of Valium from Roche, and was followed by further gains
through Roscillin (1971), generic of Ampicillin and Gramoneg (1974), a formulation of Nalidixic acid.
Because Ranbaxy had built up capability in anti-infectives in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it was
particularly ell positioned to grow through critical policy shifts of the early 1970s, particularly the
Patents Act, making its generic business easier. The policy shifts allowed it to consolidate its hold in
domestic market share, and to move into novel processes for blockbuster drugs. In particular, its
ability to develop non-infringing processes for existing drugs was a successful strategy despite the fact
that the Patent Act allowed it to do otherwise. It launched a novel process for Doxycycline
manufacture in 1978 and for the biggest seller of all, Ranitidine in 1985. Seven years later in 1992,
Ranbaxy developed a non-infringing process for Ceflacor. The Ceflacor case launched Ranbaxy into a
different league altogether. The non-infringement meant that a new form of innovation was occurring,
and signalled to pharmaceutical companies abroad that Ranbaxy was a company to monitor. Eli Lilly,
the patent holder on Ceflacor established a relationship with Ranbaxy for contract manufacturing of
Ceflacor, thus thwarting direct competition. The signal was not the non-infringing process
development alone. It was the scale-up capability of Ranbaxy and its ability to take the laboratory
process to factory scale immediately that was threatening. Large Indian companies had thus emerged
on the incumbent firm's radar. This process confirms different forms of scale economies, with the last
being unique to firms from developing countries." Large firm size in this case is thus institutionally
preferred and rewarded as technological learning occurs and investments re made in plant capacity and
in-house skills in scale-up and manufacture.
A typical story of simultaneous process and product innovation is demonstrated by the varied generics
drugs speedily brought to market by Ranbaxy, one of India's leading pharmaceutical firms. Indian
innovations like those of Ranbaxy are that these drugs provided minimal side effects or more
controlled release relative to the patented drug. Some also showed new therapeutic effects for other
treatments because of process innovation. A typical example is the generic version of the drug
Ceflacor, which not only exhibited product ingenuity through incremental product innovation, but also
4 Amsden (2002) highlights information, signalling and transaction cost economies of scale, differentiated from
production-related costs and fixed costs of design, the more "standard" scale economies.
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showed process innovation. Process innovation here related to (a) studying the patent filing from the
parent company (b) devising an in-house lab-level process to duplicate the final product, but not
process (c) devising an in-house manufacturing process suitably scaled-up to do the same, (d) pushing
the drug studies past the 56 steps that Eli Lilly had completed and patented46 . In general, leading
Indian pharmaceutical firms have developed mechanisms that have brought in a profitable flow of
revenues from generics, rapidly catching up with expiry dates and aggressively launching in both the
US and India.
Many of the company's advances on processes and products were concurrent, or with no obvious
sequencing. In addition, the company benefited from institutional parameters that allowed in-house
development of sophisticated process capabilities and a vast infrastructure of manufacturing facilities
that satisfy stringent certification requirements. Ranbaxy's case is symptomatic of the typology of
differences between the different types of innovation described in the literature.
The table below shows that even in generic drug segments, the chances of product differentiation with
far-reaching consequences (usually substantial market share, important joint venture, technology
exchange agreements or contract manufacturing revenues) are substantial. In each case, the technology
is only partly known. Some elements such as purification or yield are more tacit than others, where the
only barrier is patent expiry. Some of the drugs below are not manufactured in large scale such as
venom antidotes, but demonstrate the point that considerable process innovations exist in the Indian
case and are examples of the ability to scale-up production from lab yields to large-scale
manufacturing. Indian firms perfected the art and science of product differentiation while more
recently attempting to patent the novel properties of so-called copies. Even a company such as Cipla,
which has not been considered an innovative firm, has demonstrated some level of product
differentiation and indigenous firsts.
46 Note that size again was crucial because large revenue streams were essential to pay for this investment, but
also because only when Ceflacor was developed through a non-infringing process and ready for large-scale
manufacture, did the brand-holder register the signalling mechanism based on size.
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Table 5.6.4 Examples of some recent innovations from Indian-owned firms47
Company name Drug/technology platform Type of innovation
Cipla AIDS 3-drug cocktail, with two on- AIDS kit with easy-dosage form.
patent drug (but exported to Cocktail offered at less than half the
countries with no process patent- cost. Steady supply ensured.
only regimes) and one Cipla generic.
Ranbaxy Ciprofloxacin generic Oral once-a-day dose compared to
multiple doses needed presently by
Bayer's patented drug.
Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Prozac generic Fluoxetine Shows some novel properties. In
arrangement with patent-holder Eli
Lilly for out-licensing and production.
Shanta Biotech Hepatitis B vaccine Significantly lowered cost, alternative
culture for preparing the vaccine
Bharat Biotech Hepatitis B vaccine Significantly lowered cost, alternative
International culture for preparing the vaccine
(distinct from Shanta)
Biocon India New fermentation reactor for New fermentation technology used
enzyme culture use din Novel solid state mechanism to control
pharmaceuticals fermentation conditions
Vittal Mallya Foundation Snake venom antidote Made through culture from poultry eggs
Reliance Life Sciences Stem cell research Uses novel methods for harvesting.
A significant investment of technological ability rests in the ability of a firm to demonstrate that a
given drug does not infringe on the patent-holder's intellectual property. In particular, process and
product need be shown to be sufficiently different, while the product still needs to be sufficiently close
in therapeutic characteristics that it can compete with the incumbent drug.48 The table indicates
different categories of drug introductions by Cipla into the domestic market. The fact that product
differentiation can continue to be strategic advantages for such firms is demonstrated by the table
below. In particular, note that as discussed earlier, Cipla's Salbutamol was preferentially allocated a
license for indigenous development under the New Drug Policy.
47 Because of India's process patent regime, some of these drugs are process engineered differently from on-
patent drugs, while some are generics of off-patent drugs.
48 Often the market leader may itself be a once me-too drug, now facing generic competition of its own. For
example, Zantac was the largest-selling prescription drug treating heartburn and ulcers. It was produced by
Glaxo Wellcome (since Glaxo SmithKline, ironically), a "me-too" version of the initial "revolution",
SmithKline's Tagamet in 1977. Because Zantac could show non-infringement, it filed a patent of its own
(multiple patents, in fact, to protect the drug). Subsequently, when its patents expired, Novopharm was awarded
rights to market ranitidine, the generic chemical version of Zantac. Yet Zantac continued to enjoy significant
brand name, incumbent market power. Zantac's prowess was in establishing a product differentiation strategy
buttressed by significant revenues to spend on marketing and distribution.
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Figure 5.6.1 CIPLA first-time introductions in India
DRUG CATEGORY DRUG
Antihypertensives Propranolol
Doxasozin
Metaprolol extended-release (Metolar XR)
Anti anxiety Lorazepam
HIV Stavudine
Lamivudine
Zidovudine (AZT)
Cancer Vincristine sulphate (for acute leukaemia)
Vinblastine sulphate (for palliative treatment of cancer)
Etoposide (for various cancers)
Bicalutamide (for prostate cancer)
Ondansetron (for cancer-induced emesis)
Asthma/Respiratory Montelukast Sodium (for bronchial asthma)
Salbutamol sulphate (for bronchial asthma)
Saheterol (for bronchial asthma)
Deferiprone (world's first oral iron chelator for use in thalassaemia)
Clofibrate (for hyperlipidaemias resistant to diet)
Gugulipid (for cholesterol reduction)
Norfloxacin (broad spectrum antibacterial)
Famcyclovir (for herpes infections)
Apraclonidine (for glaucoma)
Finasteride (for benign prostatic hyperplasia)
Fluicasone porionate (topical corticosteroid)
Alendronate (for osteoporosis)
Misoprostol (for NASAID induced gastritis)
Tamsulosin (for BPH)
International patents CFC-free metered dose aerosol inhaler
International patents Rotahaler and Zerostat spacer
Source: Adapted from Cipla company reports and website
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Table 5.6.5 New Cipla introductions
Drug category Drug Novelty
Chronic Obstructive TIOVA (Tiotropium Dry powder inhalation with 18 g cause improvement in
Pulmonary Disease (COPD) bromide) lung function and reduction in symptoms than
ipratropium bromide given 4 times daily, Show superior
bronchodilation and symptomatic improvements when
compared to twice-daily salmeterol.
COPD Asthalin First-time combination of Salbutamol, a potent
bronchodilator with a safe and effective mucolytic,
Ambroxol, for nebulisation.
Anti-hypertensive Fosinace Unique dual elimination rote (50% renal and 50%
hepatic) for 24 hour blood pressure control
Budesal Respules Combination of corticosteroid budesonide with a
bronchodilator Salbutamol,
Anti-HIV Odivir Kit (world's Simplifies therapy, specially packed strip with contains
first antiretroviral once-daily does of 3 antiretrovirals that are commonly
kit) used as a triple drug regimen. Contains Efavirenz 600
mg, Lamivudine 300 mg and enteric-coated Didanosine
250 or 400 mg as separate pills.
Anti-acne Isotroin (synthetic Only drug that acts on all four factors responsible for the
Vitamin A pathogenensis of acne.
analogue)
Anti platelet therapy Clopivas AP Combination of two antiplatelet agents clopidogrel and
aspirin
Metolar XR Multiple extended release (MXR) technology. Capsule
(extended release with multiple pellets, each of which acts as a separate
metoprolol) delivery over 24 hours.
launched for first
time in India
Source: Cipla Annual reports and website
The data from Cipla, Ranbaxy, Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, Sun and Wockhardt, and supported by
various secondary documents on other leading firms, indicates that a clear sequence of "imitation" to
innovation appears to break down. While most firms were able to produce the mirrored sequence of
process steps, one-by-one, which speaks to their imitation activity, in some cases the process
developed to "reverse engineer" the product was itself sufficiently new worldwide, as to suggest some
innovative capabilities as well. In other cases, such as that for Cefaclor, the company proceeded to
map each step of the brand name company's efforts until at last, a new step, all its own, could be
patented. In the Ceflacor case, Eli Lilly had patented up to 56 steps of the development process for the
drug and Ranbaxy, attempting to develop a non-infringing method for the same drug, had to persist to
the 57th step, wherein its differentiated process emerged and could then file for a patent of its own.
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As the following narrative describes, the regulatory climate influences the valuation of innovation and
the stage at which innovation occurs in a company such as Ranbaxy and is determined in large part by
a combination of technological intricacies and the patent coverage awarded to the original innovator.
"...When allfactors are considered Ceclor (cefaclor) should remain a viable product for Eli Lilly
beyond expiration of the patent" (President, Eli Lilly pharmaceuticals, Feb 1991).
"The Ceclor synthetic route is so long and so complex' that it will be difficult to duplicate... a legal
end-run seems extremely improbable ". (President, Eli Lilly research labs).
"56 processes were under patent (with Lilly) and we found the 57 "- (Ranbaxy executive).49
This could be characterized as tenacious, rather than innovative, if the other evidence from Paragraph
IV challenges did not also support the innovation hypothesis. Some Indian companies, through
"minor" novelties, are demonstrating a product differentiation strategy which in a previous era of
patent regulation, would have warranted new patents altogether. The growing confidence of
companies is reflected in attempts to increase speed of ANDA filings and Paragraph IV patent
challenges. In 2002, DRL filed 11 drugs in the US out of a total filing of 13 worldwide. 8 out of 11
were patent challenges in 2002.50
Table 5.6.6Recent "blockbuster" patent challenges or infringement lawsuits for Indian firms
COMPANY FOREIGN FIRM PRODUCT PATENT INFRINGEMENT STATUS
CHALLENGED LAWSUIT
Dr. Reddy's Pfizer Norvasc (hypertension Challenge in
Laboratories drug, estimated worldwide lower court
sales 2002 US$3.8 billion) successful. FDA
approval
received for
manufacturing.
Pending higher
court.
Dr. Reddy's GlaxoSmithKline Zofran (for treating post-
Laboratories operative, chemotherapy
and radiotherapy induced
nausea and vomiting
Ranbaxy 1  Pfizer Lipitor (cholesterol
reducer)
Rambaxy S2 GlaxoSmithKline Augmentin
49 All quotes taken from Lanjouw (1997)
50 "Litigation in large doses", P. T. Jyothi Datta, Business Line, (The Hindu), Wednesday, Sep 18, 2002
s1 On patent challenges: "Indian companies have definitely arrived on the global scene and litigations only
ensure that the challenging company does its homework well. The onus of an honest challenge is on the generic,"
Bimal Raizada, Senior Vice-President, Ranbaxy Laboratories, quoted in "Litigation in large doses", P. T. Jyothi
Datta, BusinessLine, (The Hindu), Wednesday, Sep 18, 2002
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Source: adapted from various news reports and company press releases
The next sub-section underscores the far reach of integrated bulk drug manufacturing. As companies
learn to adapt to regulations and standards, they face new opportunities in custom synthesis to
innovator companies -some in India.
5.6.4 Launch readiness: Catching up before the race begins?
One significant feature of time-to-market is not the speed at which a drug gets through the FDA or
other regulatory process but by the speed at which the company can respond to demand for the drug
once it is launched. A high-profile example of the failure to meet market demand and the subsequent
fall in the company's ranking as a provider for that drug category is Inimunex in the year 2000. The
company announced that for its blockbuster drug for arthritis, Enbrel, it did not have sufficient
capacity to meet public demand. Besides the loss estimated at $250 million in potential revenues, the
company's stock price also took a battering. While Enbrel is the patented drug, the ability of the first-
company to profit from the tardiness of Immunex lies in its ability to ramp up at short notice, while
dealing with problems of unexpected volume demand and price pressures.
Both bulk drug capability and the adaptation to the generic drug regulatory selection mechanisms has
allowed Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) to emerge as a critical source of profitability and
proprietary assets. Both "innovators" and generic drug manufacturers in advanced industrialised
countries have historically sourced APIs from other such countries. The patent regime allows Indian
firms with formulation, dosing and API manufacture capabilities much greater familiarity with a given
product by continued exposure over a longer time than their counterparts in other countries where
markets are regulated through product patents. The strict regulatory environment has prompted further
proprietary API relationships such that innovating companies in advanced industrialised countries
search for suppliers who are able to manage proprietary chemicals and processes. Thus, API
manufacturing has emerged as a source of proprietary innovation and tacitness. The sources of Indian
API expertise range from the low cost of inputs and development to chemical synthesis capabilities,
GMP compliance and speed of development."
s2 On infringement lawsuits: "We take legal advice and respond appropriately. But we will not lose sleep over it.
It is something that one has to live with, if one has to do business in the US. ", D. S. Brar, CEO and MD of
Ranbaxy Laboratories, Ibid.
5 Dr. Reddy's Laboratories-Cheminor (since acquired) argued that its advantage is a development speed almost
twice that of any competing European or US finn.
145
For instance, new opportunities have arisen where Solvay, a Swiss company, normally sourcing from
Lonza, another Swiss company for Teveten/Eprosartan mesylate (anihypertensive sources indirectly
the same API from Dishman, and Indian firm. API manufacturing capability, inclusive of its
proprietary processes and speed to market, is itself, although not a product innovation, the source of
multiple product innovations both in-house and to innovating clients. While thus far API assets have
been central to the patent challenge and have been known to be a barrier to entry, the Indian case
demonstrates that they have evolved into proprietary assets. The greater the niche product, the faster to
market (or a combination of the two), the more likely the API manufacturing capacity becomes a
proprietary asset in itself.
While the previous sections have highlighted the product differentiation pathway of generic drugs, we
now turn briefly to a recent change in Indian companies, their production of new products.
5.7 New Chemical Entities and New realities: Arbitration on novelty
Part of the reluctance of Indian companies to search for new drugs is the cost associated with it. In
recent years, India's manufacturing firms, buoyed by successes in mature product lines, have invested
the money into drug discovery. The change of the Indian patent regime in 2005 has also been a spur
for such investments, but the example set by Dr. Reddy's Laboratories, in particular, has stood out. Its
CEO has stated more than once than Indian companies can find new molecules faster and more
cheaply than anyone else and is attempting to prove it.
Table 5.7.1 Ranbaxy New Chemical Entities
NCE Pipeline
Clinical RBx2258 : Selective 1 p antagonist for BPH -undergoing
Phase II Studies
RBx7796 : Novel VLA4 antagonist for Bronchial Asthma
- undergoing Phase I studies
RBx 7644: Anti Bacterial - Oral & IV - Phase I
Early Discovery RBx 6198 : Other BPH molecule
RBx 9611 :Overactive bladder
RBx 8700: Anti-infective , Tuberculosis
NDDS -Achievements 4 Platform Technologies:
Aerogel
Gastric Retention
PH Independent
Micro encapsulation & particle coating
Source: Company reports and website
146
But the fundamental link between process capabilities and the gradual increase in launches of
products, is the increased ability of Indian firms to differentiate products through different processes,
gain revenues by manufacturing, and invest in new drug discovery and development. Product
differentiation also brings with it a host of complementary assets such as market research, better
marketing and distribution and faster regulatory compliance." The skills developed in process
development at early synthesis stages, also assist firms in their drug discovery and development
studies.
A few firms have been entering higher value-added segments through drug discovery programs of
their own, introducing New Chemical Entities (NCEs) into the certification and regulatory process.
While some of these firms began the process of technology acquisition through links with MINCs, this
has been the exception rather than the rule, although increasingly, with newer technologies,
technology alliances have become more common.
The NCE table below also indicates that in a few instances, advanced stage pharmaceuticals from
Indian firms have also been out-licensed to MNCs, reversing a technology transfer trend to developing
countries. These same firms have then moved from generics into more profitable urology, cancer and
diabetes drugs. " In addition, by developing state of the art facilities, Indian firms are increasingly
becoming manufacturers and developers of choice for MINCs and foreign governments, as well as the
WHO. For example, Reliance Life Sciences (a spin-off of the Indian conglomerate Reliance) has been
designated by the US National Institute of Health as one of 10 worldwide preferred suppliers for stem-
cell cultures." Indian -owned firms have also benefited from global pandemics such as AIDS" and
tuberculosis as well as from bio terrorism scares such as Anthrax.58.
54 In the case of a drug under patent, the patent may specify how the drug is released and absorbed into the body.
The cholesterol-lowering drug Lovastatin is now off-patent (the original brand name was Mevacor from Merck)
but was patented as an immediate-release product. Thus, Andrx, one of the world's leading generic drug
manufacturers, was able to come up with an extended-release version, Altocor, which is not considered a generic
copy and can be patented. This "super generic" or "branded generic" is seen as vertical product differentiation,
and automatically obtains a three year period of marketing exclusivity in the US, but also comes with a higher
price since it can no longer go through the abbreviated approval process.
ss The most visible of these was the licensing of Ranbaxy's Ciprofloxacin to Bayer, with once-a-day dosage
properties, that Bayer, the patent-holder, was not able to create.6 This not only noted RLS as having state-of-the-art facilities, but also registered its sophistication in research.
- At the start of the 1990s, the cost of an AIDS treatment combination for an individual was about $8500 a year
in India, but when Indian-owned Cipla began production in 1993 of Zidovudine as a generic, and followed it
with Stavudine, Lamivuidine and Nevirapine-they had succeeded in creating the relatively successful AIDS
cocktail for US$600 per year/patient and provided it at US$ 1/day to charities like Medecins Sans Frontiers,
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Table 5.7.2 Examples of Indian New Chemical Entity pipeline
Company Molecule Category Development Stage
Ranbaxy RBx2258 Urology (BPH) Phase II
RBX6198 Urology (BPH) Discovery
RBx5736 Urology (BPH) Discovery
RBx4638 Respiratory (Novel VLA-4) Phase 1
RBx7635 Anti-fungal Discovery
RBx7644 Anti-bacterial Pre-clinical
RBx7643 Overactive Bladder Pre-clinical
Dr. Reddy's DRF-2725 Diabetes and Dyslipidemia 9  Phase III
Laboratories
DRF-2593 Diabetes Phase II
DRF-4158 Diabetes Pre-clinical
completed
DRF-NPPC Diabetes Pre-clinical
completed
DRF-1042 Cancer Phase I
DRF-1644 Cancer Pre-clinical
completed
DRF-3188 Cancer, Viral infections and Immuno- Late pre-clinical
stimulation
DRF-4832 CV-PPAR HDL Elevator Late pre-clinical
DRF-4714 CV-PPAR HDL Elevator Pre-clinical
DRF-2937 CV-anti hyper lipoprotein Pre-clinical
DRF-4848 Inflammation Late pre-clinical
Source: Adapted by author from company reports and from analyst reports, Piyush Kheria (2002)
Firms have had to first identify what other companies have commercialised compounds similar to their
own target molecule or intermediate, what starting materials or modification thereof are required to
obtain a final desired product, how to maximise drug purity and quantity, and minimising impurities
and variability. Syntheses have to be designed to yield the highest probability for commercial scaling-
causing a stir worldwide and forcing multinational pharmaceuticals to significantly lower their prices. Cipla
exports anti-AIDS drugs to more than 35 countries. In March 2002, the World Health Organisation listed Cipla
as one of the preferred international suppliers of Anti-AIDS drugs. Cipla is presently in talks with South Africa's
largest mining company to sell a three-drug cocktail of the drugs for $350 per patient per year. Of the cocktail,
Cipla has registered one generic (of Glaxo-Smithkline Beecham's Lamivuidine) in South Africa. The cocktail
consists of three products, Lamivuidine (brand name- Lamivir), Stavudine (Stavir from Bristol-Myers Squibb)
and Navirapine (Nevimune from Boehringer-Ingelheim). Cipla's stock has risen considerably after the
withdrawal by 39 transnational companies of a patent suit for AIDS drugs against the South African government.
58 The recent anthrax scare in the US highlighted the low cost of Ciprofloxacin generics made by Cipla
pharmaceuticals in India, which was selling the drug for about 10 US cents, compared to Bayer's monopoly
price of US$6 (both are retail prices). This caused some US senators to try and contact Cipla for access to cheap
Cipro, (despite US patent laws prohibiting importation of a patented drug from a company other than the patent
holder) resulting in Bayer reducing its price to 95cents.
59 Since withdrawn from trials after carcinogenicity studies showed tumours in rats and mice.
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up. This overall process development starts with route selection and design, on to kilo lab trials, pilot
laboratory scale-up and finally, commercial scale-up.
While TRIPS requirements emerge in full force in 2005, Indian paten laws are also being changed as
discussed in earlier chapters, with Amendments in 1999, 2002 and one coming up shortly before 2005.
Among the issues being revised are the introduction of product [patents, of duration of patent
monopolies and the scope of patentability.60 Keayala (1996) stresses that the government should
introduce restrictions on "product" applying only to NCEs and not to dosage forms or combinations of
existing off-patent products, for example, as have been awarded worldwide in the past to some famous
drugs such as Aspirin in 1973 (Soma compound, W Codeine) from Wallac labs, whose patented
dosage/formulations were Aspirin 325 mg+ Carisoprodol 200 mg + Codeine Phosphate 16 mg, and
whose patent expires 13/8/2002, or Aspirin 325 mg+ Carisoprodol 200 mg, whose patent expires
13/8/2002. Other famous examples of patents being given to dosage/formulations are Ranitidine Hel
(1995), also called Zantac (150,300) from Glaxo for which patents range in expiry from the same year
to 8 years later for Eq. 150 mg base tab, Eq. 300 mg base tab, Eq. 15 mg base/ml Syrup, Eq. 25 mg
base/ml inj., and Eq. 50 mg base/100 ml inj. (in order of dates of expiry). (Ibid.) These patent awards
brought considerable fortunes and market power to their parent companies. What new patent
restrictions imposed by the government could entail is a much higher burden of proof from Indian
companies, many of whom have until now, made formulations and dosage forms a fine art, but have
not shown "an inventive step" or "an important technical advance".61 Indeed, many companies
interviewed agreed that much of what they accomplish requires no significant technological
sophistication. Yet, this is similar to what many of today's leading pharmaceutical firms continues to
undertake.
The Indian findings are in fact consistent with one typology of how innovation now occurs in the
pharmaceutical industry. Incrementally modified drugs (IMDs) account for 2/3 of all drugs approved
60 A comprehensive discussion is found in Keayala (1996).
61 The Patent Act of 1970, Section 2 suggests that novelty is necessary but does not specify the "inventive step".
The Joint Parliamentary Committee suggests inclusion of a new clause (ja) "Inventive step" means a feature that
makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art. Keayala's response is "Inventive step": means a
feature of an invention that involves an important technical advance as compared to the existing knowledge
and/or having considerable economic significance and which makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled
in the art." (Ibid.)
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between 1989-2000, with old active ingredients.62 This type of innovation (IMDs) has arisen because
of the following reasons as the table shows, based on the US market.
Table 5.7.3 Incremental drug modification dynamics
Category of incentive Market manifestation Reason
to create IMDs
Legal Patent expiry Companies try to protect their winning drugs by
attempting to improve upon them
Technological Horizontal and Companies move into new markets or garner greater
vertical product share in same markets. Lesser and greater
differentiation technological differentiation (based on market
characteristics or those based on minor
improvements to the drug)
Regulatory Regulatory incentives Companies can get a drug to market faster if they
to innovate can show that a new version of an old (approved)
incrementally drug is available (the 505(b) pathway of the
USFDA), for example extended release drugs, new
ways of administering the drug (pills versus
injectibles) or purified drugs from molecular
mixtures)
Competitive Strategic ways of Companies facing patent expiries of selected drugs
entry barriers in try to patent new features of the IMD and may be
generic drugs able to obtain 3 years of exclusive market access of
they show either an entirely new version of the
earlier drug or an entirely new use for an existing
drug.
Source: Adapted by author from "Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation" (2002.)
While this typology is useful for understanding why IIMDs are increasing as a percentage of total drug
approvals in the US, it presents a slightly different conceptualisation for IMD proliferation in India,
where firms are challengers, not incumbents. It highlights the changes in innovation criteria as the
selection environment changes with regulatory changes. Indian companies are creating significant
numbers of IIMDs that in a previous era might have been considered new products.
62 "Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation", A research report by the National Institute for Health Care
Management Research and Educational Foundation (NIHCM), May 2002, Washington D.C.
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This is reflected in the statement by the K. Anji Reddy, Chairman, Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Limited:
"When I looked tat the number of new drugs that were launched the
world over, Ifound most ofthem to be analogues of the leader molecules,
or the so-called me-too molecules and second-generation
molecules.....Look at Roche's tenoxicam structure, Roche has replaced
"phenyl" in piroxicam (Pfizer) with "thienyl", and the result is that we
have a new drug with a longer half-life and has one-a-day advantage
over piroxicam. There are many such cases, the well-known examples
being Cimetidine, Ranitidine, Norfloxacin, Ciprofloxacin, Lovastatin-
Simvastatin".63
Nevertheless, reflecting changes in selection, firms now face higher thresholds in demonstrating
novelty of their outputs.
5.8 "Learning-by-Proving": a special skill-set emerges
The prevailing wisdom is that developing countries should concentrate on mature product segments,
but that the primary innovation is targeted to lower costs since the dominant design has been achieved.
The Indian experience demonstrates that firms further honed their process capabilities since product
development, specifically drug discovery, was too expensive. Secondly, even in mature product
segments, some innovation existed which was lucrative. "Learning-by-proving" in export markets
occurred in 3 modes: through tiered cGMP compliance, through vaccines procurement, and through
generic drugs. The modes explain why structural elements (cGMP) are closely linked to market entry,
and thus to incentives for further product differentiation and innovation. It has also provided many
competitive skills required from today's marketplace: rapid filing of applications for novelty, filing
challenges against incumbents and rising to litigation coming from incumbents and other generic drug
competitors. In addition, Indian firms began to use custom API synthesis as a means to increase
revenues by contract manufacturing. CGMP was a means to the end of both in-house and contract
manufacturing upgrading and signalling to companies the ability to scale-up, speed up and custom
create specialty chemicals.
The table below shows the internalisation of learning through external selection.
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REGULATORY CHANGES IN 3 SUB-CATEGORIES OF
EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT TIERED LEARNING
Waxman Hatch Act 1984 1. Tiered worldwide cGMP
worldwide
TRIIPS/WTO 1985 2. International procurement
3. Generic drugs
First wave of Indian liberalisation mid
1980s and BOP 1991 1__
What my industry profile and sub-cases demonstrate is that in addition to these forms of learning, a
clearly different manifestation of learning has arisen from facing regulatory hurdles in a tiered manner
(referred to as "learning by proving"). This type of learning certainly has elements of learning by
interacting and learning by searching, but it is more: This type of learning is in fact driven in part by
facing specifications that are externally determined at the outset, but absorbed rapidly into the internal
workings of the organisation and technological routines. They also need to adapt to new specifications
at short notice, but further, to actively speed up the internal processes of the firm, from laboratory to
final manufacture, filing and drug launch. Companies in India-in both pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical categories have learnt to litigate and face litigation.64 However, it cannot be
developed at the first encounter with regulation, it is build on a long, cumulative path of abilities based
on (a) yield advances (b) changes to the scale of the production process (c) changes to the organisation
itself-R&D functions, contract services, shifts in internal hierarchies etc. (d) horizontal product
differentiation (especially using process innovations across multiple product categories) (c) vertical
product differentiation.
India's initial economic reforms began in the mid 1980s and were propelled into crisis in 1991 with the
Balance of Payments debacle. Indian industry's wooing of overseas markets began by companies being
forced abroad by price rigidities at home, but was assisted by three structural changes: liberalisation of
the economy, changes in the US institutional environment for the pharmaceutical industry
(specifically, the Wax-Hatchman Act) and the TRIPS homogenisation initiatives. But these
technological windows were not purely exogenous constructions of opportunity, but appear to be
63 ,Quoted in his speech "The agony and the ecstasy of Drug Discovery", Foundation Day Lecture, CRIPS Vol.
4, No. 1, January-IvIarch 2003.
64 Interviewees spoke about product liability, industrial espionage that had since been prosecuted, the need to
find non-infringing routes quickly, and the importance of acquiring in-house legal expertise for both patent
challenges as well as defences. In 2002, 8 of 13 filings by Dr. Reddy's Laboratories were patent challenges in
the US market.
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dependent on both the prior capabilities of Indian firms in process development and in core entry
points of public health.65 In addition, evidence from interviews suggests that the extent to which
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical firms are able to appropriate new types of technologies and
knowledge of practice are shaped by the selection environment in which they place themselves (as
highlighted more generally by Wijnberg, 2004 forthcoming). For example, interviewees cite the
relative advances with which they can now advance in generic drug segments where the selection
mechanism is mostly known in advance, but not in "bio-generics". However, even within the same
selection mechanism, firms use appropriation in different ways. Furthermore, since the valuators of the
innovations were different in each case, (since the selection mechanism and evaluations were
different), different demand characteristics emerge in each broad phase: state-led domestic phase,
regulation-led and procurement led export phase, and the new technology-led, biopharmaceutical
phase, which is discussed in the next chapter.
Trade is structured around the basis of differences in factor endowments of various sorts, including
knowledge. History has shown quite convincingly that all firms (and all countries) neither have access
to the same bodies of knowledge nor sets of technology. Vernon (1966) and others have further argued
that while scientific principles underlying technologies were relatively well understood and managed
internationally, markets were not, thus differences in access to knowledge and the adaptability to
markets explained why variations across countries occur in innovation levels. The Indian story is
certainly consistent with this explanation. Regulations as well as procurement, both acted to
standardise information, pool knowledge across sets of technology in vaccines and generic drugs and
create new markets responsive to adaptive firms. This fuelled demand-side pressures on technological
learning and innovation, as well as complementary learning. However, before this export-push, the
demand-side story and its impact on innovation is less clear. The State acted instead to boost supply of
technologies and capabilities in the face of projected public health demands. Thus a more complete
explanation is that cumulative abilities were forced into existence and then nurtured by changes in a
selection environment, first by the state, then by foreign markets. Regulatory changes in this phase
beginning in the 1980s, also highlight the positive role that regulation can play for developing country
firms. Indians benefited from procurement and generic drug policies that made known cGMP
requirements worldwide, that provided information on technologies (to some extent) and on
competitors. Procurement provided worldwide credibility to Indian firms and global markets through
65 This is consistent with Rosenberg (1974) that determinants of technological opportunity can be seen as
endogenously determined and often arise from changes in scientific and technological developments (also see
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the WHO and UNICEF, and generic drugs allowed firms to experiment extensively with minor
product differentiation and more novel feature additions. Phase H was distinctive: the 3 types of
learning occurred facing regulations that were voluntary for firms. Those firms that chose to invest in
these capabilities, further pulled away from the rest of the sector, and prepared themselves for further
selection criteria.
Furthermore, from the 1980s onward, what constituted novelty changed, as did the burden of proof on
generic drug firms. The move of some Indian generic drug manufacturers into the US market recently
coincides roughly with the heightened US worries of terrorism and the greater attention being paid to
antibiotics and vaccine procurement. Health care costs, particularly those of prescription medications
and managed care needs have worked to drive down costs, benefiting the generic drug industries.
Although this is a mature product segment, process development capabilities have allowed innovation
to occur to some extent. The government is debating the elements of the burden of proof required of
Indian companies on what constitutes novelty, inventiveness and a product deserving patenting. This
is creating additional challenges for interviewed firms to increase in-house R&D efforts.
The following chapter discusses the advent of "new" biology tools and their impact on the Indian
biotechnology sector by bringing biology and its models of health and the human body to a chemistry-
dominated Indian industry. The specific challenges, opportunities and institutional tensions are
highlighted as the selection environment changes yet again with new scientific breakthroughs.
discussion in Pavitt, 2002).
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Chapter 6 Beyond Manufacturing: The rise of
Indian biopharmaceuticals
6.1 Changes in scientific and technological paradigms: The rise of
biopharmaceuticals
Biopharmaceuticals are simply the use of biological elements in creating medical therapies. For three
decades now, the field of therapeutics has been revolutionized by breakthroughs in molecular biology
of the early 1970s. Biology, chemistry and computation have surged ahead given the impetus from
these breakthroughs.
Nested within these changes, the Indian therapeutics and diagnostics industries were also
metamorphosing. Biopharmaceuticals brought newer product opportunities as well as newer
characteristics to more mature products. In addition, the elements of the selection environment that
affect firm choices have also changed with the onset of newer tools, products and processes. In this
sense, "biotechnology" is all about process technologies and their development. Thus placed against
earlier paradigms within the industry, this industry's institutional characteristics gain prominence.
The previous chapters laid out the history of manufacturing capability, process improvements and
learning to deal with regulations that has characterized the Indian pharmaceutical industry. While the
story of process capabilities and the environment in which this occurred unfolded from early post-
independence days to the early part of the 2 1" century, the narrative did not capture an important
paradigmatic shift occurring in the field of biology in the late 1970s. India invested in recombinant
DNA technologies in the 1980s, early relative to the advent of these technologies on the world stage in
the previous decade. Nevertheless, the majority of commercialization existed in more mature, less
technologically sophisticated technologies such as high-yielding seeds, vaccinations and industrial
fermentation and enzyme manufacture. However, its traditional strengths in agricultural technologies
had led to significant advances in plant tissue culture, micro propagation, animal husbandry,
diagnostics and vaccines.
While pharmaceutical firms underwent a learning process of their own, much of it was structured
within an environment built by the Indian state in the early years and honed by a clearly demarcated
and accessible (at least to richer firms) regulatory and standards regimen characterizing their exporting
wave. Leading pharmaceutical firms advanced and learnt through a manufacturing push, with process
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capabilities, scale up and manufacturing revenues gradually fuelling a move into the realm of early
stage drug development, and even drug discovery, both more expensive endeavours. Thus, Indian
process development and manufacturing capabilities were developed with industry protections and
honed by regulatory pathways. As the newer tools emerged, they brought forth a further focus on
process development to capitalize on these biological advances. However, the shifts in the science
base of these technologies also required a new configuration of interactions between companies and
their environment. The time between the first advances in the field worldwide, and their adoption in
India, was relatively compressed, and firms in India faced many of the same uncertainties that firms in
the US faced, for example. Thus, besides uncertain regulatory environments and rapid technological
change, firms, public research institutes and policy makers alike faced uncertain institutional models.
Specifically, the tensions present between business and scientists as the pharmaceutical industry
developed were brought into stark relief here as science took on added prominence in the emerging
field and interdisciplinary work became de rigueur in many sub-fields. These were occurring at the
same time that universities and research institutes in India were facing considerable institutional
uncertainties and opportunities of their own.
Thus, manufacturing capabilities alone were insufficient. Firms (and public research efforts) have had
to move beyond a focus on process scale-up and manufacturing capability and question the
institutional basis on which their relationship to science (and commercialization of the science) is
premised. As the numbers of scientists -turned-entrepreneurs increases, and as the number of
businesses with scientific knowledge increases, the schisms that exist today (and the stereotypes that
pervade the industry) between business and science may be bridged in the future.
This chapter has two main purposes: to lay out the changes in the Indian landscape that accompanied
the worldwide technological shifts, thus analyzing how the selection environment has changed,
particularly with regard to standards and regulations. Second, to demonstrate how a newer field has
created diverse industrial entry points by firms but also raises learning challenges of its own. In both
themes, selection environment and product (im) maturity, in this newer field, the role of information
gathering in building knowledge again gained visibility. Yet, the embedded nature of the firm in its
local environment precluded the possibility that all search paths were readily available or equally
costly. Resource-constraints, as in the pharmaceutical case, affected initial search choices, process
development paths and final innovation.
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When previous chapters discussed learning, it was situated against a backdrop of relatively mature
product lines, but nevertheless required considerable investments by firms (even in generic drugs,
perhaps assumed to be the "easiest" segment to learn from). The analysis continues in
biopharmaceuticals by highlighting some distinctive cases of how learning takes place at firm level,
the challenges and the methods by which advance has occurred.' Here too, the fact that a product is
known to the world has nevertheless initiated a learning process in a firm facing the process
development for the product for the first time. The rise of capabilities in this sector is a new
phenomenon, and the chapter maps out the variation in environments and paths accordingly.
6.2 Emerging technologies: process development revisited
Within the drug industry, the technique of choice and the paradigm for drug discovery was random
screening before the 1970s where serendipity, large samples and systematic search were seen to result
in the occasional promising drug candidate. In pre-1970 period, "discovery" related to random
screening which led to specific compounds being selected out for further work based on properties that
seemed promising. Furthermore, this resulted in classification opportunities when molecules with new
therapeutic qualities were discovered. No explicit therapeutic biological models were used to
understand why certain molecules might have a certain efficacy. The search was primarily
characterized by chemical properties of the candidate molecules.
The 1970s brought new breakthroughs in genetics and cell and molecular biology. A new way of
looking at the human body and disease emerged, and with it, new techniques and models of disease
and possible therapeutic candidates. Rational drug design signifying a higher level of understanding to
"design" molecules with certain characteristics allowed for less labour intensive searches and a higher
"hit" rate. In the post-1 970s period, with HST and drug design, the researchers began backwards from
the known disease and sets of molecules were designed to fit the needs of treating a certain disease.
Although they are actively "designed", this is the equivalent of the "discovery". However, the methods
are often not either drug design or random screening alone, but a combination of both.
With these technological changes came organizational restructuring. It also resulted in a division of
labour with large pharmaceutical firms taking over almost exclusively full development of promising
drug candidates, marketing and distribution functions, while drug discovery began to occur with
higher frequency in dedicated biotechnology firms. Not just therapeutics, but diagnostics as well was
1As discussed in the chapter on methodology, data collection was complicated by the confidential nature of
many of the exchanges. Thus, some useful case illustrations could not be developed fully because the company
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affected by this change. Pharmaceuticals have since been changed, both in the processes that lead to
new products, and in the product characteristics themselves. Biotechnology used in pharmaceuticals, is
species specific since they are characterized by new uses of genetic manipulation. In modem
pharmaceuticals, these processes may range from applied genetics (traditional or modem), genetic
engineering (of which rDNA is most commonly used), cell-fusion technologies (of which hybridoma
to make monoclonal antibodies is the most common) to protein engineering. Furthermore, traditional
industrial processes such as fermentation, have been given a new lease of life through modem
biotechnologies, and pharmaceuticals, which depend on fermentation for chemical synthesis, have
now returned to this revitalized process in modem biopharmaceuticals. The ability of pharmaceutical
firms to control enzyme culture through the fermentation process, for example, critically determines
their path to some types of drug development.
Generally, three generations of products exist: the older methods of farm and industrial scale
production of cheese making and brewing; a second generation primarily using fermentation with end
products of enzymes (in food and related industries) and antibiotics (in health); a third generation
using modem biotechnologies, such as vaccines of various kinds, human growth hormone and
genetically produced insulin. The table below shows products developed using biotechnologies, and
classifies them by user industries. Many processes are shared across sectors. For example, the process
of enzyme immobilization has important technological learning effects and consequences for both
industrial applications and biopharmaceuticals.
Table 6.2.1 Examples of biotechnology products
SECTOR PRODUCT WHETHER
INDIGENOUSLY
PRODUCED
Pharmaceuticals Alpha and gamma interferons Yes
Erythropoietin Yes
Hepatitis B vaccines Yes
Human insulin Yes
Interlukin-2 Yes
Gm-CSF 2  Yes
Diagnostics AIDS kits Yes
Aquaculture diseases detection kits Yes
Hepatitis kits Yes
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could be easily identified if the particular details of the product/process were discussed.
2 GM-CSF = Granulocyte Macrophage Colony Stimulating Factor, AIDS = Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
In addition, various indigenous diagnostic kits have also become available: (a) commercial
applications: HIV (using agglutination ELISA' and Western blot techniques), Heptatis C (ELISA),
Cysticercosis (ELISA) and (b) those under development: Tuberculosis, (PCR), Leishmaniasis (PCR),
Malaria (ELISA/Dipstick, HLA (PCR/ELISA) and Typhoid (ELISA) (Padmanaban, 2003).
In particular, the process development characteristics vary between synthetic and biological
therapeutics. Furthermore, process development has different elements of lab to factory scale-up in
biopharmaceuticals as the table illustrates.
Table 6.2.2 Process development in pharmaceuticals and biotechnology
EXAMPLES OF PROCESS DEVELOPMENT NARROW CATEGORIES
Pharmaceuticals Process research:
Alternative synthetic routes
Routes scaled up for laboratory use
Lab-level production for clinical studies
Pilot development:
Scale-up to pilot plant
Kinetics and scale-up uncertainties
Production for clinical trials
Design of plant equipment
Commercial plant transfer and start-up
Scale-up to commercial plant-level
Scale-up of processes for commercialization
Biotechnology Process research
Develop Analytical methods
Cell line routes
Pilot development:
Small-scale purification
Scale-up to bench level
Pilot batches
Commercial plant transfer and start-up
Scale-up for commercialization
Adapted from Pisano (1997)
3 ELISA = Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay, PCR = Polymerase Chain Reaction, HIV = Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, Agglutination refers to a technique in rapid diagnostic testing based on the cohesion of
white or colored latex particles, gelatin beads dyes, colloidal particles, or preserved mammalian/avian blood cells
to carry antibodies or antigens.
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6.3 The Public effort of the 1980s-1990s: galvanizing an industry (again)
"For pharmaceuticalfirms, scale-up is obvious, for biotech firms,
scale-up is not obvious. ....This is notjust about throwing money;
trouble-shooting ability and scale-up are critical for biotech.....
Companies need technologies that differentiate them and also
revenue streams. " (Interview)
India's move into biology-based products, was driven in large part by external scientific and
technological advances, but depended on accumulated process capabilities built up in chemistry,
biochemistry and certain fields of biology, such as structural biology for example, where significant
worldwide breakthroughs such as collagen modeling, were made. It also depended to some extent on
advances in agricultural biotechnology and the levels of confidence of scientists that advances using
the 'new' biotechnologies could be successfully applied to challenges of human (and animal) health.
India had already invested in recombinant DNA technologies in the 1980s, although the bulk of its
present commercialization is in mature segments such as high-yielding seeds, vaccinations, industrial
fermentation and enzyme manufacture. Its traditional strengths in agricultural technologies had led to
advances in plant tissue culture, micro propagation, animal husbandry, diagnostics and vaccines.
India's biotechnology capabilities straddle different industrial sectors and a varied assortment of "old"
and newer biological and chemical general-purpose tools.4 (see also Lachke et al. 1988, Padh, 1997,
Sharma, 2001, Nagaratnam, 2001, Padmanaban, 2003).
4 The Department of Biotechnology (DBT) of the Indian government uses a sweeping definition of
biotechnology that leaves many ambiguities: "biotechnology is an application of recombinant and non-
recombinant technologies in biological resource utilization for product and process development aimed for
commercialization" (for a full discussion of classification problems, see Chaturvedi, 2002). Even biotechnology
patents have not been segregated into different types. One problematic feature is the differing definitions used by
various ministries of the government in their internal reporting. Some efforts for consolidation of the data
collection exercise have now commenced. The OECD definition is "The application of science and technology
to living organisms, as well as parts, products and models thereof, to alter living or non-living materials for the
production of knowledge,. goods or services". (OECD ad hoc committee) The meeting uses 5 categories to
develop a list-based definition of biotechnology: 1. DNA (Genetics, pharmaco-genetics, gene probes, DNA
sequencing/synthesis/simplification, genetic engineering) 2. Proteins an molecules (Protein/peptide,
sequencing/synthesis, lipid/protein engineering, proteomics, hormones, and growth factors, cell
receptors/signalling/pheromonics) 3. Cell and tissue culture and engineering (Cell/tissue culture, tissue
engineering, hybridisation, cellular fusion, vaccine/immune stimulants, embryo manipulation) 4. Process
biotechnologies (Bioreactors, fermentation, bio processing, bio leaching, bio-pulping, bio-bleaching, bio
desulphurisation, bioremediation and bio filtration) 5. Sub-cellular organisms (Gene therapy, viral vectors).
Source: OECD, cited in Chaturvedi (2002).
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The country has achieved some level of success in innovation in the following fields: Basic Research:
(a) establishing the helical structure of collagen, assisting therefore in solving for protein structures.
(b) Sequencing of Arabidopsis and rice genomes (c) gene identification (d) drug delivery systems (e)
diagnostics (e) recombinant vaccines (f) computational biology, Sharma (2001). The government of
India established the National Biotechnology Board in 1982 and the subsequent creation of the
Department of Biotechnology, Ministry of Science and Technology, in the early 1980s was intended to
propel innovation across industry, medicine and agriculture. Specific recent focus as been on
increasing productivity in agriculture (in the seed sector, as in the Green Revolution biotechnologies
as well as in veterinary products), industrial biotechnology, bio informatics dealing with newer gene
techniques, and environmental biotechnologies, particularly bio pesticides and bio fuels. (Sharma
200 1)5 In bio informatics, India's progress in information technology and computer software and
services has supported a focus on genome research and applications, drug design and the development
of a molecular taxonomy. Computational biologists have linked up with computer scientists to find
new life in drug discovery and development.'
Many successes have been on the agricultural biotechnology front, but some scientists still feel that
this area had far more potential than has been realized and that prioritizing health biotechnology to the
detriment of agricultural biotech was incorrect.! On the food and livestock area, India has changed
from milk-scarce to becoming the world's largest producer of milk. This "White Revolution", had its
institutional base in a revolution in dairy co-operatives in the West of India, and became synonymous
with a revolution in collection, transportation and distribution of milk and profits to million of small
and marginal farmers. However, an important component of this revolution was supported by the
biotechnological development of vaccine kits and of the institutional innovation of livestock medicine
franchises for their propagation.
5 There has also been some effort to involve NGOs to take up the use of innovations in small bio industries,
particularly for women. India has also explicitly created the Biotechnology Consortium of India Limited (BCIL)
and is working with the Swiss Development Corporation as intermediary and institutional donor to foster
relations between and pool resources of public and private sectors.
6 An Indian government mission, the Jai Vigyan Mission, has been established to develop genomic databases.
India's Department of Biotechnology has developed a nationwide bio informatics network with 10 Distributed
Information Centres and 35 sub-distributed information centres. Also distributed round the country and graphics
centres (Sharma, 2001). The Government of India also has 48 approved (accredited) Master of Science, Post-
doctoral and MD biotechnology training programs in almost all states and union territories. Fellowships for
students to go abroad, shorter training programs, training at other Indian institutes, and the development of a
popular lecture series on biotech, are all part of a recent package adopted by the government. There have been
some attempts to focus particularly on encouraging and rewarding women in the biosciences.
7 As one scientist said, "Government should have pushed the agricultural biotech area. We tried to do what the
Western world did. We should have done differently" (Interview, 7 June 2003)
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Explicit early attempts by government to establish tissue culture pilot plants in Pune and Delhi have
resulted in considerable success, and these have been converted into Micro-propagation Technology
Parks with the explicit aim of transferring technology to entrepreneurs. Success has been visible in
cardamom and vanilla tissue culture research. The National Plant Genome centre in Delhi has
provided some promising leads in transgenic cotton, moongbean, potato and brassica. In health,
important advances have occurred in protein studies in mosquitoes and in the demonstration of transfer
of genes in a site-specific way of the reconstituted viral envelopes containing F proteins of the virus
(Sharma, 2001). Both have come from university laboratories.
In 2002-'03, biopharmaceuticals had revenues of Rs. 1275 crores8, around 70% of the biotechnology
market (excluding various suppliers and hybrid seed companies), followed a distant second by
industrial biotechnology at Rs. 235 crores (13%), services companies' Rs. 135 crores (7%),
agricultural biotechnology Rs. 110 crores (6%) and bioinformatics Rs. 75 crores (4%). When all
categories including suppliers and hybrid seed companies are included, biopharmaceuticals account
for 55% of the total industry sales revenues. The vaccines market comprised 57 percent of the total
biopharma segment, with total sales of Rs 725 crores, therapeutics with 32% and diagnostics with
8%.1" There appear to be at least 176'"biotechnology firms in the country and possibly more than 200
active ones. 12 The same geographic regions with large concentrations of public research institutes are
also areas where multinational companies have clustered or outsourced computer services and which
are concurrently vibrant IT service centres. Many of those are now biotechnology hubs (either
pharmaceutical or other types-particularly agricultural biotechnology) such as Bangalore and
Hyderabad. About 60% of the Indian biotech sector is made up of pharmaceuticals and human health
industries, closely followed by agri-biotech. (Ernst and Young, 2001). " Other initiatives to drive the
growth of the "sector" have included the establishment of facilitative organizations such as The
8 Rs.1 crore=Rs. 10 million
9 Some of which may have pharmaceutical R&D being conducted in-house.
10 Data from Industry Overview, Biospectrum, Vol 1, Issue 7, September 2003, p. 10, India
"1 The Department of Biotechnology (DBT) established the Biotech Consortium of Indian Limited (BCIL) as a
public company. Its 2001 directory surveys all firms in various user industries.
12 Biospectrum, Vol 1, Issue 7, September 2003, p. 10, India
13 There is an urgent need for classification and measurement within biopharmaceuticals, and the biotechnology
sectors more broadly. For example, Chaturvedi (2002) looks at variation across reports on sizes of various Indian
sub-sectors from the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the Department of Biotechnology (DBT) and the
magazine The Economist. The Indian biotechnology industry is estimated to be approximately US$ 2.5 billion
(CII), US$1.9 billion (DBT) and $US 1.5 billion (Economist). The same types of large variation exists across
162
Biotech Consortium India Limited (BCIL), a public limited company founded by the Department of
Biotechnology (DBT), Government of India, in 1990 with a corpus of Rs. 5.37 crores (Rs.53.7
million) with the explicit aim of accelerating the commercialization of biotechnology in the country
through technology development and technology transfer and acting as a link among all Indian
research institutes, firms, government and funding bodies. Financial institutions provided the corpus
across the country such as the IDBI, ICICI, IFCI, IFCI Venture Capital Funds, UTI and
pharmaceutical firms such as Ranbaxy, Cadila, Glaxo India, and SPIC. Its Board comprises scientists
from public research institutes such as the Central Drug Research Institute, Institute of Microbial
Technology, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, financiers from ICICI and from IDBI and
company CEOs such as those from Dr. Reddy's Laboratories and Bharat Biotech International."
The total R&D budget outlay of the last decade of major R&D funding has risen and for
biotechnology alone, the budgets are also increasing from the Department of Biotechnology (DBT).
Under the Ninth and Tenth Five Year Plans, governmental allocations for biotechnology have also
increased from Rs. 6,215.42 million in the Ninth Plan to Rs. 20, 750 million in the Tenth Plan, an
approximately 233% increase.' 5 (DBT, GOI, various years). Three newer initiatives, the Drug
Development Program, the Technology Development Board (TDB) and the New Millennium
Technology Imperative (NMITLI), have attempted to build scale of efforts and provide incentives to
the private sector and to collaborative research. Much of the same impetus that gave rise to a vast
public research infrastructure for the pharmaceutical industry has also acted as an umbrella for
research in the life sciences. The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research was founded in 1942 as
India's largest network of public R&D laboratories.
Some of its wings are now actively involved in biotechnology, but the integration of biology into the
supremacy of existing chemistry-based research centres has not always been easy. Under a combined
onslaught of liberalization-induced economic crises in Indian laboratories and faced an impending
product patent regime, CSIR has been actively patenting in recent years, and seeking industry partners.
It has 101 biological science patents, of which 64 are US patents and 34 Indian patents with a total of
biopharmaceuticals (defined as Diagnostics/Vaccines only for comparisons) US$420 million (CII), US$150
million (DBT) and US$375 million (Economist).4 From BCIL's reports.
" This outlay includes facilities, Centres of Excellence programs and other program support, R&D outlays,
Biotechnology for Societal Development and Bioprocess and Product development (both of which are mostly
new allocations in the Tenth Plan). These outlays also include international cooperation, human resource
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2605 patents since 1976, of which 896 patents in all scientific fields have been obtained from 2000
alone (author's calculations from CSIR patent database).
Despite India's considerable investments in science and technology over the years, its universities and
public research institutes continue to be hindered by outdated models, a search for newer vision and
difficulties collaborating within public research and with industry. Thus, biopharmaceutical research
has provided some significant challenges, and impetus, for institutional change. At the same time, the
compression in timeline at the onset of the new technologies of the 1970s to the frequency of
innovation in the field also has blurred the signposts for the field. The next section underscores the
varied learning challenges for firms in a new selection environment, and suggests that innovation
strictly defined as invention, or first introduction worldwide of a scientific or technological feat,
misses much of the remarkable diversity of learning to innovate and the extent to which it depends on
its localized environment.
6.4 Where signposts are blurred and the map is new: learning paths in
biopharmaceuticals
"Hepatitis B being a known technology is like saying missile
technology is known or the atom bomb is public domain. We
still need ways to construct it and to take it to market and
compete. " (Interviewee)
By the end of 2003, there were six indigenously developed biopharmaceutical products being sold in
the Indian market and with some markets abroad: recombinant Hepatitis B Vaccine, recombinant
human insulin, recombinant Streptokinase, Interferon Alpha 2b, Erythropoetin and GCSF and others
are being developed. None of these products is new worldwide, but in some cases Indian firms have
still been distinctive in their recombinant efforts. For example, Bharat Biotech is the second largest
Hepatitis B producer worldwide and one of the few to manufacture recombinant Streptokinase.
Wockhardt is the 4* manufacturer worldwide of human insulin and the first Asian company and
Shanta Biotech is the first Indian company to receive WHO certification for Hep B. Wockhardt is the
first WHO-GMP approved Hep B product from India,
The nature of innovation within the industry is captured in the following table, many of which are for
products and/or processes introduced into the Indian market for the first time, and some as a new
worldwide introduction. The innovations range from new versions of older products characterized by
development, bioinformatics, funding of actual autonomous institutes (not those under the CSIR mandate) as
well as the actual workings of the DBT itself. (Also, see Chaturvedi, 2002, p.6)
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fewer impurities, side effects and greater benefits, new processes to obtain higher yields for known
DRUG TYPE OF INNOVATION
AIDS 3-drug cocktail, with two on-patent drug Changed formulation, easy to use kit. Steady supply
(but exported to countries with no process patent- ensured. Cocktail offered at less than half the cost.
only regimes) and one Cipla generic.
Ciprofloxacin generic Oral once-a-day dose compared to multiple doses
needed presently by Bayer's patented drug.
Prozac generic Fluoxetine Different dosage. Shows some novel properties. In
arrangement with patent-holder Eli Lilly for out-
licensing and manufacture.
Hepatitis B vaccine 2 alternative cultures for preparing the vaccine.
Significantly lowered cost,
New fermentation reactor for enzyme culture New fermentation technology used. Novel solid state
mechanism to control fermentation conditions
Snake venom antidote Made through culture from poultry eggs
Stem cell research Uses novel methods for harvesting. Associated institutes
in India have also used ophthalmologic cells.
cultures, and application of older processes or concepts to entirely new applications, particularly those
with India-specific biological resources (plant or human). As an example of a company able to move
between manufacture of known drugs and vaccines to one able to innovate in-house, Bharat Biotech's
process development capabilities have taken a variety of forms: (a) in-house production process with
platform technology for more refined vaccines with worldwide patents" (b) serotype for vaccines
using new production process" (c) development and scaling up for new vaccines and development of
regionally specific bovine and human strains" (d) discovery and development of new molecules for
existing infections through new in-house method for recombinant proteins 19 (e) first in country to
manufacture new generation vaccines."
The coming sections highlight specific learning challenges and structural problems facing the industry.
The new institutional characteristics of the firms and the ways in which they absorb knowledge is
visible in two main ways: the diversity of learning paths and the niche research opportunities they
pursue. Perhaps most importantly, they highlight the breadth of complementary learning strategies
employed under constrained resources and search horizons. The diverse learning also underscores the
diversity in industrial actors who have emerged in the biopharmaceutical realm. A variety of
16 First Cesium Chloride free (CsCl) vaccine worldwide manufactured using a patented innovative in-house
production process.
17 Serotype for Hepatitis A with new production process.
18 Rotaviral vaccine candidate attempts, in collaboration with various US-based public and private research
institutes.
19 A new molecular entity for Lysostaphin against Staphylo coccus aureus infections and for r-strpetokinase.
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technology paths have intersected, giving rise to shifts in industrial reconfigurations, such as brewing
companies with expertise in fermentation (which uses biological agents) which they then utilise in
developing therapeutics and diagnostic kits.
6.4.1 Technological and regulatory challenges: narratives from companies
The entry of Indian pharmaceutical and other companies into newer biological products particularly
recombinant proteins arose in part because of the dire need for cheap vaccines for common diseases.
Companies like Bharat Biotech International Limited and Shanta Biotech made national headlines for
initiating a competitive drive to manufacture a recombinant hepatitis B vaccine, the first such Indian
vaccine appearing on the market in 1997 and costing 20 times less than the existing multinational
company product from SmithKline Beecham. Since then the public and private initiatives have been to
build capability in erythropoietin, stimulating growth factor, and insulin, among others. These
companies developed their own manufacturing technologies suited to local conditions, and created a
variety of process and production technologies for these known vaccines, while attempting to meet
world-class standards for the end product. Thus the fact that the product was known worldwide did not
prevent a learning process from taking place.
The Indian capability in bio-pharmaceuticals has been built in a shared, but not coordinated way, by
two powerful sets of actors: the first is the state, and the second, mid-size and small Indian firms. The
story of the pharmaceutical companies is a different one from the biotech companies to the extent that
they show a particular technological path of advancement from chemistry to biotech. Although an
increasing number of pharmaceutical companies have invested in in-house biopharmaceutical
capability, broadly speaking, "biotech" companies are a motley crew of smaller companies with
capabilities being built around genomics, but in applications as varied as brewing, bioinformatics, seed
genotyping, phage therapies and "bio" insecticides. Their story is one of building technological
capability around relatively mature, proven concepts and their innovation is then one of process
improvement and the search for new applications. An important additional factor warranting more
research is the notable presence of foreign-returned (usually from the US) scientists and engineers in
this industry, many of who were connected at various times with centres of biotechnology R&D (and
thus venture capital funding as well) near San Francisco, San Diego and Boston in the US.
20 For single-shot typhoid vaccines
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The industry comprises a diversity of firms, from development and manufacturing firms to drug
discovery, bioinformatics and equipment supplier and materials supplier firms.2 ' In recent years,
Hyderabad companies like Shanta Biotech2 2 , Bharat biotech2 ' and Dr. Reddy's Laboratories 24 have
succeeded in entering the drug development and manufacturing domain, and have adopted
biotechnological tools to produce vaccines and other drugs. At the drug discovery end, Bangalore-
based companies like Strand Genomics2" (starting with bioinformatics), Avesthagen 26 , Dr. Reddy's and
Aurigene"2 have all invested in building their genomics capability to look at a variety of challenging
drug and agricultural biotechnologies. Furthermore, the Hepatitis B learning path, and that of other
recombinant products, has required close collaboration with universities and public research institutes
who conducted some of the initial work on the vaccine. Companies stated that it was important for
industry to speak the language of science. Shantha Biotechnics, for example, continues a range of
efforts with public research institutes.28 While institutional changes have been complex, process
development and especially manufacturing ability continues to play a dominant role in Indian
biopharmaceuticals. Even though such collaborations exist, and transfers of technology may take place
into companies, the latter must be able to contend with process scale-up problems ranging from
21 Because "new" biotech applications are relatively recent, the classification of companies is difficult since the
learning process involves diversifying into new areas, adding organisational segments and changing business
strategies.
22 The company aims to "achieve break throughs in modern biotechnology leading to development of products
and services that address critical healthcare needs. (They) have the competence to provide high quality contract
R & D services ranging from molecular cloning to process development and formulation." (Company website)
23 The company is engaged in "the field of developing Next-Generation Vaccines and Biopharmaceuticals
through original and collaborative research." (Company website)
2 DRL is a pharmaceutical company, but its biotechnology division "deals with therapeutics, vaccines and
diagnostics. Molecular biology, cell culture, fermentation, downstream processing and hybridoma technology are
the focus areas. Dr Reddy's core competency is in the recombinant proteins technology platform." (Company
website)
25 The company is "a leading life sciences informatics company focused on software for drug discovery and
development" (Company website)
26 The company applies "it's integrated technology platform for novel seed development offering nutriceuticals
to complement its disease specific medicinal plant based drug discovery and plant based solution for chronic
health problems where no existing effective treatment exists today." (Company website)
27 "Aurigene is a Boston-based drug discovery organization, with state-of-the-art research facilities in Bangalore,
India. With a combination of internal discovery programs and sponsored research activities, Aurigene accelerates
discovery by providing products and services that specifically address chokepoints in the discovery value chain."
(Company website)
28 The company was launched from a base in the Centre for Cell and Molecular Biology (CCMB) in Hyderabad-
after beginning research efforts at Osmania University in the same city, and has continued to build on its public
partnerships for drugs that have broad use. For example, it collaborates with CCMB in Hyderabad, the Indian
Institute of Science (IISc) in Bangalore, Jawaharlal University in Delhi, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre
(BARC), Mumbai, Institute of Chemical Biology, Calcutta, among others complete list of public and private
collaborations around specific products is available in the report of French Embassy, New Delhi, RUET, Joel,
ZERAH Marie-Helene, MARIA Augustin, GIRAUD Pierre-Noel, (2002), "Biotechnologies in India", Report
commissioned by The French Embassy in India
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usability of host cultures, to regulatory problems and attempts to synchronize their in-house efforts
with client R&D.
6.4.2 Case 1 Expressions of advance: approval mechanisms and brands
The Hepatitis story illustrates the challenges facing firms because even though the technology now lies
in the public domain, it has a host of tacit characteristics that only in-house search, experimentation
and mistakes will decipher. It also raises the issues of media exposure and national expectation lying
heavily on the shoulders of fledgling companies. 29 This case briefly highlights an additional problem
faced by a few companies in the sample. It is posed in general terms because of data confidentiality
from the companies interviewed. In this, different paths to the same end drug through different host
cultures are not straightforward. In the example below, posed in general terms of an actual known non-
Indian case, three leading companies used three different cultures to express the same drug form. In
each case, the process had to be approved by regulatory authorities by demonstrating a host of species-
specific and efficacy studies. The fact that the end product may be identical appears to suggest that the
process differences should not determine the product, that there are many ways to the same end. There
are 5 distinct European processes with different expression systems that have led to the creation of an
identical human growth hormone.34
29 One company said. "The first time was much easier. The more well known you are, the harder it will
become"." (Interview)
30 If this characteristic of biological development of therapeutics if regulated as such, there may be more promise
than now currently appears for Indian companies, who have limited resources and high levels of process
development.
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Culture/Expression system
Process 1: E Coli Pharmacia/Scherina
Biopharmaceutical output:
NovNdiskElii191-amino acid sequence
Process 2: Special copying the human pituitary
strains of E. Coli growth hormone.
Source: Adapted from Contract Pharma magazine, Nov/Dec 2003,
In process engineering in this subsector, companies may have multiple ways to achieve the end result
(i.e. drug). However, the analogy with pharmaceuticals ends here. The example shows three ways in
which major companies created the human growth hormone. Each process is associated with a specific
choice of culture/expression system in which the process is directed and controlled. However,
demonstrating that the end product is similar is insufficient a proof of product efficacy or safety.
Because of species specificity, among other things, the company must also show that the process
sequences are similar on a variety of dimensions.
The interview data demonstrated cases where the very first element of the token search, their cultures,
was not a given. Companies were constrained in terms of their access to comparable cultures or access
to approved cultures. In one case, the interviewee indicated that the host had presented high yields and
a variety of studies had shown the safety and efficacy of the end result. Yet, the company was to
discover that by US FDA guidelines, the culture wasn't approved and thus the process could not be
taken further. In another case, the company was unsure of the product liability implications if a
specific culture was pursued and the end product were to cause undesirable effects. In a third case,
public research laboratories and private companies alike were continuing to manufacture vaccines for
local use with a sheep brain culture.
In such instances, the variation in regulations and the uncertainties regarding US FDA regulations for
certain categories of biopharmaceuticals as well as litigation and product liability uncertainties for
vaccines, have all made search activities not an entirely open-ended operation. Companies have to
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select from what they can afford to pursue, and within this, what they can anticipate being able to have
approved, even if they can extract high yields for the particular process.
6.4.3 Case 2: International ladders, international uncertainties
Company 2 began as a vaccines supplier and only later emerged with a formulations base. It emerged
from its old ownership with a few very competitive brands. Although some of its portfolio could have
created very easy revenues, they chose not to focus on low technology, easy revenue segments such as
cough medications. Other bulk drugs companies had emerged from antibiotics groups such as
Cephalosporins. These were hugely competitive in India. For these companies, formulations had been
a lesser priority. Company 2's own existing bulk drugs portfolio has existed for decades.
The animal health vaccine market in India is fragmented and viruses keep changing so companies are
forced to keep up with technologies. But their partnership with a specific foreign company ended
when it sold the animal health products division to another company, and company 2's access to
technology in this area ended. They tried another company to link up with; again, they sold their
division to another company.
Company 2 claims a certain pride in working with the State and in creating vaccines that assist
children. In vaccines, not all products are technology transferred. They were never interested in
Hepatitis B, but have been interested in combination vaccines. They have focused on technology
platforms for preventive reasons. E.g. rDNA and very interested in WHO/UN markets, where public
procurement is important, and they push for public procurement advocacy, with new developing
country vaccine initiatives. Global EPI vaccine programs are almost 85% provided by developing
country pharmaceutical companies. These directives have been criticized by developed countries.
However, CCMB with their work on stem cells, and All India Institute for Medical Sciences (AIIMS)
with their work on the AIDS vaccine, have both done some path breaking work. Also, one of the
worldwide leading biotech firms had chosen Company 2 as an AIDS vaccine provider, but this turned
out not to be a workable solution. Company 2 is not that interested in biotechnology apart from
vaccines, and not in industrial enzymes, even if the technology is close to in-house abilities.
The WHO (and initiatives such as GAVI, the Gates Foundation and the Rockfeller foundation) have
recognized the efforts of Company 2 and its work in vaccines has been equated to the Expanded
Program of Immunization (EPI) programs and their standards. These programs have played a
significant role in sustainability and supply of vaccines because the end products do not have large
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commercial markets. At the same time, the cGMP requirements have also kept changing, so
companies need procurement to make the process viable. This is a guarantee to Company 2 and others
of assured demand in foreign countries that come under the purview of these immunization programs.
The recognition of companies by such international programs for R&D and procurement makes new
collaborative opportunities possible, as a signaling mechanism to other firms. Its effect on platform
standardization assists Company 2 and others like it in their export path.
Because they have had such a long history of vaccine development, their technological commitment is
clear. All companies and governments in developing countries have learnt to make vaccines around
the same time, so this itself is not a differentiating factor. But big changes emerged with Hepatitis B
vaccines through the recombinant B vaccine. Combination technologies have been used to develop
both recombinant B and combo vaccines (multiple vaccines) and these are process and platform
driven. For Company 2, regulatory issues surrounding their products drove the decision to buy existing
products and technologies instead of facing the uncertainties and costs and developing products in-
house. This makes it easier for the company to get products to market. The Department of
Biotechnology had licensed the new yeast medium, but they never pursued this fully in-house since
they never quite felt they had enough time to do full development in-house.
Company 2 is now dedicating about 30% of internal resources for the future in terms of both R&D
investments as well as to technological alliances with public research institutes. These options are not
as expensive as buyouts of companies or their products. In some cases, the link with PRIs has been for
key technologies, in some cases purely for infrastructure. Furthermore, when links such as these exist
with PRIs, some other aspects of getting to market simplify because assistance is available: such as
financial assistance, quicker import of equipment, assistance with meeting regulatory policy, overall
speed in getting to market). PRIs have been most helpful when the problem is encapsulated. This has
allowed Company 2 to emerge again in global vaccine program initiatives. Earlier, MNCs such as
Merck, Aventis and SmithKline Beecham used to supply about 100% of WHO's supply, but now they
have dropped to les than 15% since they also have invested less in capabilities for hexavalent and
pentavalent vaccines. On the other hand, Indian EPIs, African EPIs etc have been critical for
companies like company B. Even 15% of the pentavalent market, for example, is greater than 6 times
the total EPI market for India, so it viewed as very much worth getting into since the "Big 4"
companies in the pharmaceutical realm working on vaccines are not going to fight for this share. So it
is not that technology, per se, is needed for catching up, but getting to the market is harder. Both
physical GMP models (compliance) are expensive, as are other regulatory hurdles.
Company 2 also stressed that it does not know how big FDA hurdles are going to be for biologicals.
Even in the US market, these hurdles are unknown, so they have built an in-house team to deal with all
aspects of the biotech markets. Furthermore, it is unclear what product liability will be in biologicals.
In the case of Wyeth, for example, a serious vaccine controversy emerged. 50 children died because of
a reaction to the vaccine but the company got off relatively unscathed because the US FDA had
licensed the technology to them. Also, the biological specificity means that Phase 3 work is intensive
and that national control agencies of all countries will be working hard-for example, such as the
agency in India in Khasauli where specified random sample tests on the batches are carried out.
In terms of advances in Company 2's core fields, overall drivers are broad perspectives in health such
as those that drove the Human Genome Project. One core problem is that upcoming process
technologies (conjugation reagents, micro arrays) are all patented and these are critical input
technologies into vaccines. The obstacles for Company 2 are thus monopolies on key input process
technologies, having a market presence in core areas for long enough, while having money at the same
time to invest in technological learning.
If A is the initial culture and three different strains of yeast are used to get to B, the Hep B product, the
process patent drives the process. The host cell is patentable, but it has taken a long time to find,
stabilize, test and demonstrate that the vaccine can be found here, and finally working all the way to
market. So the process requires that Company 2 (and others like it) needs to patent the yeast medium
(the Aventis strategy) and then see if they can get other products out of this medium. Pursuing the one
method for making Hep B alone does not make much business sense.
Besides the access that the relationship with PRIs buys for Company 2 and information on the
regulatory structure and hurdles, there isn't any real difference between India (local) public domain
information and that obtained elsewhere. In fact for vaccine research, Company 2 has developed links
with a variety of foreign universities and research institutes. Thus local academia does not always have
to be so critical, unless one is trying to use links with the government for scaling up. or got getting
researchers with specific regional diseases or other expertise. Successful companies know exactly
what to obtain fro m their relationship with PRIs-time-specific encapsulated problems are best, not
172
exploratory work. Only a few Indian companies have in-house scaling-up capability for R&D and only
these are truly able to benefit from links with the public sector. Thus, the public sector cannot be a
substitute for in-house technology capabilities. If there is no real knowledge base in the company, in-
house retention of scientists in the long-term is a nightmare.
6.4.4 Case 3: Pursuing high-quality and local traditions
Company 3 is an arm of a larger company that investigates pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical
lines of research. The parent company has pursued this investment as an exploration into possible
future profits. The research arm, which is referred to here as Company 3 (although within the same
company, but acting independently), has developed multiple innovative new processes and some
differentiated products using both chemistry and biology as routes. The head of Company 3 the public
research institutes as having been critical in amassing capabilities, but lacking the abilities to
commercialize their findings, while industry has had little appreciation for scientific and technological
advances and feels this is symptomatic of much of Indian industry which needs to think more long-
term.
In the nutriceuticals realm, a public research institute had identified a strain of a compound for the first
time almost four decades ago. An MNC became interested in this compound, particularly in the
animal studies. Company 3 recognized that this compound was central to health care stores in the US.
Its contribution was to create a pure soluble salt of this compound and has subsequently patented this
in India, Europe and the US and has completed both animal and clinical studies. It finds that although
the intended benefit shows less dramatic results, a highly significant side benefit has been found and
pursued-cholesterol reduction. They now have built links with other Indian organizations for clinical
studies. While the parent company is global and has much marketing and distribution experience, they
have no expertise in this area. So company 3 finds itself having to learn the export markets itself. They
have found a contract manufacturing partner close by whom they trust to discuss proprietary
technologies. They have taken the process and manufactured 1 ton of the compound a month.
Exporters buy this for almost a third of their price but at 50% purity, whereas theirs is 95% pure, but
people are unwilling to accept their higher price. Part of their work now is to convince customers that
the higher price is worth the cost. They are pursuing these soluble salts and their tests since if they
come through, immense revenues may be in store. They have found markets in Indonesia and Japan.
Two companies received information about the product through old employees and combined this
with public domain patent information and created the product at a lower price to undercut them. Now
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company 3 has also learnt to litigate. Although it doesn't have the powers to commercialize the
technology, they simply license it out and put the earned royalties back into their R&D.
Company 3 also discussed 4 other products, discussing the inability of most of Indian industry to
appreciate the technological challenges in process research, scale-up, commercialization. They even
developed a fermentation control process using a sophisticated algorithm that may have benefited
some companies, but were ignored. They have since developed an Indian patent for this. They are now
pursuing marketing links directly with foreign companies abroad so as to advance their products.
They are looking for products that are profitable to India, then to the US. Resource constraints have
created this blend of expertise in house. Another additional difficulty is the cost and procedures
involved with patenting. A US patent costs about 30-40 thousand dollars, but now their own patent
lawyer in Delhi does all the work and sends his counterpart in the US the final materials. Thus, the
patent costs are brought down to about 10,000 USS$. Company 3 then described a series of other
products and challenges of technological learning, regulatory hurdles, cost of development, and the
slow development of links with other companies in India and abroad for marketing links. They see
increased public-private interaction now.
In most of these products, there is a common technological theme, where one process capability (in
this case a specific soluble salt) is developed and improved continuously and applied in different
contexts. For example, they are investigating known pharmacological off-patent compounds which are
no longer effective (i.e. resistant drugs) and then attempting to add local natural products that have
antibodies and creating very innovative products. They are also looking at specific genes cloned in
yeast, which do not appear to have a specific biologic activity. They are working on this with a small
company with specific expertise (founded by a former company executive) and working on company
X's site. If they get good yields and good biological activity, then they will have some combined
marketing benefit. Although yeast expression has been done before there continues to be a large
demand for such yields. They have a process patent in the US now.
6.4.5 Case 4 "From Brewing to Biotech": lateral learning and industrial reconfiguration
"...(From a) Company focused on manufacturing enzymes by
fermentation into being a Fermentation Company focusing on
Enzymes and Pharmaceuticals production."
(http://www.biocon.com)
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When Biocon began its journey into Statins, the route was indirect. Its past user industries ranged from
brewing industries to textiles. It first began investigating enzymes through the food industry, and then
struggled for some time to find an alternate non-infringing route to manufacture at industrial scale
Koji enzymes, ordinarily available only from Japan. After considerable search and experimentation in
Bangalore, Biocon was able to prepare these enzymes by itself, the success launching a large line of
processes and products depending on this input. It also created new urgencies for platform
technologies that stabilized the conditions under which enzymes were manufactured and could act.
This resulted in the launch of it's patented (worldwide patent) for the Plafractor, a solid-state system.
Statins, an off-patent biological therapeutic were an attractive segment to manufacture in.
Given that almost 7 of the world's top 20 best-selling drugs are fermentation -based, it allows
industrial companies such as Biocon, originating from a non-pharmaceutical route, with expertise in
enzyme manufacture and fermentation, to enter and gain market share in the pharmaceutical industry
through its process development and manufacturing capabilities. The company itself did not directly
gain from the policy push of the 1960s and 1970s for pharmaceutical companies, even if it did benefit
from the scientists, engineers and doctors available. Biocon however demonstrated that a company
could advance without direct policy inputs if it were to invest in its own in-house R&D to find non-
infringing ways to the same goal and take advantage of certain elements of the selection environment,
such as opportunities in generic drugs. However, in recent years it has also benefited from interaction
with universities and with other companies in the biopharmaceutical arena (which have themselves
benefited from public research institutes) such as Shanta Biotech." Biocon has now taken on the
mantle of public policy champion and is helping direct the biotechnology policies of the government
of Karnataka and the national government.
31 The two companies have entered in to an agreement to produce human insulin.
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Table 6.4.1 Industrial entry points into biopharmaceuticals
Product type Product names Details
Fermentation-based Statins (Lovastatin, lipid-lowering agents
therapeutics Simvastatin, Pravastatin,
Atorvastatin)'
Synthetic Chemistry- LOLA, L-Ornithine L- treatment of acute and chronic liver diseases
based therapeutics Asparate (LOLA)
Etamsylate prophylaxis and control of hemorrhage from small blood
vessels
Biological extracts Hexpan - facilitate digestion and assimilation in the intestinal tract.
from the industrial
food sectors applied
to therapeutics
Biotag replacement therapy in pathological conditions in which the
concentration of bile acids in upper intestine is low
Pepsin digestive aid.
Trypsin-Chymotrypsin debriding agent, anti-inflammatory agent
Papain breaking down proteins.
Source: Adapted by the author directly from company reports.
Biocon, as other Indian biopharmaceutical firms, was omnivorous in sourcing technology until they
developed the capability to make or develop it internally.
Table 6.4.2 Learning channels for Biocon
Entity name (date Entity type Source Type of learning
operations begun
at Biocon)
Papain (1978) Plant enzyme Technology Manufacture
extract transfer from then
co-founding
company, Biocon
Ireland
Isinglass (1978) Marine Technology Manufacture
hydrocolloid transfer from then
co-founding
company, Biocon
Ireland
Koji fermentation Enzyme In-house R&D Methods and machinery needed for this
products (1984) enzyme's manufacture not known.
Developed own small-scale
manufacturing processes in less than 3
years through R&D, beginning with
microbial strain selection, development,
plant design and fabrication.
Proprietary Fermentation- In-house R&D
"Plafractor" based solid state
technology, US surface
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patent 2000 manufacturing
technology 
_ _
Fermentation- In-house R&D
based submerged
manufacturing
I technology
Source: adapted by author from company reports and interview materials
The table below shows the business evolution of the Biocon conglomerate, mirroring its technological
learning path. It has evolved from enzyme and fermentation manufacture and marketing, to producing
generics, which are developed through a proprietary process technology, thus giving them significant
leverage in patenting and product differentiation through control of the generic drug's attributes. In
addition, the company has an "easy" source of revenue through contract R&D and manufacturing on
multiple domains" enzymes, fermentation and generic drugs manufacture, more recently. It has also
embarked on clinical studies for in-house drug development and as a contracted service to other
companies.
Business unit Function
Biocon India Fermentation, enzyme R&D and manufacture for
food and pharmaceutical industry
Contract pharmaceutical R&D
Syngene Contract pharmaceutical R&D
Helix Contract biopharmaceuticals
Clingene Longitudinal and genomics-based patient studies
in selected disease and population segments for
clinical trials and drug certification
(Both in-house and contract studies)
Source: adapted by author from company reports and interview
A form of "lateral" technological learning has taken place", with a clear pathway unique to the history
of the firm. Biocon's learning has not followed the tiered path of many Indian pharmaceutical firms
with an entry point in public health, in part because the company emerged from industrial, not health
applications and did not face the same regulatory framework. In recent years, as the move has been to
adapt in-house fermentation expertise to biopharmaceutical applications, Biocon has also begun to
face such criterion, but the company's capabilities have allowed it to target Tier 3 countries directly.
Two technology sub-areas, Solid State Fermentation (SSF) and Submerged Fermentation (SMF), in
the company's repertoire came together in a variety of lateral ways to create their solid-state
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fermentation patented technology. Importantly, SSF was the entry technology into enzyme research
for industrial applications as well as in therapeutics in an attempt to manufacture Lovastatin, while
SMF led in three directions-Lovastatin, Pravastatin and rDNA products. The entry points into different
product avenues also created new organizational entities and service functions such as Clingene and
Syngene as the company learnt laterally. Syngene created to deal with recombinant products, also
helped in the creation of Simvastatin, while Clinigene dealt with biomarkers of various types. In the
process, clinical trial capabilities were built in the larger Biocon family as well." Biocon underlines
the importance of the manufacturing-driven route to bio-pharmaceutical entry. Although the company
invested in its own R&D early in its growth, its strengths lay in its ability to develop the process and
scale-up and manufacture the substance. This ability in turn, led to the development of in-house
proprietary fermentation technologies and processes that have led to entry points in fermentation-
based biopharmaceuticals.
6.4.6 Case 5 "Learn while you Earn": Contract Research, High-throughput search
"(We view) CROs as a statistical way to encounter large volumes of
biological problems and obtain detailed domain knowledge which is
lacking in molecular biology. Genomics patterns are not ABCD
patterns. (We) need an eye and experience and domain knowledge,
the bottleneck is not enough molecular biologists." (Interview)
The previous examples of learning dealt primarily with in-house search and experimentation driven by
the company's own research efforts. Interviews with Contract Research Organizations, (CROs),
however, show complementary paths to knowledge acquisition of new technologies, new applications,
new geographic markets and new alliances."
Both pharmaceutical and biotech firms have chosen a common pathway to develop multidisciplinary
detailed domain knowledge-CROs, in biopharmaceuticals. While Indian companies have shown
superiority in multiple segments of the pharmaceutical world such as computation, manufacturing,
contract R&D, they make attractive partners even with unresolved intellectual property regime
changes." Thus, companies that can do multiple such tasks combined are more likely to pull ahead in
their learning process because the gains are multiplicative, not additive, it appears.
33 Source: Kiran Mazumdar, CEO Biocon, in interview.
3 In the case of Biocon, we saw the ways in which contract research and clinical studies wings arose from lateral
paths of technological exploration. Here we investigate the actual learning pathway within the CRO.
35 Interviewed firms spend considerable time ironing out the IP aspects of their agreements with clients and use it
as a means to build their own IP-base, as later discussed.
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The intellectual property and proprietary technology aims are negotiated over a period of time. Both
older pharmaceutical and younger biopharmaceutical firms have chosen this mechanism to attract
large international firms to do business with them. To do this, the firms need to demonstrate that they
are not simply good service partners. The irony is that despite the potential (but rarely realized)
conflicts of intellectual property if the Indian firm has an in-house R&D division of its own, these
firms are sought after as they have "signaled" to international firms their ability to conduct high-
caliber R&D themselves. One interviewee highlighted a business strategy in terms of learning to
consolidate their proprietary base over time: "First three years, we plan a simple services model,
assign IP to client, later we negotiate IP, and later, develop IP ourselves. 2005 makes no difference,
its only perception."(Interview)
A host of Indian private and public firms and laboratories are now taking on the services function as
part of the earning while learning process.
International alliances
Company/PRI International alliance Nature of alliance
Dr. Reddy's Laboratory Novo Nodirsk (largest DRL's new molecule for insulin-resistant
insulin manufacturer diabetes has been licensed to NN.
worldwide)
Ranbaxy Pfizer Licensed a new drug molecule for benign
prostatitis
Indian Institute of SmithKline Beecham High throughput screening services for
Chemical Technology drug molecules
Process development of a new molecule
Cytomed
National Chemical Lab DuPont Process development of a new molecule
Bangalore Genei AstraZeneca Endonuclease supply
Nicholas Piramal Hoechst Marion Roussel Contract research
Wockhardt Sidmark Labs Sourcing and global marketing
Cheminor Drugs PRI Inc. Contract manufacturing and global
marketing
NATCO Pharma Mallinkrodt Contract research for drug development
Glaxo India Affymax Combinatorial chemistry for drug design
Source: Bowonder, 2003.
For such companies, the multi-pronged approach serves a variety of needs: First, the company gains a
steady stream of revenues to grow. Second, the company is able to signal to both Indian and foreign
companies alike that their in-house R&D function is of a certain quality.36 Third, the company
36 Some firms had limited in-house R&D functions and chose instead to be predominantly contract
manufacturers, as opposed to contract researchers. While the manufacturing also required some R&D functions,
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develops an array {N} of clients, each of which provides a distinctive block of problem solving {bi} in
R&D to the CRO.
As one interviewee stated succinctly,
"To build relationships, you can only do this as a services company.
There is a lot of learning in each relationship" (Interview, June 2 5 'h
2002)
The schematic below draws on interviews and
Problem
block bi
:s the pathway of learning.
The firms first interact with each client on a purely individual basis with a well-defined set of IP
restrictions in place. The client out-sources a specific problem block {bi}, which in many cases is
poorly defined and/or has exploratory elements, the outcomes of which are obscure. In some cases the
technological learning process coincides with repeated articulation and discussion with the client about
how the block should be defined (the client is not always able to suggest the exact parameters to
investigate). Next, the CRO takes on the block (or subset) after considerable investment of time on
defining the boundaries of the problem where possible. Third, a search is conducted of all relevant
materials in the public domain that can be used (including patent filings) for the problem at hand.3 7
Fourth, laboratory-based and/or in silico (computational) problem solving occurs. Discussions go back
the production tended to be relegated to certain well established and non-controversial (in terms of IP) areas such
as generic drug manufacture or enzyme manufacture for the incumbent (and patent holder) itself.
37 In some cases, this was done at the outset of problem definition/negotiation because the CRO had expertise in
this area. Interviewees who had diabetes or oncology-related specializations often found they knew as much (if
not more) in some problem segments, which has led to new niche areas being carved out as part of their business
plan.
180
bn
and forth with the client at all later stages until the outsourced problem is solved. Subsequently, with
multiple clients, the process is repeated for different problem blocks {bi}.
However, where the greatest learning takes place relative to the firm's own R&D function is in dealing
with multiple clients. First, with each client, the CRO has to estimate how important the problem is to
the client to estimate how important its own capabilities in this sphere are on the world stage. It is
predominantly in relation to its client that the CRO recognizes its true worth and what segments of
expertise it should consider enlarging within its own in-house R&D effort. Second, the CRO must
estimate and define the related problem blocks that it is not being invited to work on and which
parameters of domain knowledge it is being excluded from. This requires not simply good business
sense. To know what it is missing requires the CRO to be technologically fairly sophisticated to define
the set of possibilities within which it is operating. Third, by combining multiple such interactions,
while preserving IP integrity, the CRO also learns the dominant areas of opportunity, technological
challenge and where its own in-house R&D function is lacking (or excelling).
An important industry-wise element to this individual learning trajectory is that CROs are gradually
developing local clients, where many firms previously conducted all functions in-house."
One company in cell-based therapies and with extensive links to large hospitals and clinicians searches
for public domain knowledge opportunities and buys, rather than make at home. However, some level
of expertise is still needed to recognize the opportunities and partner with hospitals for data analysis.
Learning paths tend to be similar in some respects in the CRO model, and competition is increasing.
The company stated, "We give extension to the patent-mostly lots of trademarks. A progression of
skills is happening. The only thing that brings in revenues is a good patent position. Buy rather than
build, you can get cheap IP, good bargains. The biggest competition is local competition, our
competitive advantage is the same as theirs".
6.4.7 Case 6: Diversification: a company as a function of its environment
Firm 6 is a large company with a US and Indian base. It began in an entirely unrelated industry and
then diversified successfully multiple times, growing in size, and has since moved into
38 One interviewee stated "Producing materials and contract research (is useful). It does help to do R&D
yourself VC money also keeps burn-rate lower and CROs keep this model healthy." Another stated: "In
combinatorial chemistry, India companies do not have the libraries of compounds like big pharmaceutical
companies abroad. Thus, some smaller Indian companies are providing specialized chemistry, and especially
combinatorial chemistry expertise to others. This service/CRO model allows rapid development time-lines. A
network of like-minded companies in Bangalore is now emerging, where each needs the other and using local
expertise is slowly becoming cheaper and more reliable to use than past foreign contacts." (Interview)
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biopharmaceuticals. Their story is one of acquisition of capabilities from the local skill-base of
chemistry and bioinformatics and they concentrate on services for process R&D, informatics and
medicinal chemistry. More recently, they also provide services for various stages of pre-clinical and
clinical trials. Company 6 has acquired both in silico capability and are constructing wet labs. Their
competitive advantage is recognized by their executives and R&D personnel alike, as being within
rapid scale-up and high levels of financial investments relative to the rest of the industry. "Even Merck
doesn 't work on 5-10 targets simultaneously "." They are able to do this because the diversified model
allows them to channel money rapidly into promising areas. They are also extremely capable of
accessing chemistry and life sciences knowledge rapidly from key contacts in the R&D laboratories of
leading public research institutes.
Their knowledge-acquisition mode for services is built on a multiplicative factor of having multiple
sources of capability in chemistry, biology, computing, combined with rapid scale-up of searches for
drug discovery and development. In addition, their process R&D services comprise work on both
intermediates and fine chemicals, catalyst design and development and process development for chiral
drugs. Their learning process has been triggered by the search for appropriate skill resources. They
have since employed a senior scientist formerly of a PRI, with a strong track record of
accomplishments.
"In a contract research organization, you don't know what contracts you will get ... .so you need
breadth ".. "The technology bottlenecks are the identification of targets, validation of targets and
number of hits. But this is hard, and one in India can do this." The increase in target protein patenting
has limited the options of Indian firms and so joint ventures and licensing are the possible options.
However, licensing can be prohibitively expensive and joint ventures can share their validated target
proteins as part of the outsourced capability, making this a revenues plus IP sharing model, and thus
attractive. They see their scale of operations as different from US CROs in two major respects. First,
they depend on the scalability of skilled manpower, but who do need additional training, which they
accomplish in-house in sophisticated laboratories. Second, they guarantee that their quality is the best,
not just above average. For example, curation is a complex process with a number of reactions. One
needs not just an informational database which many CROs can accomplish, but also the ability to put
the date into an appropriate form i.e. Knowledge is critical. One needs at least four elements: (a)
39 Whether this is true or not, the author cannot say, but it is sufficient information that Company D is deemed to
be an attractive partner to a variety of major foreign firms.
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ability to acquire data (b) create a simulation model (c) knowing the number of possible algorithms to
try to hunt for possible candidates and (d) understanding the constraints and parameter of the search.
In addition, they need to train manpower across degrees and in depth to conduct studies for lead
generation and lead optimization. These workers need motivation and a level of innovation in their
searches.
"The problem is with biology screens, protein-based assays or cell-based assays. As yet, in vitro
screens are a problem, but Indian scientists in the US have this capability, while we have in vivo
capabilities" Company 6 sees it "just as a matter of time" before it finds some promising drug
molecules for its clients. They are strong enough just on the chemistry side to make investments in
biological tools less urgent. Company 6 indicates that it is a function of its chemistry environment and
past. "We can't pick projects and future capability at random. A company sits in its environment. It
can then expand into specific areas that complement these capabilities. The gaps between the US and
us are increasing, not decreasing, in the biological sciences. However, in informatics and chemistry,
this is not so steep. In informatics, India is pulling ahead or is already ahead. In chemistry, there is
not much difference."
It appears that the joint venture/shared IP model is attractive because the proof of concept is
established and there are new targets in the public domain, which have not yet come to market. These
present possibilities as do candidates that are in Phase III. Phase II drugs can sometimes show
additional beneficial properties at that stage of testing.
6.5 Learning and innovation: where the search space is constrained
Firms have learnt "by doing" slightly differently (through mild product differentiation) each time.
Furthermore, every time they speed up, scale up or manufacture for new customers, production
parameters change and force firms to learn anew. Although the technologies are not necessarily at the
vanguard of the field, they have stimulated considerable learning at firm level. As was the case in
pharmaceuticals, here too, companies outside the leading few are distinctive. For example, Krebs
Biochemicals, with approximately 650 employees, is ranked in the top 10 firms worldwide for the
manufacture of Ephedrine and Pseudophedrine HCL/Sulphate using fermentation technology, partners
with and supplies to other large companies such as Glaxo, Johnson and Johnson, Parke Davis, Pfizer,
Ranbaxy, Lupin and Wockhardt, exports 50-60% of its total production to 30 countries, including Tier
3 countries such as Germany and the US. While its R&D investments as a percentage of sales are 1%.
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It has now invested manufacturing efforts into the production of Pravastatin and is attempting to move
40into more complex drug segments .
6.5.1 Technological and market uncertainties: Why learning by proving isn't as easy
In generics, biopharmaceuticals face some challenges that synthetic pharmaceuticals do not. The table
below shows the primary differences between the two forms of manufacture. Bio-generics regulations
are still being drafted in both the US and in Europe. Indian patent law is simultaneously witnessing
reform in biological substances. Firms face manufacturing challenges scaling up active
biopharmaceutical ingredients for bulk manufacture, uncertainties in the regulatory process, and large
investments to show bio-equivalence.
Pharmaceutical Generic Drugs (Generics/Multi-
Source Pharmaceuticals)
I. Essentially similar to original product
whose patent has expired and contain the
same active substance
2. Face a simplified approval process
(ANDAs)
3. Face little advertising and use a generic
as opposed to brand name
4. Compete with low prices/high volume
(unless first to market or with
exclusivity period)
5. Market size worldwide approx.
US$380billion
Biotechnologically Produced Generic Drugs
("Bio-Generics")
I. Essentially similar to original product
whose patent has expired and contain the
same active substance
2. Face a simplified approval process
(ANDAs)
3. Face little advertising and use a generic as
opposed to brand name
4. Compete with low prices/high volume
(unless first to market or with exclusivity
period)
5. Market size worldwide approx. US$20
billion
6. Products potentially open to generic
competition: erythropoietin, alpha
interferon, hepatitis B vaccine, human
growth hormone, insulin etc.
7. Large biogenerics firms outside India.
Biggest obstacles:
(a) ABPIs (Active biopharmaceutical
ingredients) in bulk which do not
violate patents
(b) Lack of a clear regulatory
framework
(c) Expensive demonstration of
bioequivalence, which is highly
species-specific, among others.
(d) Unclear product liability.
40 Biospectrum, Vol 1, Issue 7, September 2003, p. 10, India,
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6.5.2 Niche research: the legacy of secluded competition and local relevance
Niches do not have to be small in scope. The combination of local demand, and local skills, assure
Indian companies significant markets in certain areas and arise from past investments in certain types
of education, particular types of R&D infrastructure and the historical trajectory of pharmaceutical and
other industrial firms.
"India has a strong chemistry base, similar to that of Germany, as
well as capabilities within public research institutes. Our skills are
in organic chemistry and natural product chemistry (such as
flavonoids etc from sandalwood oil, for example"
(Interview, June 12th 2002)
As in pharmaceutical research, the desire to apply older technologies to pressing local problems was
expressed by one interviewee:
" We don't need tissue engineering or other more sophisticated
technologies. We don't need many high-tech products to copy the
US. We need basic things here. For example, water purification
systems using rDNA technology, now that's what we need."
(Interview, June 12* 2002)
At the same time, the haziness of the regulatory options, the relative lack of locally patented tools, the
cost of drug discovery and development work and the country's previous pharmaceutical history have
led Indian firms to certain spaces of learning where, for instance, (a) proof of concept is well
developed (b) where market opportunities have been created by the absence of big companies (c)
traditional medicines and population-specific diseases present opportunities (see Jayaraman, 2003) (d)
local applications are unavailable for existing products like diagnostic kits. A combination of
constrained supply of certain skills and financial resources, and an immense identifiable demand in
certain therapeutic areas has led to locally relevant and locally supplied niche technological foci.
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Table 6.5.1 Local demand, local resources: niche research
AIDS diagnostic kits Need locally usable, easily testable kits. Peptide-based kits now
available.
Alternative cultures for rabies Local research trajectories specific to resources available. Some
scientists expressed concern that India had developed a nerve-
tissue vaccine for rabies where the virus was isolated from the
sheep's brain, while most other countries seem to use cell culture
vaccines.
Antibiotics Bacterial culture strains for antibiotics: Many existing strains
such as streptomyces are developed from soil samples Other
strains of bacteria are found more commonly and can be
developed from less materials.
Furthermore, many big pharmaceutical companies are pulling out
because of alleged non-viability for resistant strains.
Additionally, many pharmaceutical companies worldwide have
been unable to meet the purity specifications of their USFDA-
inspected plants.
Diagnostic kits for local needs, some of Many existing kits worldwide are for diseases with little
which have worldwide demand relevance to the tropics and to India. Some Indian firms have
been able to make kits for neurosircosyrhossis (tapeworm
induced), which are cerebro-spinal fluid based for antigens
against this organism. Also PCR-based kits for shrimp virus.
Drugs for illnesses easily studied in large Diabetes type II, for example. Also, Indian population
Indian populations taxonomies for pancreatisis in Kerala, for example, allow linking
of genetic features is closely-knit communities with large
population samples.
New TB regimens Search for non-DOTS strategies, i.e. less strict-regimens for
administration of the drug.
Non-allopathic drugs (herbal, Ayurvedic A long tradition of Indian medicine is now being clinically
traditional medicines) investigated and taxonomies are being created with potential
therapeutic values.4
Phage therapies Antibiotics research and success crowded out this field from the
1940s onward Few other companies are pursuing this now.
Tested in India in the 1800s, being re-visited. Being used for
burns, where in India people often die of the infection, not the
burns themselves.
Reagents of dual/triple track purity Allows for different end-customers and price ranges, plus
provide custom oligo-nucleotides, custom antibodies, sequencing
services and PCR-based diagnostics for example, and provide a
host of services to local companies, which foreign firms will not
do. They also act as a test centre themselves, so viruses do not
need to be transferred to other facilities.
41 "More than 70% of the population looks to traditional medicine, not allopathic drugs...Judging efficacy and
validation by morn methods, standardization, fingerprinting could lead to an active formulation of a drug."
(Interview, June 14 2002)
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Over the past 5 years, the Technology Development Board of the Government has also created a
reinforcing cycle by funding a variety of locally needed therapeutics and diagnostics, ranging from the
production of amino Butanol as an intermediate for tuberculosis treatments (as an input for the
production of Ethambutol Hydrochloride), production of antibiotics such as Cefixime, an orally active
Cephalosporins, Hepatitis B vaccine development, and the development of the pediatric version of the
recombinant Hepatitis B vaccine. The Board also funded cardiovascular drug development.42
It remains to be seen whether Indian firms will be able to consolidate positions over a broader set of
technologies. They certainly lack the revenue streams and depth of public (and VC) funding available
to US companies.43 The primary constraint is not the ability to conduct search and experimentation in
segments of the field that are being pursued in the US or other advanced, but the historical path that
rewards firms (up to some point of saturation) to continue in past segments. The promise lies in the
possibility that some of these "niches" are amenable to worldwide breakthrough such as diabetes
studies, phage therapy or even systematically studied treatments originating from local traditions.
6.6 Stepping back into the process: The State and public domain
innovation
"Government is now a driver again." (Interview)
A common critique of Indian pharmaceutical firms was that they have stagnated technologically, with
only a few making substantial strides in innovative new products. Most had been seen as arising out of
a "trading" and not "entrepreneurial" mentality, and with little appreciation for the science or
technology behind the drug, mature or otherwise. This had been compounded by the unavoidable fact
that drug discovery was an expensive, uncertain business, and most Indian companies simply lacked
the resources to make substantial inroads into this process. Those that could appear to now be
investing a rising percentages of sales revenues in R&D (with approximately 6-7% being the highest
thus far in 2003).
Because of the shift in the life-science base of therapeutics, with the onset of molecular, cell biology
and genetics, different learning strategies had been forced on Indian firms. Firstly, they now required a
much greater appreciation of how to weave industrial and scientific interest more closely, a difficult
undertaking for older firms built on a trading model. The requirement was to now straddle the interests
42 "Technology board disburses Rs 30 crores for 20 projects", The Indian Express, April 20th 1998.
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of multiple educational institutions, research institutes, and commercial entities such as firms, all
supposedly with an interest in the same core technologies. Secondly, it required a learning situated
around commercialization itself, no longer a process of trade, but of transfer of knowledge flowing
across multiple institutions of learning. It also required the creation of new ones, such as intellectual
property cells, licensing officers, legal knowledge, venture capital firms and policy mechanisms that
encompass all of these.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, public research institutes such as the Central Drug research Institute
(CDRI) and the Indian Institute for Chemical Technology (IICT) were known for significant advances
in new drug routes, despite the pressures to privatize. CDRI has developed a one-a-week contraceptive
pill (Saheli), the only non-steroidal contraceptive pill worldwide as well as its Memory Plus TM and
Vincristine (from Ayurvedic traditions). The Indian Institute of Science researchers have developed a
male injectable contraceptive vaccine, which shows some promise. The National Institute of
Immunology has made advances in contraception using extracts from the Neem tree and has created a
second vaccine contraceptive, using HCG a human hormone, and is now undergoing clinical tests.
As previous sections highlighted, Indian public efforts in biotechnologies were initiated relatively
quickly after the first commercialization of the industry in the US. However, its pharmaceutical
industry trajectory was not easily replicated with the new role for biology-based models and the multi-
disciplinary challenges facing scientists. Furthermore, the crisis facing Indian science and technology
related in part to differing perceptions on the role of the public sector, specifically its research and
commercialization functions. Some viewed the State as crowding out private research, while others
viewed private companies as incapable of undertaking cutting-edge research. Yet others suggested that
the R&D focus should be in areas with local relevance for the masses, not in treating "urban diseases
of the West". However, where most public and private sector interviewees converge is in the
interpretation of US biotech history and the under-appreciated role of public domain research and
funding in propelling US companies forward." One statement captured the challenges facing Indian
companies in their self-assessments of skills and their acculturation (and awe) that Western private
firms appear to be able to accomplish so much: "US companies didn't have cutting edge research.
43 One enthusiastic interviewee said: "What you are seeing now in Bangalore is Genentech early on; with
companies looking for new products to India, but also to the world.... We have the historicalfortune of now
having a corpus of like-minded people".
44 Only a small sub-segment of interviews suggested other views. Furthermore, even where the public role of the
US was critiqued, it was in the context of inefficiencies with the public funding distribution and evaluation of
returns of agencies such as the U.S. National Institutes of Health.
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Human insulin work camefrom licensing through City of Hope research. We are made to believe that
corporate scientists have done this." (Interview) "The entire knowledge base of this industry is public
domain. The US story is one of slow development (of capabilities] and absorption capabilities of
companies " (Interview, July 5th 2002). It also suggests that a re-reading of innovation history from
western examples may be useful. As one scientist said, "There is a lack of understanding (in industry)
of US history and a lack of understanding of science itself and its applications ". (Interview, June 14*
2002).
Other examples of public sector undertaking (and less publicized) are companies like the National
Dairy Development Board which is now working with Indian Immunologicals Limited (Hyderabad)
for a foot and mouth vaccine in cattle and has since diversified into human biologicals, and the Indian
Institute of microbial Technology (Chandigarh) which is working on live recombinant DNA vaccines
for cholera and rabies. At the same time, the Centre for Diagnostic Fingerprinting (Hyderabad) has a
worldwide distinction as one of the few to have developed a genetic process for overproducing
plasmid DNA and the Indian Institute of Science also was able to bring down the cost and dependence
on imports for plasmid DNA. Preliminary data suggests that firms have been seeking out public
research collaborations, thus pointing to a possible avenue for research on policy options.45 One
potentially significant area of increased governmental activity is in funding exploratory work, which it
already does in modest amounts. Companies spoke about how the search parameters in
biopharmaceuticals are constrained by lack of funds.
45 This is consistent with findings in Ramani (2002), which highlights that their number of collaborations with
PRIs is greater in their sample. However, their sample implied that Indian firms initiated more collaboration with
foreigners than with Indian research centres. This is consistent with my findings, since the export-push period
has been. formative in teaching Indian firms how to negotiate, and build intellectual property in-house as well as
through collaborative work. However, Ramani (2002) suggests (but does not show significance) that R&D
expenditure may be inversely related to size of the firm. Redwood (1994) and Lanjouw (1998) suggest that tacit
knowledge in the engineering field may prevent companies publishing or patenting, particularly when
considering the cumbersome patenting system in the country.
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6.7 Science and business: new interactions for old players
Indian industry-wide advances have arisen in part from gains in diverse, but related skill segments.4 6
The role of public information and knowledge and the ways in which they can be utilized to push an
entire economy forward, is made richer by this section that describes tensions between science and
business in India. While these tensions have always existed in the pharmaceutical industry, the fast-
paced, science-based approach to biopharmaceuticals has made problems more visible.
The mixing of public domain and private research capabilities has brought a host of complications and
anxieties to the fore. First, the concerns that low-cost work will drive the economy, second, the
stagnation in commercialization capabilities has perhaps never become as evident and necessary as in
biopharmaceuticals. One problem has been the difficulty in chemistry-trained scientists and engineers
in the private sector from embracing "new" biology tools and models of therapeutics47 .Another has
been the difficulty in initiating and sustaining conversations between public and private sector
researchers, particularly within whose responsibility the proof of concept lies. Universities such as the
Indian Institute of Science have tried to innovate institutionally by allowing professors to spin off
companies and creating industry research consortia on campus. However, problems have arisen since
the 1980s of proof of concept, scaling up and compatibility to real-world conditions. "When the
diagnostic kit was sent to 4 Mumbai hospitals, they said, "it doesn't work". The capabilities within the
hospital were bleak (but even so) we have a lab to end-use gap. We need to be able to move from
"milliliters" to "drops", move from "distilled water" to "tap water": (Interview)
As one statement typified the difficulties pharmaceutical firms had in embracing newer tools after the
1980s: ""In the 1990s there was a lot ofpressure in parliament from international hype in the
biomedical area, to push to develop diagnostics-antibody or DNA. About a dozen diagnostics came
out, zero came to market. On the one hand, scientists did not know what makes it work in the field and
on the other, companies had problems. Family-based pharma companies were only capable ofputting
a wrapper on a product and selling it. Towards the end of the 1990s, [there was] a sea change and
46 "With an analogy to computer science, we have speed ofprogrammers, quality ofprogrammers and number of
contracts. India is good at all of these things more than all other countries and all of this is in one country.
Therefore, even if they work with the US or other companies, they foster each other's capabilities because they
need them. Thus, each epsilon improves and cumulatively combines to produce a big delta. So delta doesn't
depend on only domain expertise in molecular biology, genetic etc, but also on domain expertise in other areas."
(Interviewee)
47 Those companies begun by academic scientists trained in the life sciences have not faced this problem.
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there is a learning period of working together. In the last 5 years a big change has occurred and a
newer class of entrepreneurs in Hyderabad, engineers or scientists, including life sciences, working
abroad, then came back and started companies. "' There now appear to be more people in industry
who grasp the fundamentals of science, and more scientists who choose to become entrepreneurial. A
cultural change providing increased prestige for industry work, previously awarded to academics, is
gradually taking place.
Although faced with considerable problem-solving challenges in the discovery and development phase
(particularly the latter), a variety of companies highlighted the role as centres of excellence that public
domain research bodies should strive for, not all of which are easily reconcilable. "Basic research is
vital for product development".... "We do too much in-house. CDRP" should be doing something
cutting-edge and pass it on." Money should go into fundamental research and academia rather than
a biotech fund; Science in PRIS should also look to scale up their own technologies......""Unless we
have one academic centre of excellence and motivate professors to start companies, we won'tfind
small dedicated biotech firms, because they are not parented well by big pharma. "Government
should be funding pure science and global excellence, a laissez-faire model ". "Basic science is
needed."
A critique of academic scientists that emerged from both academics and industrialists during
interviews was the view that academia is a low risk profession and that Indian academia tends to do
reconfirmation findings, or minor permutations on known problem areas. While industry forces a
certain frequency of problem solving challenges, academics can avoid this by simply switching to
another research area and may never have to actually solve a technical problem that creates a
procedural bottleneck. The tensions are highlighted in the annoyance of the private sector that
academics should be interested in money at all, and the perception by many scientists in public
research that industrialists know nothing of science. " We have the best biophysics people in the
country, but they want money for what is given away almost free in the US. There is no accountability
in Indian academia, no products out, no rigorous peer review and they are not forced to test ideas."
(Interview, July 11, 2002)
48 Another interviewee described the fundamental challenges to moving into drug discovery in
biopharmaceuticals: "It is hard to do drug discovery because (a) there is no synergy between academia and
industry. Start-ups are very sparsely populated. (2) Capital intensive (3) Lack of high-quality academics in
biology. Indian academia is good at hands on skills, but we are followers not leaders in conceptualizing areas
and we have no management of science with connection to technology."
49 Central Drug Research Institute
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What changed, however, were the nature of links between public and private sectors. Crisis-driven
change here has meant that both have been forced closer together, the public because of resource
constraints and a need to prove that demand exists, the private because they are not bastions of the
science, or the infrastructure to discover. However, their conversation has been muffled, incoherent
and frustrated at the best of times, and simply non-existent or furious, at the worst. Crisis-driven
change has occurred not because of the Indian liberalization alone, but because Indian firms already
established and export-driven, were facing challenges on new fronts, particularly the patent regime
change and pressures of new regulatory markets. While the latter could mostly be dealt with in the
company alone, the push to create new products, or greater product differentiation required dipping
into the public research till again. PRIs faced new challenges since some were born and driven by
chemistry-including biochemistry, while others were looking at whole-organism derived analysis. In
addition, PRIs were pushed to find ways to create locally needed drugs. Furthermore, Hyderabad and
other-manufacturing company sites were becoming centres of considerable riches made from mature
product line manufacturing.
Another, more fundamental problem is arising on the continuing dependence on tools of analysis,
many of which are now patented by US companies and must be licensed. This is exacerbated by
curricular limitations in India, where inter-disciplinary work rarely exists or is rewarded and tools and
products thus appear to be more difficult to generate.50 5 ' For instance, process technologies such as
conjugation, reagents and micro arrays are all patented and act as input technologies for vaccine
development.
50 There is limited interview data to resolve this latter issue. Certainly an interesting and relatively
straightforward future area of research is the classification of innovations arising from India and other
developing countries a function of disciplinary backgrounds of the team members and contrasting this with, say,
the US.
51 One interviewee described the process: "The gap is widening. I see a technology lag to the US benchmark.
Public domain knowledge is available from the US to India but there are no interdisciplinary programs here. We
have computer science, but no biomedical engineering or tissue engineering. We need this! These are criticalfor
'black box technologies i.e. for transferring basic knowledge to commercialised products. For example, making
a DNA sequence is a sealed box. Also, scientific and technological changes are causing a sea change in organic
chemistry. Thus, in five years, our entire medical technology will depend on US products unless we begin basic
engineering degrees and build to fields such as biomedical engineering. We also need national-level
accreditation boards for good courses" (Interview, June 12' 2002)
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6.8 The changing selection environment
In the last several years several environmental factors have continued to change. The Drug Policy of
1978 was subsequently modified to the Drug Policy of 1986 and changed again in 1994 taking account
of new Indian obligations under the WTO agreements, among others. Overall. Since complete
economy-wide liberalization in 1991, industrial licensing for drug manufacture has been abolished
except for those bulk drugs manufactured using recombinant DNA technologies, those bulk drugs
requiring in-vivo use of nucleic acids, and formulations targeting specific cell and tissues. The same
applies to Foreign Technology Agreements for recombinant DNA technology-produced bulk drugs.
Pressures on manufacturers of older segments has increased following the GOI approval for allowing
free imports of 5 important bulk drugs such as those for Vitamin B 1 and Tetracyclin.
There has also been a denial of permission for exporting new molecules (such as Viagra), which have
not yet been clinically tested and cleared by the Drug Authority of India. This particularly affects
Indian companies whose main business was to imitate new formulations. There has also been a
transfer of some therapies to Over-the-Counter (OTC) status, which reduces their profitability.
Moreover, the remaining 5 drugs reserved for manufacture by the public sector was abolished in 1999,
and almost simultaneously, in 2000, FDI through automatic approval was raised from 51% to 74% and
eventually 100%. Public sector units are being privatized, including flagship enterprises such as
Hindustan Antibiotics and IDPL. A new patents bill was introduced in parliament as well as further
incentives for expenditure on in-house R&D. There have been revisions on price controls, with 4 price
decontrol exercises in three months of 1999 alone by Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority. Finally, in
sweeping changes to price control rules, a large number of drugs have been taken off the controlled
categories and ceilings on profits raised in these and other segments of drugs.
An important additional institution, still being implemented, is that of health insurance. Over 80% of
the Indian population remains without access to health insurance. Besides Central Government and
some State schemes, the main providers of health insurance are relatively small non-governmental
organization and co-operative insurance mechanisms, but which have a large potential for growth.
The rapid growth of health insurance in the country is likely to have far-reaching effects on the
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industry and it is no surprise that some companies have been
diversifying into this sector and stepping-up educational efforts on the principles of insurance.
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The importance of public science to the evolution of the biotech sector in the US where the field has
progressed the most is born out in numerous studies, but its particular dependence on public science
relative to other industries is also important. (McMillan, Narin and Deeds, 2000). In the Indian case,
the State has acted predominantly as customer, supplier and to a lesser extent, competitor. But broader,
public domain research organizations (universities and public research institutes alike) have acted as a
conduit for key technologies and as a negotiator at international level on behalf of its firms. In recent
years, it has had an incubatory role, assisting small biotech firms". Its primary strength (and
weakness) has arisen in the domain of setting a socio-political vision of public health (even if only
partially fulfilled), rules by which firms emerge, grow and encounter one another (including the
policies of price regulation and licensing), and delineating the scope and scale of the marketplace
(including intellectual property regimes and anti-monopolistic laws). In the export-phase, the role of
the State has been relatively reticent compared to the first phase. Here, foreign determinants of health
and safety regulations have largely shaped the innovation by Indian firms, and have been
supplemented by international agencies acting as customers.
In all, findings suggest that in the key early phases of the industry growth, the source of innovation for
manufacturing companies has been less in the interaction with suppliers (except when it was the
State), not through downstream users (except in the case of exporting to tiered regulatory conditions or
international public procurement). The central source of innovation has been the manufacturer itself
combined with its links to public research institutes in the country. More recently, with
biopharmaceuticals, companies and public domain research have been driven closer together, both in
India and with foreign institutes. It remains to be tested whether Indian national publications and
patents demonstrate a strong geographic self-similarity and dependence, i.e. cite national science
(such as indicated by Narin and Olivastro, 1992 and others). However, it is clear that an attempt was
made by the State apparatus-including departments of S&T, public research institutes and some
universities-to develop locally-relevant technologies and products and modify existing mature
instrumentation and analysis tools to be suitable for local R&D. In the case of Biocon and others such
as Krebs, the products such as enzymes are intermediate goods and are used across sectors. Some
innovation does indeed occur by interacting with the user, but the major breakthroughs appear to have
driven by in-house R&D combined with PRIs. This story that demand conditions did not uniquely
5 Examples of firms that have been assisted in the Bangalore-Hyderabad region are: Xcyton (National Institutes
of Mental Health and Neurosciences, NIMHANS), Avesthagen (assisted by NCBS site facilities and the
University of Agricultural Sciences), Shantha Biotech (Osmania University and CCMB), Genotypic Technology
(IISc and University of Madhurai. Also equipment from the Centre for Biotechnology, Delhi),
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determine the trajectory of firms as often described through users and through suppliers appears
common to some other stories abroad in the industry. In particular, the role of search in a space of
scarcity (the supply side) warrants future study."
The two cities where most interviews were conducted have also competed with each other to develop
bases for innovation and high technology. Nevertheless, as local capabilities develop, cross-city
alliances are also being forged. There is some evidence of increased collaboration of companies and
scientists across the boundaries. Some companies have more than one location in the two cities, others
interact with scientists in the other city."
6.9 Summary:
Biopharmaceuticals has shown a different trajectory of learning than that of synthetic pharmaceuticals.
The advances worldwide are relatively new, yet certain categories of therapeutics are already mature,
such as human insulin and erythropoietin. However, here, because the substance is biologic in nature,
and not chemical, the variations by species are considerable, as are the conditions for holding a
process stable. Bioprocess engineering faces considerable challenges in scale up and manufacture. In
addition, the tacitness of the process is significant as are economic conditions for appropriation.
As for biopharmaceuticals, process expertise has become critical. The policy mix that assisted
pharmaceutical firms (public health entry points, process development capability, patent regime,
among others) has helped here too. However, a critical feature has been entry points of public health
for vaccines and diagnostic kits which has allowed windows of learning to an otherwise emerging set
of process technologies. The national and international procurement policies of WHO and UNICEF
have been equally important. In both cases, the role of the State as initiator of technology transfer,
creation and adaptation, has been systematic. In both the State and its public research apparatus has
been important in "jump starting" private sector capabilities on a large scale, either through direct
technology transfer and assisted commercialization, or indirectly, through infrastructure support or
research services. India's leading biotech firms have obtained key technologies from the State and
5 Novo Nordisk of Denmark), the world's largest producer of industrial enzymes and insulin, where innovation
was driven in large part by scarcity of pancreas, from pigs, to manufacture insulin, rather than the obvious
demand for insulin. Additionally, chemical companies also required pancreas since the trypsin enzyme used in
industrial processes was also derived from pancreas. Further, theory had it that insulin and enzymes could not be
obtained from the same pancreatic glands. Novo Nordisk, driven by pancreas scarcity, was forced to investigate
this further and eventually proved the theory wrong. (See Laursen, Keld, 1996).
5 Some older distinctions-that Bangalore was biology-based and Hyderabad chemistry-based, are slowly
breaking down, although old competitive urges to differentiate cities, prompted one Bangalore scientist to state,
Bangalore supplies the brains, Hyderabad the manufacturing capability!" (Interview, June 14h 2002)
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have since invested in upgrading or deepening these technology lines. Contract research services have
provided an additional window into cutting-edge research because they allow firms to encounter a
much higher number of biological system problems than possible to launch projects with their own
capital capabilities, and they allow in-house R&D activities and experimentation to complement
external search. Lastly, private and public infrastructure in clinical medicine-hospitals, clinics- and a
large domestic patient profile of distinct ethnic and disease profiles has allowed Indian
biopharmaceuticals to straddle a much broader set of capabilities from drug discovery to taxonomy-
building, clinical trials, drug development, manufacturing and sales.
However, there have been some important differences. While in pharmaceuticals, large firms have
dominated the innovation profile, in biopharmaceuticals; smaller firms have also entered in vaccine
development and in "bio-generics". The organizational forms have also varied with diversified
business groups and dedicated drug discovery firms at the two ends of the specialization spectrum.
State involvement has led the entry again, with Indian public research institutes initiating the
indigenisation of the newer technologies and some transfers of technology into the private domain.
Similar to pharmaceuticals again, private firms did not depend on the State alone. Some that had
access to capital (externally through banks and venture capitalists, or internally through manufacturing
revenues or service revenues) moved directly to drug discovery, or continue to work with a
combination of public domain institutes in India and abroad (such as public sector research labs and
universities).
From a technological standpoint, Indian biopharmaceutical firms face far greater market uncertainties
in the US and elsewhere. Bio-generics are neither well defined, nor face clear regulations. This lack of
market assurance has a large part to play in limiting Indian firms to niches with well-defined proof of
concept such as vaccines (Shanta Biotech, Bharat Biotech International Limited, Wockhardt),
antibiotics and exploratory potential therapies such as bacteriophages (Gangagen), again with public
health implications.
In the biopharmaceutical realm, the implications of the product life cycle are less clear. Certainly, the
prime innovations have arisen in the advanced industrialised countries and more mature segments are
being investigated in India-diagnostic kits, vaccines etc. However, again, a point of considerable
importance, that may lie closer to the suggestions of systems theories of innovation. What is being
developed in India also corresponds to (a) niche areas that have either been mostly ignored or
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jettisoned in the West, but have considerable import for the Indian population (bacteriophages, kits for
diseases and population groups specific to the tropics etc.) or (b) industrial restructuring or
convergence areas of expertise such as fermentation.
Overall, the number of total companies is small. An innovative segment is emerging which is
attempting to compete on scientific capability as well as the low costs of R&D. Industrial biotech
companies which have since entered drug production are also beginning to differentiate themselves
into niche production areas drawing on their past enzyme and fermentation expertise. The sector is too
young to draw any generalized conclusions about its future growth. However, the diversity in the
technological learning paths of the various companies illustrate that in both mature segments and in
emerging drug discovery and development opportunities, the existence of public domain technologies
or off-patent techniques does not necessarily make a specific technology or set of tools easy to acquire,
adapt or improve. It also suggests that certain niches develop because institutional competence
(research profiles in universities and public research institutes) tends to preserve past trajectories,
underlying the importance of tertiary educational investments and local relevance of therapeutics.
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Chapter 7 Synthesis and Conclusions
"It has been assumed here that learning takes place only as a by-product
of ordinary production. In fact, society has created institutions, education
and research, whose purpose it is to enable learning to take place more
rapidly. A fuller model would take account of these additional variables."
(Arrow, 1962)
[It is desirable that we]" do not treat learning as somehow an inevitable
and uninfluenceable consequence of doing. Rather, learning is viewed
more actively, and it is apparent that resources can be applied to
learning." (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p.258)
7.1 Introduction-Technological learning as shaped by selection environments
The analytical focus of this thesis was situated around two core areas: product maturity and the selection
environment. This chapter returns to these two themes and related questions on innovation type and
sequence. While the stages of population variation, selection and retention in the evolutionary process all
provide insights into how learning occurs, the data has paid special attention to various selection pressures
on firms and has shifted the focus away from intellectual property as the defining characteristic for the
two sectors. Indian firms were able to advance despite their low R&D investments relative to their peers
in industrialised countries and despite their "copying" and generic drug manufacture because a varied set
of selection environments forced this learning on them. This dissertation showed first, that a changing
selection environment laid out the elements of entry in building the industry; second, how innovation
skills developed despite the fact that firms were primarily in mature product segments. Manufacturing
skills were critical; they led to innovation through the ability to rapidly create slightly differentiated
products, which presumably led to gradual shifts in the demand curve accompanied by simultaneous
shifts in the supply curve due to lowered costs. The ability to scale up from lab to factory provided firms
with an advantage due to proprietary process capabilities, manufacturing revenue streams and in-house
flexibility and speed to reach market.
Early policy supports to build capabilities allowed some firms to move into subsequent environments,
with culling of the population and honing of capabilities occurring at the cusp of each new phase. Thus,
exclusively industry-level analyses and "new to world" markers for innovation mask the variety of firm-
level learning strategies and innovative potential as they faced different selection pressures. Furthermore,
policy can act to shape the selection environment, at the same time that it assists firms in recognising
these pressures and offering incentives for building capabilities that can be selected for. Causal ambiguity
and time lags accommodated in theories of selection, however, create special challenges. Cumulative
pathways for capability-building matter, but may not show immediate results. Indian firms appear to have
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benefited both from Phase I policies, and firm-level efforts in Phase II, but cannot securely extrapolate for
later years in Phase III and beyond. Industrial policy acted to increase variation and create early selection
mechanisms, while industry grapples today with issues of retention and adaptation. Variation among
firms has been taken primarily as given during Phase I, and future research should study the specific traits
that allow for increased diversity or homogeneity and positive selection of firms as they migrate to later
phases. Firms have indeed been alternately assisted and pressured with patent regime changes. However,
the interviews indicated an internal struggle for many firms to identify broader dynamics of selection and
capabilities, but with a limited vocabulary structured around debates of intellectual property.
Indian nationalism was structured around core principles of socialism and equity in production and
distribution. Notwithstanding this, leading firms by market share grew ever larger by production capacity,
output volume, revenues and employment. If we situate Indian advance and that of other countries against
a backdrop of learning- we can understand why innovation may arise even in mature products, and not
driven by cost cutting alone, or why sequenced entry regulated markets may drive and sustain certain
types of learning. Ownership also becomes one explanatory variable (and policy tool) to create
indigenous capabilities. The vehicle of technological learning has been manufacturing and process
capabilities. Thus, policies that rewarded (a) manufacturing and process innovation and (b) national
ownership helped firms to advance. Technological learning was not neutral to firm ownership, confirming
past studies.
Firms have emerged from a protected national context to an export-related set of opportunities. However,
there was nothing automatic or "natural" about the progression of capabilities or of this transition. Indeed,
the selection environment at the early stages structured the likelihood that some firms would be able to
"graduate"', but the nature of the transition-to the export world, was varied. The move into developing
countries could, perhaps, have been anticipated. However, the timing of the opening up of the US market
through the Hatch-Waxman Act, to generic drugs was an unexpected opportunity for which prior
preparation was imperative. Those that could make this transition were provided some technological and
significant market advancement. The intellectual property regime in this framework was thus important
less as a direct tool for companies to "copy and prosper" and more because it created a vast array of
domestic product differentiation strategies and savings associated with multiple formulations and dosage
types. More important than IP alone, were a series of policies designed to build capacity in the sector, and
to force firms to back-integrate into bulk drugs so that national health security could be assured. Thus
while profit margins declined due to price regulations on "essential" drugs, capacity increases and
induced learning, resulted in some economies of scale. Patent laws also assisted firms to consolidate their
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positions, hone reverse engineering and imitation skills to a fine art, and to increase competition for first-
entry and speed of introduction to Indian markets of drugs on-patent elsewhere. However, the
chronological analysis argued that the intellectual property regime alone couldn't explain India's advance
to date, important though it was to acquisition of core technologies and market opportunities.
The limitations of views that over-specify a firm's agency and minimise the environment surrounding it,
comes into stark relief in the biopharmaceutical sector, where institutional characteristics of firm-
university-public research interaction and characteristics of the technology have served to make more
complex the firm's interaction with its selection environment. Of some concern are the tensions between
the perceived (and, in some cases, real) lags in biology skills in industry, contrasted with chemistry-based
capabilities that vaulted the pharmaceutical industry to its present position. Also onerous is the burden of
proof of concept-whether something is viable to commercially produce-requiring significant process
capabilities and an understanding of science and market, a rare combination. Yet, despite these hurdles,
biopharmaceuticals has benefited as a sectoral latecomer, from models for advance taken from the
pharmaceutical industry, where industry associations and the socio-political ramifications of drug
discovery and development have been well studied and adapted to a new technological imperative.
7.2 Learning pathways:
Indian industry saw at least 3 distinct types of selection environments, only the first of which was
strongly policy driven and where most analyses remain. The remaining two were driven by regulatory and
technological changes in the industry, which required new institutional configurations in the two sectors.
Instead of an environment driven by intellectual property rules alone, 3 types of learning emerged
depending on the selection environment of the time and amid resource constraints: Induced (phase I,
1950s-1970s), Tiered (phase II, 1980s-1990s), -Uncertain (phase III, 1980s-2000s).' The table below
summarises the learning pathways, the era in which they occurred and the nature of the sub-phases of
LEARNING S.E YEARS SUB-PHASE
(APPROX)
Induced Phase I-Policy Phase 1950-1970s Public effort
Private effoit
Tiered Phase II-Regulatory 198Os-1990s Tiered worldwide cGMPegulations
Intemational vaccine procumnt
Genric drugs
Uncertain Phase III- Regulatory and 1980s-2000s Biopharmaceuticals
tecnological and diversity of 6 example pathways studied
As highlighted in the chapters, Phases 2 and 3 were overlapping in time period and tiered learning continues today
for an increasing number of firms in the two sectors.
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learning that they involved. Resource constraints seem to have dogged firms in their approach to drug
discovery through many sub-phases.
This dissertation analysed India's performance in two sectors with substantially different constraints and
opportunities. The advance occurred under two technological paradigms of synthetic and natural product
chemistry on the one hand and subsequent biological advances on the other. The findings indicate the
importance of understanding the broader environment in which firms are situated and the capabilities that
arise within this environment. In such a view, there is no "automatic" capability pathway, but selection
criteria, devised in some cases by national policies and social concerns, or by international agencies,
constrain and shape the path of firms. In particular, innovations through process capabilities appear not to
be driven by cost-cutting concerns alone, but are honed by forces of the environment. Firms have
weathered pressures ranging from low profit margins in some segments, impending changes in the
intellectual property regime, variations within the export markets and more recently, the pressures of
adapting to new technological imperatives. Yet, a few firms have shown some tenacity in adding to their
repertoire of technologies with some novel products and processes. Relative to their counterparts in some
advanced industrialised countries such as the US, UK or Switzerland, these leading firms have a limited
range of new products (New Chemical Entities, NCEs), but this number is slowly rising, showing that a
move from "imitation" to "innovation" is indeed possible. But the data suggests more: that in the
development of skills to counter problems of financial and material resource constraints, uncertainty,
information disruptions and regulatory changes, firms have also been forced to find new paths to older
problems, raising the question of what characterises novelty and innovation. These findings suggest that
more research is needed on the dynamics of innovation and on the characteristics that distinguish firms
from each other within the same environment. This dissertation demonstrates that the story of the rise of
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical capabilities in India is both more complex and fraught with
difficulties, on the one hand, but also offers more possibilities for building capabilities in developing
countries and other sectors within India, than current debates anticipate if process capabilities are seen as
a goal in themselves and not simply the means to new products.
In addition to the 3 distinct types of learning in 3 chronological phases, there were also other types of
sequential learning occurring at industry level (but not necessarily for every firm). The table shows a
stylized progression of technological and market learning and advance through 3 steps along three
dimensions for entry, capture and upgrading path for pharmaceuticals. Further tests could be put in place
to see if such a progression is a valid representation for developing countries and if their implications for
public health drug manufacture can be coherently translated into policy design.
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Type of learning Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
Market entry Public health drugs Other essential and Other "non-essentials" high
non-essential drugs value-added drugs
(cardiovascular, "lifestyle",
Market capture Domestic market Unregulated and Regulated tiered markets and
consolidation of further consolidation of
domestic market domestic market
Upgrading Importing bulk drugs Manufacture of bulk Generic drug manufacture
and manufacture drugs from local raw and a few NCEs
materials
The sequence of market entry was not coincidental. Firms were able to build abroad on what they had
built locally. Once the domestic market was mostly consolidated, the move began into overseas-
unregulated markets and firms then systematically "graduated" into more stringent regulated markets.
Home markets were thus experimental grounds for technological advance combined with building up of
complementary assets of distribution, marketing and building brand names. Government policies thus
assisted firms in technology acquisition, adaptation and the building of these assets. Unregulated overseas
markets helped consolidate gains on these fronts and brought in "easy" revenues, since often the
regulations were of lesser intensity than in India. The first tier of regulated markets in the transition
economies also proved a learning challenge.
(A) Induced learning: a State-constructed selection environment based on an interplay of core beliefs of
technological self-reliance (of which intellectual property is only one tool) and an economically,
politically and technologically defensible and strategic choice of public health drugs as an entry point (for
which MNCs were one source of technological sophistication). This also created a capture of the domestic
market, a step with considerable learning value. Multinational firms were sidelined, but kept within the
industry (and not nationalised) because no Indian firm as yet had significant technological capacity. From
a technological standpoint, policies created market incentives (large domestic market size and public
procurements) and a psychological boost for technological investments. Policies thus allowed firms a
chance to strategically enter an otherwise inexorable product life cycle. All policies were not without
fault. Supply in many areas fell short of targets, and price regulations arguably lowered costs and created
further incentives for process innovation, but acted unwittingly as an export-push strategy. It is
impossible to know whether more firms could have "graduated" to a higher level of capabilities had they
had a better constructed export policy supporting them, Some companies have suggested that the level of
intervention by the State at all levels was excessive. Yet, the evidence indicates that many supports-such
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as the patent regime, preferential licenses and procurement, were critical when firms were faced with the
technological assets (and revenues, perhaps most importantly) of foreign firms.
(B) Learning-by-proving: Emerging from this State-led selection environment, some Indian
manufacturing firms were able to quickly take advantage of far-reaching changes in the international drug
markets, including policy changes to enhance competition in the US. Thus, if public health acted as a
market entry and market capture point, then regulatory conditions in tiered markets served to provide
continuous technological and quality variations that enhanced firm-level learning. The evidence
demonstrates that Indian firms advanced technologically and in business acumen through tiered markets
which served two functions: First, they allowed Indian firms to interrupt the continuous progression of the
product life-cycle and capture new markets without necessarily producing more sophisticated
technologies. Second, regulatory sequencing allowed for "consolidation plateaus", where technological
and business learning imbibed in one tier could be further absorbed into the company's organisational and
technological framework before the creation of strategies appropriate for the next tier or set of countries
within the same tier. At each plateau, multiple country markets presented themselves for lateral expansion
and increased revenue streams without the need for significant leaps in technology. Firms were allowed
the opportunity to build complementary assets alongside, such as patent capabilities and rapid filing with
the appropriate regulatory authorities. In addition, international agency procurement was decisive for
vaccine (and some diagnostic kit) providers, serving to reduce demand and regulatory uncertainties and
providing a stepping stone into foreign markets in the way that tiered regulatory markets had done for
pharmaceutical firms in other segments.
(c) Learning under uncertainty: However, in the case of bio-pharmaceuticals, regulatory environments
and institutional models are poorly defined (except those imported directly from the pharmaceutical
sector) and tiered markets do not exist. Technological changes have been rapid and the number of
commercialised therapeutics very small. Thus Indian firms must learn to cope with a spectrum of
uncertainties, technological and regulatory alike. Information on new technologies and non-infringing
processes is unavailable and firms now invest energies heavily to be part of more international networks
of knowledge. As a shift in the underlying technologies took hold in the post- 1 970s era of the explosion
in molecular biology, Indian firms have also ventured back to national laboratories and local universities
to tease out State-led capabilities from an earlier era to develop a nationally and geographically specific
set of niche markets, while continuing to forge alliances abroad. Many innovative firms have emerged
from manufacturing histories and the same policies that rewarded process capabilities, but faced with a
change in technological paradigms, a new set of firms is emerging alongside primarily focused on drug
discovery and development.
203
In all cases, those firms with in-house R&D capabilities were best positioned to learn quickly and absorb
and modify new knowledge (new to them, if not to the world). However, this sector is still young and
learning patterns are yet to emerge.
7.3 Process capabilities: the goal, not just the means
Manufacturing is not the only innovation path in Indian pharmaceuticals/biotech. However, almost entire
Indian technological advance has occurred in firms with manufacturing histories. The Indian evidence
from secondary sources and interviews suggests that cost continues to play an important role in all Indian
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical segments. Even in innovative firms, it is closely tied to low R&D
costs, particularly the availability of cheap but highly skilled personnel. However, the Indian case, while
consistent with the wage advantage story, suggests that cost-cutting measures alone were not the prime
drivers of innovation in scale-up and manufacturing. Firms attempted their own search efforts. Secondly,
low wages cannot explain the clearly differentiated two broad (and evolving) segments of the
pharmaceutical industry, and the high-end contract researchers (and manufacturers) of the Indian
biopharmaceutical sub-sectors.
While it was indeed true that the ability to scale up and manufacture was critical to many of the success
stories, the specific tiered regulatory learning environment and the uncertainties and rapid technological
changes occurring in biopharmaceuticals significantly shaped them. Indeed, in the case of
biopharmaceuticals, a "pure process" set of technologies, the absence of such a structured learning
sequence has precluded the obvious opportunities for Indian firms, no matter how well honed their
process abilities. Overall, the move of Indian firms into process capabilities was considered an affordable
expertise; firms were not making a choice from an open-ended set of alternatives ("product versus
"process") but from a specific historical path.
Process development is a non-linear, unpredictable process since many chemical and biological processes
are sensitive to scale and many second-order perturbative effects come into play when the operational
volumes and temperatures are increased. An interesting feature is the way scale-up and process
improvements can be adapted to existing technologies. For instance, a few firms have emerged from
strengths in the fermentation and brewing industries with enzyme R&D and have since moved into
biopharmaceutical manufacturing, and then into R&D to create bio-generic drugs. Although the product is
now relatively mature on the world market, a significant learning process has taken place within these
firms. Their breakthroughs can be said to come less from a "science-push", and far more from directed
technological problem solving associated with environment control and scale-up for mass manufacture of
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enzymes. In the Indian case, process capabilities led to the ability to find 1. New ways to known ends and
as a by-product, to find new ends themselves while searching for new pathways.2. New ways to use
existing processes because of resource constraints, and new ways to link promising properties of
compounds across projects (sometimes looking for very different applications) due to resource
constraints.3. New ways to link in-house R&D with contract R&D services and enhance search and
experimentation through both, so that the universe of known ends is ever expanding. Process
developments then should be considered both the goal itself to product improvement and cost reductions,
not the means alone.
7.3.1 Innovation type and sequence:
In the Indian case, process innovations abounded relative to products, due in large part to the supply-side
incentive of process patents and lack of product patents. Price controls in particular, appears to have
eventually acted as a disincentive to invest in early-stage R&D, but did increase process investments to
find new ways to (a) reduce manufacturing costs further (b) speed up entry into patent-expired drug
segments (c) speed up entry into drug segments where new therapeutic effects can be demonstrated. There
has been a distinct incentive for innovations arising from a "manufacturing-push" resulting in
sophisticated process engineering and manufacturing experience in these firms' ability to develop path-
breaking R&D and product capabilities. Furthermore, resource-constraints, both financial and skill-based,
have channelled energies further into process development.
Advances in Indian companies, have been small, but noticeable improvements in processes and products,
quality control, preparation for clinical trials and more recently, learning to file for approvals abroad, and
litigate, if necessary. Furthermore, they have attempted to hold on to older public health niches
(antibiotics, vaccines, diagnostic kits) with newer technologies and sustained compliance with US FDA
standards, while other MNCs have failed to hold on to. Their stresses on capabilities that are difficult to
imitate: finding multiple paths to the same end drug, finding multiple lateral uses for the same
compounds, finding multiple small, but valuable add-on features to existing drugs etc., have all built on
certain historical constructions of opportunity and later windows of opportunity.
In biopharmaceuticals, the characterisation of some of the originating breakthroughs do indeed come from
a scientific discovery, but the evidence of learning paths shows that it is dependent a great deal on
adaptation to existing technologies. Process development sophistication often arose from related, but
technologically "old" fields in latecomers, such as brewing and fermentation in liquor, food and
pharmaceutical sectors, which were then the basis for product advancement in biotech and
pharmaceuticals. Thus maturity of process from one sub-area is translated to rapid advance of both
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process and products in another. Furthermore, companies compete on speed, ability to litigate as well as
change processes in-house, thus awarding bonus points for agility to vertically integrated companies,
where constancy of supply, purity of samples and problem-solving can all be coordinated more
comprehensively.
The NCEs of these companies may not be categorized as "true" novelties in the sense that they arise
where their competitive advantage is greatest: process modifications to existing entities that bring out
novel properties for example it may minimize side effects or eliminate them, or improve efficiency of
uptake. Since some of the companies such as Ranbaxy and Cipla also specialize in Novel Drug Delivery
Systems and new platform technologies, the novel properties may be revised dosage or dosage form,
which demonstrates, increased therapeutic efficiency. While novelty has been demonstrated, the evidence
from Indian pharmaceuticals suggests that even supposed "radical" breakthroughs (the category of NCEs
used to show innovation) are often incremental improvements. They derive from a long history of
experimentation, in this case in manufacturing and process engineering and process chemistry.
The data reveals that early technological capabilities in the Indian pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceutical
sectors was more due to the State structuring a nurturing selection environment, than it was due to some
price-driven market selection leading to "spontaneous" capabilities in firms. Later capabilities were honed
by international export opportunities seized by a sub-set of innovative firms who also built up in-house
R&D capabilities. However, the selection environment was not simply a culling mechanism. It was used
strategically to build process capabilities and induce firms to learn and upgrade their capabilities. Thus,
this dissertation argues that process capabilities should be seen as a skill set central to Indian (and indeed,
other national) innovation, not merely as an intellectual property unit of analysis, set against products.
The first, processes, have given rise to the latter, products, against the conventional view that process
innovations arise after product innovations and predominantly to push down costs.
In case of sequencing, there appears to be no simple rule, running counter to that suggested by Kim et al.
"imitation" does lead to innovation in many cases, but often imitation and innovation exist alongside and
in most cases, innovators are imitators some of the time, and imitators are also innovators some of the
time. Specifically, the study of Indian pharmaceuticals shows that (a) process innovations did not always
come after mature product innovations but to search for new ways to create new products (b) that process
innovations themselves often led to product innovation opportunities and (c) Process innovation also
provided accelerated time to market since competitors could not as easily copy a process as they did with
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products. This allowed companies that were quick to patent or file for exclusive rights to drugs going off
patent, to establish a significant head start on competitors.2
The evidence suggests that more research is necessary to determine if a clear sequence is visible.
Industry-wide, imitation to innovation has some value as a metaphor, but hides firm-level capabilities
where innovation and "imitation" exist side-by-side. Furthermore, "innovation" is a context-dependent
description, and appears to rely in part on the specific selection environment and regulatory standards
applied to novelty. Firms have been differentially "innovative" at different times even in their path to
create "me-too" drugs, or in their search for new processes to old drugs. Indeed, consistent with the NIE
evidence from East Asia, multiple learning strategies have been used.
7.3.2 Responding to demand while grappling with supply
Should local market demand alone been sufficient to propel the industry forward, then we should have
seen Indian firms meeting the immense needs for local tuberculosis, AIDS, malaria and other local
diseases. Indeed, demand had been created and sustained by the State and international procurement
agencies at various times. It had not been market driven until India's export push, largely driven by falling
profit margins at home under a strict price control regime and coinciding with an increase in overseas
opportunity. The main challenge was access to key technologies to jump start the local industry, strictures
on acquisition of knowledge (such as product patents), problems in technology transfer to upgrade
existing processes and finally, the lack of raw materials or pure input materials. In short, in-house
innovations emerged under resource-constraints at the outset, not merely well articulated consumer or
other demand. Companies were forced to vertically integrate (more on grounds of induced efficiency
from uncertain inputs) rather than some magical convergence to efficient scale and forced to delve into
existing stores of past competencies to find new areas of endeavour, deliberately turning their backs on
potentially new areas of work that would have required new investments and skills.
The findings point to the fact that fundamental capabilities built in Indian firms were not indigenous alone
at every phase, but a variation over time. The richness of the story also lies in the multiple strategies
within one industry. S. Korean technological advance for instance, while clearly heavily dependent on
State intervention across industries, was also dependent on exports to the US. The rise of other countries,
including Japan (and many of today's developed countries) also occurred at a time when patent laws were
less stringently monitored. Indeed, the importance of the East Asian cases as guides to development
2 Less publicised endeavours in public health and vaccines, also showed innovations for local applications. In many
cases firms appear to have innovated because of a hard-budget constraint or because of a scarcity of appropriate
materials. This "resource-constrained" innovation needs mention since the economics field tends to associate an
abundance (or at least deliberate investment) of resources as a pre-requisite for innovation
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seems to lie more in the variation in paths across the cases rather than their similarities as various authors
have recently suggested. However, there has been not enough attention paid to the conditions that are
often seen as exceptional, but perhaps more correctly are the rule: i.e. changing international dimensions
of technology, trade and current events that proscribe the path of many developing countries, such as bi-
lateral trade opportunities, WTO rules, specific national events such as legal battles with foreign firms, or
technological choices gone bad. In the desire to show clear-cut causality between event and outcome,
models run the risk of minimising the role of other changes in the environment.
7.4 Bringing the State back into the Process: new imperatives for old actors
While the Indian story indeed shows that State intervention was a crucial determinant of early capability,
it also demonstrates that international changes, particularly export markets through regulatory and
procurement-driven upgrading, have since shaped the path of leading firms and their innovation effort.
The pharmaceutical industry and biopharmaceuticals have witnessed dramatic shifts in market structure
and technologies. While it is certainly true that national policy measures do matter, the Indian case shows
that at different times, past the traditional 'infant protection' phase, international policies-such as the
Wax-Hatchman Act in the US, arisen as a US-based national policy measure, or international public
health procurement, have been equally important in structuring environments for selection and learning,
and not just as 'shocks' to the learning system. But the findings of external environmental influence and
selection, does not weaken the importance of national policy, far from it. Indeed, the data demonstrates
that early skill-building and capture of the large domestic market, driven in large part by Indian industrial
and health policies, were critical to the eventual growth and export-push of Indian firms.
The story of building technological capabilities in the private sector has been neither a simple dichotomy
between import-substitution and export-orientation, nor one of the public versus the private sector. In
particular, economy-wide liberalisation has spurred both greater exposure to foreign markets, regulations
and competition, but also created new needs for old relationships with the State R&D apparatus, and for
new roles for the State itself to build legitimacy with the private sector. In the early years, firms sought
the State's expertise for sourcing technology, upgrading and for procurement. Public health policies and
public labs provided the initial means for technological advance through formulations and key public
health drugs. Public labs were sources of highly trained workers and tertiary education policies
augmented this. Government policies structured competition to aid latecomer firms and create roadblocks
for MNCs in the local market. The Indian government's process patent regime was a deliberate attempt to
move nationally owned firms into technological innovation. However, patent law, although usually seen
as such, was not the only driver, since almost all countries had the same patent regime for some or most
of this century.
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In later years, the role of the State diminished in pharmaceuticals and the early technological learning led
to Indian firms moving in sequenced stages abroad and then seizing generic drug opportunities in the
highly lucrative, but competitive US market. With the advent of biopharmaceutical opportunities, early
investments in State research laboratories and universities paid off in part by creating a pool of skilled
labour available to work on recent biotechnologies. Relatively reticent in the intermediate export phase,
the State has re-emerged in the genomics and post-liberalisation era as a partner for firms seeking to
upgrade and re-defining itself as a supplier of technologies, skills (scientists), managers and infrastructure
in the presence of a better articulated demand from Indian companies and facing pressures of its own.
Overall, for both synthetic and biological pharmaceuticals, public domain and industrial research have
been driven closer together.
However, with uncertainties in regulation, with rapidly changing tools and applications,
biopharmaceuticals in India is largely relegated to niches such as vaccines, some diagnostics and "bio
generics" (possibly the most uncertain of them all). Thus, while the State has not always been necessary,
its role in innovation has been to create a base for R&D in the public sector and attempt (not always
successfully) technology transfer to private firms. While the US market has led the demand and created
the ultimate market, the State and local firms have been pushed together to find ways to retain the
domestic market at the same time that they strive to become more competitive globally.
Corresponding to the learning taxonomy, there have been three diffuse phases of State response to the
state of technological capabilities within the private sector. First, State involvement structured the initial
entry and foray into a vast array of essential drugs. This period of induced technological upgrading in
public health as an entry point was a necessary component of transferring domestic market dominance
into Indian-owned hands and induced large firms as the leading innovators. Second, growing private firms
did not build capabilities pushed by the State alone. They themselves were agnostic about the most
appropriate path, choosing a combination of in-house R&D for reverse engineering as well as novelty,
joint ventures and inward licensing. In fact, just as the pressures to stand on their own were mounting, the
State apparatus for transferring technologies and the private sector's capacities to absorb or
commercialise them were severely mismatched. Since the focus (and pressure) at all times was to move
into more highly value-added segments, this required product differentiation capacity, which arose from
necessary technology investments in process development. Again, while Indian-based foreign firms had
access to the same skilled people and superior sets of technologies, Indian patent and production laws and
price controls acted to create indigenous capability for Indian-owned firms. In particular, they unwittingly
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created immense incentives for process development and export. Thus, while export-led learning was
desirable in itself, it does not appear to have arisen due to any concerted policy push. Third, export
markets have been a constant allure, but Indian companies initially lacked the capabilities to enter the
most regulated of them. The State was able to structure the initial capabilities, but not the outward push.
Here, both firm-initiated strategies (US generic drug market), and international procurement policies
(from WHO and UNICEF) created regulatory sequencing in tiered markets and created appropriate
conditions for voluntary technological upgrading. While some Indian-based foreign firms have been able
to use these public health procurement opportunities, most did not export from India to the US for the
generic market. In recent years, more foreign firms have adopted similar strategies for local production.
Thus, in the long term, Indian-owned firms will have to differentiate themselves from these other
contenders.
While its record at technology transfer from PRIs to firms was relatively dismal, and its ability to meet its
production targets for certain categories, or reward innovations-by assistance to commercialise- when
they arose were even worse, overall, it managed to increase domestic competition (even in the relative
absence of foreign firms), increase technological levels of capability, secure key technologies (through
the process patent regime) and keep costs down. In particular, process capabilities in chemistry and
engineering are now firmly established, making some sub-segment of Indian firms innovative, many
attractive contract research and contract manufacturing partners worldwide and creating considerable
opportunity in explaining laterally along the pharmaceutical value chain, linking in clinical actors-
hospitals, laboratories etc and bio informatics/computational biology experts.
However, in the biopharmaceutical and broader biotech realm, this form of success came less easily.
Firms had neither clearly defined technologies, the time to learn (technologies were changing too rapidly
in the West), nor the need for close ties between science and commercialised technology suddenly came
to the fore. The weaknesses of the State infrastructure in supplying relevant technologies to firms, and the
limited abilities of the latter to receive absorb, adapt and improve them were suddenly visible. However,
the timing of the molecular biology revolution corresponded well with India's own opening of the
economy and considerable realignment of priorities of its public research apparatus. Nevertheless,
viewing economic advance as driven by policy goals alone hides the adaptations by firms (and the
individuals who comprise them) to changes, expected and unexpected, in the environment.
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7.4.1 Revisiting the Infant-Industry: protection and competition
The early selection environment, which governmental policies certainly influenced, has been discussed
most often in the developing country literature in terms of biased weighting in favour of indigenous firms
and infant industry protections that were undeserved. While the record of state protections to young
industries is mixed, the Indian pharmaceutical history suggests that variants of traditional protections may
be helpful in understanding how government policies can assist a young industry. The demand that the
State-and international agencies- can generate through technology procurement programs particularly
those linked to public health in this industry, may be a powerful stabilising factor that diminishes
uncertainty and provides legitimacy to firm-level search efforts. These however can only assist long-term
learning if they are closely linked to upgrading requirements and strict standards.
Could Indian firms have been induced to even greater technological levels of mastery and higher orders of
competition? Quite likely. In some cases such as price regulation, export planning and technology transfer
between public research institutes and private firms, Indian State attempts were clumsy at the best, and
undermined future technology absorption at worst. However, the end result is that despite the problems of
commercialization of key technologies and in under-supply of certain drug segments because of price
controls, the Indian industry is robust, the Indian market is highly competitive and leading Indian firms
are becoming global firms in market reach. In particular, the entry points of public health drugs and the
deliberate exclusion of foreign firms from the Indian market appear critical in the history of Indian
pharmaceutical capabilities. In the case of biopharmaceuticals, many companies arose from similar
histories, or drew on similar sets of talent and infrastructure in the public research institutes and from
other private firms. While Indian tertiary education policies were de-linked from this capture process,
they were nevertheless central to galvanizing an entire industry on cheap, but highly skilled labour.
The reason Indian firms may have escaped stagnation during protectionism, is perhaps because a healthy
prior level of competition existed in the industry, and the profit margin increases promised abroad lured
such firms to each different 'level' of selection. In particular, access to the highly regulated US market
through a hierarchy of less regulated markets has encouraged Indian firms to innovate, speed up, increase
quality, and scale up operations and exports. An important lesson from this story is that export
opportunities for developing countries will continue to be an important source of learning. The extent to
which these markets remain open to exports from these countries is a contested area, however.
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7.5 The importance of technology-specific prescriptions
Characteristics of the technology need far greater attention. Past economic studies, even from the
institutional school, have tended to treat policy prescriptions, and the role of the State, relatively
independent of how the technology varies. Despite the industry's gains and the learning by firms, there
are some limitations to how broadly this path can be generalised. First, pharmaceutical and
biopharmaceutical regulations are highly specific to the industry. The multi-tiered "stages of growth" that
so characterise the pharmaceutical story of this thesis is difficult to replicate. Yet, the lessons to be drawn
from this research for developing economies are broader than this. Entry/capture points, tiered learning
and supports to indigenous firms in both mature and emerging technologies can be internalised into other
industries, as can the role of public supports for developing process capabilities industry-wide.
Technology-led variation in policy prescriptions should be clear. In the case of antibiotics, for example,
Indian firms have continued to manufacture, albeit with limited innovation, but are now in a position to
make gains from the exit of many global firms from this segment. Furthermore, niche areas, such as
studies relevant to the Indian sub-continent (or other developing countries), require different types of
promotional policies than do those competing in the world market against large multinational firms. Even
in biopharmaceuticals, the extent of supports needed for small, innovative firms, requires different forms
of agility and responsiveness from public research efforts than does pharmaceuticals as a whole.
In biopharmaceuticals, the path was different: From reagents to fermentors, quality control raised serious
problems and the cost of demonstrating bio-equivalence, combined with a hazy regulation climate,
created learning problems for firms. In addition, the field of biological research and emergent tools forced
industry to look closer to the scientific originators in universities and PRIs. Problems of coordination
between science and industry became pronounced. While learning by doing was done through repeated
process innovation in natural and synthetic pharmaceuticals, biopharmaceuticals was in essence a process
and nothing else. Species specificity, manufacturing environment and quality problems were severe. The
regulatory uncertainties were exacerbated by closer time horizons. Thus tiered export markets dependent
on clear regulations and capture of the home market, were simply not existent in the same fashion.
Similarly, multidisciplinary challenges are significant.
Variations across technology in the paths of learning can be partly attributed to uncertainty, which arises
because of new technologies, difficulties of technology transfer and new regulations and information
constraints. Secondly, assured market access linked to technological upgrading such as the procurement
policies for vaccines, for example, becomes a critical component of this learning for some firms. It
minimised uncertainty and boosted firm-level investments in in-house R&D. Yet, this is not simple
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protectionism. This sequential challenge allowed significant learning and sustained lessons from one
market to the next more highly regulated one. Firms straddled multiple tiers at once and did not
necessarily have to move out of one before they entered the next.
In the age of TRIPs, the policy challenge becomes noticeable. Once product patents are introduced, the
demarcation may become evident, between innovative process capable firms and all the rest. However,
policy makers still have a few cards up their sleeve. If the growth of indigenous firms is indeed a national
goal, then protections from foreign competition at the early stages of firm growth can only occur under
rules of relatively high domestic competition where firms are kept from technological stagnation.3 The
interview and archival data indicates that the rules of the competitive selection mechanism can be
structured to favor technology upgrading. First, the government should be particularly focused on making
market opportunities available and attractive to Indian firms. International and national public
procurement is one path, where high-quality output and R&D investments are rewarded, as are creating
other export markets. Second, public research institutes could be far greater assets to indigenous firms
than they have been, with difficulties on both the public and private side. A "Mission mode" goal for
scientific and technological challenges in the health sectors is another means to galvanize public support,
private investments and interest and State funding, expertise and infrastructure. Thirdly, "demand" pull
through public funding (successful in the US case) could fashion innovation even in mature segments
where large MNCs are pulling away, and where explicit exclusion of foreign firms may not be necessary
(and difficult under WTO rules). Finally, although far more challenging from an international foreign
policy perspective is to fashion educational, R&D and other institutional supports to develop process
skills despite TRIPs. Indeed, although many have written TRIPS off as a completed chapter, this
dissertation raises questions of the appropriateness of such homogenization policies given the diverse
industrial and learning pathways in the single country case and two sectors. The research emphasises the
inappropriateness of trying to "catch up" or treat developing countries as perpetual 'latecomers'. External
regulatory triggers to upgrade cannot have much value unless the developing country has some level of
indigenous institutional structure to propel firms to be competitive.
3 Even acknowledging that leading firms still had some monopoly power in their respective sub-segments, the vast
majority of manufacturers still appear to have been faced with considerable price competition.
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Conclusions
Despite the evidence that Indian companies had a historically low rate of R&D investments, started by
"copying" on-patent drugs (legal in India) and moved on to generic drugs, many faced high competition,
at home and abroad, low cost but high quality requirements and high speed needs.
Current debates, which either analyse the technological advancement of developing countries primarily in
terms of intellectual property regimes, suggest that the only vehicles of innovative technology are foreign
(Western) firms, or that only long histories of high R&D spending by firms result in innovative industries,
entirely miss the significance of India's trajectory of technological upgrading. Those that argue that the
main opportunity for developing countries is merely through cost cutting in mature segments miss the
evidence of Indian innovation even in mature product lines. The selection environment in which these
technological capabilities were acquired cannot be divorced from national visions of socio-political and
economic advance, nor can they be uniform over time and countries. Various environments selected for
and honed process capabilities further. Details of the technology need to be brought back into economic
discussions of markets, States and technological learning since roles and structures of any institution are
difficult to generalise across technological challenges. The research findings imply that industrial
development can emerge from a variety of technological entry points and these can be strategically
structured by supporting public policies, particularly in procurement. Indeed, at least three broad types of
learning for process development capabilities have taken place, reflecting the selection environment of the
time.
India's introduction of product patent laws in 2005 has also created pressures on firms to build in-house
R&D capabilities and search locally for profitable alliances with public-domain research institutes.
Current weaknesses are the relative numbers of innovative firms to those that compete on cost alone.
Furthermore, India's low-cost advantage for the innovators is predominantly in R&D (costs of
scientists/engineers) and this will erode when more MNCs enter the market and woo this low-cost high-
skilled labour. The strengths of the industry besides the innovative capabilities, are the sheer number of
manufacturers, increasing numbers of internationally certified facilities, contract manufacturers, contract
R&D service providers and public health suppliers to international agencies and foreign governments.
Imitation by itself with no parallel in-house process or product innovation is unlikely to be as successful a
strategy. Companies that are truly innovative in processes are always on the lookout for product
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innovations. There is no clear dichotomy between companies that are product developers/ "true"
innovators, supposedly, and those that are process developers. I.e. imitators eventually do become
innovators, but even imitators are innovators some of the time. Importantly, a strong historical component
of innovators' work has been imitative themselves of others. Furthermore, "older" technological
capabilities often gave rise to rapid advances in areas with new technological product opportunities.
There are continuing weak links in the innovation chain. In particular, both industries suffer from small
numbers of firms with significant potential for high quality discovery or development and manufacture.
The pharmaceutical industry is particularly skewed in terms of the numbers of innovative firms to the
huge number of drug manufacturers predominantly following well-beaten paths. The extent to which the
numbers of innovative firms and high quality manufacturers rise, the more likely that Indian industry can
continue to adapt and overcome challenges posed by their future selection environments. Indeed, it will
also dictate the extent to which they shape these environments as well.
The research indicates that process capabilities should be seen as a vital set of skills integral to advances
in both processes and products in the industry, and not analysed primarily as a unit of intellectual property
protection. Secondly, "catch-up" frameworks appear not to be wholly useful in studying technological
advance. In this industry, many niche areas of expertise were historically driven and have created specific
strategies for learning that are dependent on local skills and past policy choices. Finally, public health
access debates should be broadened to address firm-level learning opportunities and procurement policies
for developing countries. Indian history shows that these debates are intertwined.
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